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This dissertation examined the effects of freedom-limiting communication on attitude 
structures at three points in time. A 2 (Threat to freedom: low threat vs. high threat) x 2 
(Restoration postscript: present vs. filler postscript) x 3 (Time: immediat -time 
measurement vs. one-minute delay vs. two-minute delay) plus 3 (control groups for each 
time point: immediate-time measurement vs. one-minute delay vs. two-minute delay) 
between-participants design was employed. The results replicated the findings of existing 
research on reactance by showing that when threat to freedom was high, a boomerang 
effect emerged, leading to change in attitude and behavioral intention in the direction 
opposite to the one advocated in the message. This study also advanced the theory of 
reactance by documenting how threat to freedom affects both the focal attitude concept 
targeted by the message (here, recycling) as well as a concept related to the target concept 
(here, energy conservation). In addition, the effects of pairing different levels of threat to 
freedom with a restoration postscript were examined: The findings indicate  that adding a 
  
restoration postscript (defined as the suggestion that an individual still ha freedom to 
make a decision) to low threat to freedom messages might be detrimental to persuasion as 
compared to adding a restoration component when threat to freedom is high. Finally, the 
effects of threat to freedom and restoration over time were considered: The results of the 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
In persuasion research, there are instances of public service campaigns attempting 
to fight such risks as adolescent drug use, smoking, or underage drinking that failed to 
induce change consistent with the behavior advocated in the message (e.g., Backer, 
Rogers, & Sopory, 1992; Burgoon, Alvaro, Broneck, et al., 2002; DeJong & Winston, 
1990; Hornik, 2002; Salmon & Atkin, 2003; Salmon & Murray-Johnson, 2000). 
Moreover, some campaigns resulted in attitude change directly opposite to the advocated 
position (e.g., Hornik et al., 2001), inducing a boomerang effect.   
One theory explaining reduced persuasion and boomerang effects is the theory of 
psychological reactance (J. W. Brehm, 1966; S. S. Brehm & Brehm, 1981; Miron & 
Brehm, 2006).1 The main tenet of the theory is that messages explicitly limiting or 
threatening to limit people’s freedoms lead to an aversive motivation, known as 
reactance, and reactance is negatively related to persuasion. The results of the studies 
examining the effects of freedom-limiting communication (e.g., Dillard & Shen, 2005; 
Rains & Turner, 2007) suggest that the failure of many campaigns can, indeed, be 
attributed to reactance.2  
Although the prevalence of reactance to persuasive messages is a concern fr both 
scholars and practitioners, how reactance manifests itself over time remains unknown. 
Some investigations have focused primarily on the immediate effects of reactance on 
attitude change (e.g., Dillard & Shen, 2005; Rains & Turner, 2007); other studies 
(especially post-campaign interviews and surveys) do measure the outcomes of reactance 
at more removed periods of time (i.e., not immediately after the threat to freed m 




have not been examined: It is not known whether the effects of reactance diminish over 
time or instead become more pronounced as the studies of the mere-thought effect might 
suggest (see Tesser, 1978). Investigating the effects of reactance over time will shed light 
on the dynamics of reactance. 
Reactance is typically examined in terms of a single outcome variable. There is 
evidence, however, that persuasive messages sometimes have a greater effect on other 
attitude concepts in the cognitive structure than on the attitude targeted by the message 
(Dinauer & Fink, 2005). Similar processes are likely for reactance: Becaus  individuals 
center their efforts to restore freedom on the target concept, other concepts related to the 
target concept may be indirectly affected by the message. From now on and throughout 
the paper, the concept targeted by the persuasive message will be referred to as the target 
concept, and a concept associated with the target concept in the cognitive structures will 
be referred to as the related concept.3 
A new direction in reactance research has been the examination of restorations 
designed to eliminate or reduce the perception of threat to freedom (e.g., C. H. Miller, 
Lane, Deatrick, Young, & Potts, 2007; Quick & Stephenson, 2008). It has been shown 
that a simple restoration postscript, defined as the suggestion that an individual still h s 
freedom to make a decision, substantially reduced the perception of a threat to fedom 
(C. H. Miller et al., 2007). Despite this initial evidence of restoration effectiveness in 
reducing freedom threats, the relationship between the restoration and persuasion has n t 
been explored. In addition, if restoration is expected to diminish reactance regarding the 
attitude concept targeted by the message (i.e., the target concept), it is likely that other 




affected by restoration as well.  
The underlying theory that allows for a more systemic understanding of attitude-
related processes (i.e., allows examining multiple attitude concepts simultaneously) is the 
Galileo theory (e.g., Woelfel & Fink, 1980; Woelfel & Saltiel, 1988). The theory assumes 
that movement of attitude objects in individuals’ cognitive structures represents attitude 
change processes (Dinauer, 2003). Such processes include reactance and boomerang 
effects, yet neither reactance nor boomerang effects have ever been exami ed in the 
context of relevant attitude structures. Employing the Galileo theory for the examination 
of individuals’ cognitive structures under different conditions of freedom-limiting 
communication and at different times allows for comparison of the structural differences 
of individuals’ cognitive structures. As a result, inferences can be made about the 
movements of attitude objects within the relevant attitude structures.     
The purpose of this dissertation is to examine participants’ attitude structures 
under different conditions of threat to freedom and restoration of freedom measured t 
three points in time. The sections below provide an overview of the theory of 
psychological reactance focusing on its antecedents, issues of measurements, and 
alternative methods of restoration of freedom. Next, the issue of time in attitude research 
will be discussed and relevant research will be presented. As this research is based on the 
investigation of individuals’ cognitive structures, the Galileo theory and method will be 
described. The dissertation will conclude with the report of results and a discussion of 





Chapter 2: Reactance, Restoration, Cognitive Structu e and 
Dynamics 
 
The Theory of Psychological Reactance 
Theoretical Foundations 
J. W. Brehm’s theory of psychological reactance is a motivational theory of 
resistance to persuasion (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). This motivational approach is not 
surprising given the time when the theory was written. As Eagly and Chaiken (1993) 
pointed out, the theory represents the spirit of attitude change research of the 1950s and 
1960s that focused largely on the issues of motivation (e.g., cognitive dissonance theory).
In fact, J. W. Brehm’s earlier work was primarily based on testing the theory of cognitive 
dissonance (Festinger, 1957) within the free-choice paradigm (Harmon-Jones, 2002).  
In J. W. Brehm’s (1956) research on the free-choice paradigm, dissonance is 
aroused after individuals have made a decision. Dissonance is aroused because 
individuals become cognizant that the option chosen has some negative characteristics 
whereas the not-chosen option has some positive characteristics (i.e., individuals 
experienced post-decisional regret). This dissonance is subsequently reduced through the 
process of “subtracting the negative aspects of the chosen alternative or positive aspects 
of the rejected alternative; . . . [or] adding positive aspects to the chosen alternative or 
negative aspects to the rejected alternative” (i.e., the process known as spreading of 
alternatives; Harmon-Jones, 2002, p. 101).  
The key implication for the theory of reactance stemming from the free-choice 
paradigm is that the ability to choose between alternatives is an important part of decision 
making. Reactance theory examines circumstances that eliminate or threaten this ability 




freedom to choose among different options, especially when dealing with free behaviors. 
Free behaviors are those that people are aware of and perceive themselves as capable of 
executing (J. W. Brehm, 1966).4 If the freedom to perform free behaviors is threatened, 
psychological reactance is induced. Reactance motivates people to restore the th atened 
or eliminated freedom (J. W. Brehm, 1966; Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). Thus, four 
components are central to reactance process: “freedom, threat to freedom, reactanc , and 
restoration of freedom” (Dillard & Shen, 2005, p. 145). 
Reactance Effects 
In a typical reactance study, participants are pressured (usually by means of 
forceful language) to endorse a particular view or to perform a certain behavior (Eagly & 
Chaiken, 1993). As a result of this pressure, the participants may adopt attitudes and 
behaviors contrary to those prescribed by the messages. For example, Wright, Wadley
Danner, and Phillips (1992) examined the effects of threats to freedom on preferenc fo  
dating partners. Participants were females who were shown pictures of two potential male 
dating candidates that the participants in the control condition rated as equally attr ctive. 
The female participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions: a control 
condition, a mild persuasive attempt condition, and a high threat to freedom condition. 
All participants read both candidates’ profiles. In the mild-persuasive-attemp  condition, 
the experimenter (a female) informally suggested to the participant th t she liked 
candidate A and he seemed cute; in the high threat condition, the experimenter said “I 
don’t see that there is any choice but to choose A” (p. 87); and in the control condition, 
participants did not receive a message advocating for either candidate. The results 
indicated that 56% of the participants in the control condition chose candidate A; in the 




the participants selected candidate A in the high threat condition. Thus, in the high threat 
condition, Wright et al.’s (1992) participants (consistent with the reactance predictions) 
moved away from the position advocated in the message (i.e., exhibited a boomerang 
effect) by choosing candidate B. 
Such conceptualization of a boomerang effect is typical for many reactance 
studies: In these studies participants are given two options and then are pressured to 
choose one over the other (e.g., Heilman & Garner, 1975; Wright et al., 1992). In the case 
of Wright et al. (1992), the measure of attitude change was a choice between the two 
candidates, which is in essence a two-point scale from “selected” to “not selected.” Such 
a conceptualization may facilitate finding a boomerang effect: If individuals’ only option 
to manifest reactance is by selecting the only other alternative (i.e., not the ne advocated 
by the message), they will resort to choosing this alternative. Thus, in case of  
dichotomous measure, the results are more likely to yield a boomerang effect than in the 
case of a continuous attitude measure. This difference in dependent measure may be why 
some of the studies using continuous attitude measures only report reduced persuasion 
and not a boomerang effect (e.g., Worchel & Brehm, 1970). Perhaps, S. S. Brehm and 
Brehm (1981) were aware of this measurement issue as they argued that although a 
boomerang in an attitude or a behavior is the best evidence for reactance, reduced 
compliance or attitude change also provide support for the theory. 
In methods terms, the difference between the boomerang effect and reduced 
persuasion is that reduced persuasion is measured by examining the difference between 
the low threat and high threat to freedom conditions. By examining these two conditions, 




high threat conditions, but this comparison does not allow determining whether the 
attitudes after receiving a high threat to freedom induction changed in the direction 
opposite to the initial attitudinal position. To demonstrate movement of attitudes in the 
direction opposite to the initial position (i.e., to demonstrate a boomerang effect), a 
control group has to be included in the design of a study. Some researchers maintain that 
some additional requirements must be satisfied to show a boomerang effect (e.g., Boster, 
Turner, & Lapinski, 2009), including having a pretest. However, selecting issues that are 
pro-attitudinal may not necessitate a pretest and simply having a control group may be 
sufficient. Thus, using a control group without a pretest was the approach used in this 
dissertation.  
Measuring Reactance 
Reactance was originally proposed to be a motivational state arising as a response 
to threats or limitation of freedoms that “cannot be measured” and can only be inferr d 
from behavioral outcomes such as reduced compliance and boomerang attitude or 
behavior change (S. S. Brehm & Brehm, 1981, pp. 37-38). Dillard and Shen (2005) 
proposed an alternative, in which reactance is “operationalized as a composite of self-
report indices of anger and negative cognitions” (p. 144). This operationalization of 
reactance is discussed next. 
Dillard and Shen (2005) tested and compared four competing models of 
reactance, in which reactance was conceptualized as (a) purely cognitive; (b) purely 
affective; (c) as cognitive and affective (i.e., in structural equation modeling t rms, 
cognition and affect are separate factors); and (d) as a blend of cognition and affect (i.e., 
cognition and affect are indicators of reactance, which is included as a single factor in the 




private action (i.e., flossing one’s teeth) and study 2 endorsed a public action (i.e., 
reducing one’s own binge drinking). The messages were either framed in terms of threat 
to health or as a high or low threat to freedom. In the high threat to freedom message, 
participants in the flossing condition were told that not flossing is stupid and that they 
have to do it. Similarly, participants in the anti-binge-drinking condition that induced 
high threat were told that no other conclusion from the messages that they were given 
was possible: The participants must drink responsibly. In this study, a threat to freed m 
induction (low vs. high) was used as the independent variable. Anger was measured using 
a self-report of angry feelings, and negative cognitions were measured using a thought 
listing task. Results indicated that the model of reactance conceptualized as an amalgam 
of anger and negative cognitions was the best-fitting model. Rains and Turner (2007) and 
Quick and Stephenson (2007a) replicated Dillard and Shen’s results. In sum, the results 
of these studies indicated that reactance can be successfully measured as a combination 
of anger and negative cognitions. The next section examines the antecedents that lead to 
reactance.  
Antecedents to Reactance 
S. S. Brehm and Brehm (1981) and subsequent reactance researchers have 
suggested a variety of antecedents of reactance. Antecedents frequently us d in research 
to induce reactance are language intensity (e.g., Dillard & Shen, 2005; C. H. Miller et al., 
2007) and intent to persuade (e.g., Dillard & Shen, 2005). Combining several antecedents 
(Dillard & Shen, 2005) has been shown to successfully elicit reactance. The same 
approach was adopted in this dissertation: The reactance induction was a composite of 
language intensity and intent to persuade. Such an approach was adopted because 




2002; Cialdini & Petty, 1981; Eagly & Chaiken, 1993); overt attempts at influence (using 
explicit and forceful language) are likely to increase the perception of freedom threats. 
Two antecedents to reactance, language intensity and intent to persuade, are discussed 
below. 
Language intensity. Language intensity has been linked to the favorability with 
which a message recipient responds to a message (Burgoon, Jones, & Stewart, 1975; 
O’Keefe, 1997). C. H. Miller et al. (2007) defined language intensity in terms of messag  
explicitness. Explicit messages “convey a single meaning and leave little doubt as to the 
source’s intentions” (C. H. Miller et al., p. 223). Further, controlling language (as a form 
of explicit communication) is characterized by the use of imperatives (McLaughlin, 
Shutz, & Wight, 1980): Forceful modal verbs such as should, ought, and must suggest 
that the communication is an explicit command attempting to limit individuals’ freedoms 
(C. H. Miller et al., 2007). For instance, C. H. Miller et al.’s (2007) participants were 
given messages advocating regular exercise. As predicted, controlling language increased 
perceived anger and the perception of threat to freedom as compared to when less 
controlling language was used. Other studies (e.g., Bensley & Wu, 1991; Doob & 
Zabrack; 1971; Quick & Stephenson, 2008; Worchel & Brehm, 1970) provide additional 
evidence linking forceful, intense, or dogmatic language to an increased magnitude of 
reactance. 
Perceptions of intent to persuade as a threat to freedom. The theory of reactance 
suggests that any message with persuasive intent may be perceived to be a threat to
freedom even if following the behavior or agreeing with the attitude endorsed by the 




Furthermore, merely warning people about the persuasive intent of the message has been 
shown to negatively bias people’s thoughts about the issue and the message (see 
discussion in Cialdini & Petty, 1981; Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; and Petty & Wegener, 
1998). Similarly, Benoit’s (1998) meta-analysis examining the effects of forewarning on 
persuasion showed that in the 12 studies that he considered, the participants who were 
warned about receiving a persuasive appeal were less persuaded than those who did not 
receive any such warning. These and other studies have demonstrated that the perceiv d 
intent to persuade has effects consistent with the theory of reactance (Heller, Pallak, & 
Picek, 1973; Kohn & Barnes, 1977; Worchel & Brehm, 1970). 
Overcoming Reactance 
Effects of freedom-threatening messages can be alleviated by providing 
individuals with alternative ways to restore threatened freedoms. Restoration of freedom 
implies giving back a “sense of autonomy and self-determination” (C. H. Miller et al., 
2007, p. 224; see also J. W. Brehm, 1966; Worchel & Brehm, 1971). Restoration of 
freedom can be achieved directly (J. W. Brehm, 1966) and indirectly (e.g., Burgoon, 
Alvaro, Broneck, et al., 2002; Worchel & Brehm, 1970).  
Direct restoration can be achieved through a boomerang effect: In that case, 
individuals can restore their lost or threatened freedom by engaging in a behavior directly 
opposite to the one advocated in the message (J. W. Brehm, 1966). In addition to the 
boomerang effect, direct restoration of freedom may be achieved by expressing negative 
attitudes toward the behavior advocated in the message (Burgoon, Alvaro, Grandpre, et 
al., 2002; Dillard & Shen, 2005; Rains & Turner, 2007) or having behavioral intentions 





Indirect restoration of freedom can occur through derogating the message 
(Grandpre et al., 2003; Quick & Considine, in press; Quick & Stephenson, 2007a) or the 
source of the message (Burgoon, Alvaro, Broneck, et al., 2002; C. H. Miller et al., 2007; 
Wicklund, 1974). Lost freedoms can also be restored vicariously: Vicarious restoration is 
achieved either when an alternative freedom is restored instead of the one that was 
directly threatened (C. H. Miller et al., 2007) or when “an individual associates with 
others or merely observes others perform the threatened behavior” (Quick & Stephenson, 
2008, p. 452). In addition, lost or threatened freedoms can be restored by giving some of 
the threatened or lost freedoms back; Heilman and Garner (1975) provided an example of 
how such restoration of freedom works. 
Heilman and Garner (1975) conducted a study of the effects of reactance on 
compliance. Their participants took part in a simulation of vinegar tasting (four diffe ent 
kinds). All the participants were told that they would receive some money for their 
participation, but some of them were told they would be paid a bonus each time they 
tasted vinegar, and others were told that if they refused to taste the vinegar they would be 
punished (i.e., they would have to pay a penalty). In addition, the participants were told 
that they either had or did not have a choice of the kind of vinegar that they were to tast . 
Heilman and Garner found the lowest compliance in the threat of punishment with no 
choice condition. But when some of the freedoms were restored (i.e., participants were 
given a choice of the vinegar that they were going to taste), the compliance rate of the 
participants who were threatened with a punishment but were given a choice as to the 
kind of vinegar that they were to taste was identical to the choice with reward condition. 




freedoms back (i.e., providing them with some choice) can be a successful form of 
restoration, helping to override the effects of reactance-inducing communicatio .   
More recently, C. H. Miller et al. (2007) used a restoration postscript to 
counteract the effects of the high threat to freedom. The postscript message restored 
participants’ freedom by “the simple suggestion” (p. 224) that it is ultimately up to them 
to decide whether or not to perform a behavior (here, exercise) advocated in the message. 
C. H. Miller et al. reasoned that when a restoration postscript follows a persuasive appeal, 
the persuasive intent of the message will appear less explicit and participants’ threatened 
freedoms will be restored. Their results were consistent with their predictions: Pairing 
high threat message with a restoration postscript reduced participants’ perceptions of 
threat to freedom. In their discussion, the authors hypothesized that a restoration 
postscript “offers an uncomplicated, direct, and apparently effective way to help avert 
harmful boomerang effects” (p. 234). Further, they posited that restoration postscript can 
be also used to “disguise the overt nature of a persuasive message” (p. 225). Thus, it is 
likely that restoration postscripts are effective for both low and high threat to freedom 
messages because in the case of the former, it ameliorates the mild threat to fr edom 
inherent in any persuasive communication (see Burgoon, Alvaro, Grandpre, et al., 2002), 
and in the case of the latter, it reduces the effects of reactance.   
In sum, C. H. Miller et al. (2007) proposed that including a restoration postscript 
offers “a rather simple and straightforward” approach to restoration of freedom (p. 234). 
In this dissertation, the effects of this approach were further tested. Although the results 
of C. H. Miller et al.’s (2007) results indicated that a restoration postscript hel ed reduce 




not addressed in their study. Further examination is required to understand the 
relationship between restoration and persuasion. Moreover, no attempts have been made 
to examine the effects of the restoration postscripts on reactance within the context of 
relevant attitude structures and at different points in time. This dissertation is he first 
attempt to address these questions. The section below presents the literature on attitude 
change trajectories and reviews evidence for the effects of time on reactance.  
Time and the Effects of Reactance 
In the persuasion literature, the role of temporal trajectories of attitude change has 
been given little attention (Kaplowitz & Fink, 1988). A typical attitude change study 
records changes in individuals’ attitudes and beliefs at only one point in time, namely, 
after receipt of the stimulus message, then compares the experimental group to the 
control group, on the basis of which inferences about attitude change are generated 
(Chung, Fink, & Kaplowitz, 2007). As Chung et al. pointed out, such an approach to 
attitude change rests on a problematic assumption that after the experimental inductions, 
attitudes and beliefs reach equilibrium and remain unchanged until the receipt of some 
new information. Given that belief change can occur even in the absence of new 
information (e.g., J. W. Brehm & Wicklund, 1970; Fink, Kaplowitz, & Hubbard, 2002; 
Kaplowitz, Fink, & Bauer, 1983; Tesser, 1978; Valacher, Nowak, & Kaufman, 1994; 
Walster, 1964), this assumption is likely to be erroneous. 
Despite this general lack of attention to the examination of attitude change over 
time, several studies have attempted to theoretically specify the temporal trajectories of 
attitude change (e.g., J. W. Brehm & Wicklund, 1970; Fink et al., 2002; Kaplowitz et al., 
1983; Tesser, 1978; Valacher et al., 1994; Walster, 1964). Tesser (1978), for example, 




topic leads to attitude polarization. (Note that attitude polarization was inferred from the 
proportion of participants who became more extreme on their initial position.) However, 
exposing individuals to a message has a different effect: Kaplowitz et al. (1983) 
suggested that any decision-making process may be thought of as a seriesof motions 
towards and away from the position advocated in the message.  
The aforementioned research indicates that measuring attitudes at one point in
time, typically immediately after the receipt of a message, provides a v ry limited 
representation of the attitude change process at work. Despite the obvious relevance of 
time to the study of reactance, there have been only two studies pertinent to the 
examination of reactance effects over time. Walster (1964) examined the effects of post-
decisional regret at four different points in time. Army draftees were ask d to choose one 
of two careers to pursue in their two years of service. Both careers were described to 
include both positive and negative features of each career option. The participants were 
randomly assigned to either the immediate response, four-minute-delay, 15-minute-delay, 
or 90-minute-delay condition. Consistent with previous studies on dissonance, regret was 
assessed by re-measuring the attractiveness of the two career options after the initial 
decision was made; if the chosen option was rated as less attractive as compared to a non-
chosen one, post-decisional regret was inferred. At the subsequent measurement, if the 
chosen option was rated as more attractive as compared to the initial rating, and the 
rejected option was rated as less attractive as compared to the initial rating, dissonance 
reduction was inferred. Walster’s results indicated some dissonance reduction in the 
immediate condition (as inferred from small, although not significantly different from 




decrease in attractiveness of the rejected option), post-decisional regret in the four-
minute-delay condition (as inferred from a significant difference between the decrease in 
attractiveness of the chosen option and the increase in attractiveness of the rejected 
option), and dissonance reduction in the 15-minute condition (as inferred from a 
substantial, statistically significant difference between the increase in attractiveness of the 
chosen option and the decrease in attractiveness of the rejected option). Miron and Brehm 
(2006) contended that what Walster referred to as a post-decisional regret (i.e., a reversal 
tendency after giving up one of the alternatives) was a reactance effect. 
Another attempt to study temporal effects of reactance is a study by R. L. Miller 
(1976), who focused on the effects of reactance induced through overexposure. His 
rationale for the overexposure effect stemmed from Zajonc’s (1968) discussion of the 
mere exposure effect, especially its later conceptualization, which posited an inverted-U-
shaped relationship between the amount of the exposure and evaluative ratings. In this 
later conceptualization, the inverted-U-shaped effect at higher levels of exposure was 
suggested to be due to reactance (Zajonc, Shaver, Tavris, & van Kneveld, 1972). 
In R. L. Miller’s (1976) examination of the overexposure-induced reactance 
effects, participants were exposed to posters advocating foreign aid reduction.5 Attitudes 
were measured at four different points in time. On the first day of the experiment, non-
exposure (i.e., control group) participants completed a questionnaire about their attitudes 
to foreign aid. The first wave of exposure (30 posters) started the next day and theposters 
were left for three days in the common areas of a dormitory. In the evening of day fur of
the study (i.e., the third day of the exposure), a randomly selected moderate exposur  




exposure, 170 additional posters were placed on the walls and were also left there for 
three days (as in the moderate exposure condition). On the evening of day seven, 
overexposure participants were asked to complete the dependent measures. The 
dormitories were cleared of posters the next day. Finally, the participants n the delayed 
post-test condition were asked to indicate their attitudes to foreign aid on day twelve of 
the experiment (they presumably had seen the posters during the exposure period). 
R. L. Miller’s (1976) results showed the effect of reactance as indicate by 
reduced persuasion in the overexposure condition; however, at the delayed post-measure 
the effect of reactance was less in magnitude but not significantly different from the 
overexposure effect.6 In sum, although not the strongest evidence for reactance, R. L. 
Miller’s data were consistent with reactance theory predictions. In addition, this study is 
the only attempt at examining the temporal trajectories of the effects of overexposure-
induced reactance.    
Despite R. L. Miller’s (1976) investigation, very little is known about reactance 
beyond the immediate effects measured right after the threat to freedom in uction. Thus, 
the understanding of the dynamics involved in reactance may be incomplete. Single time 
measures of reactance effects do not add to the understanding of the cognitive dynamics: 
To draw conclusions about the temporal trajectories of reactance, attitude measures at 
more than two points in time are needed. Two points in time only allow the 
demonstration of linear effects; a greater number of points allows for greater specificity 
regarding the shape of the attitude change function. Moreover, examining the dynamics 
of reactance within the context of relevant attitude structures may shed light on the 




well. The theory providing a framework for an examination of cognitive structures and 
movements within them is reviewed below. 
Examining Cognitive Structures: The Galileo Theory 
Theoretical Framework 
Attitude change researchers have long been interested in understanding the 
relationships between persuasion and attitude structure. Rosenberg (1956), for example, 
pointed out the importance of cognitive structures for understanding the composition of 
what he referred to as “attitudinal cognitoriums” (p. 369). Tourangeau, Rasinski, and 
D’Andrade (1991) provide some evidence that attitudinal structures consist of linked 
attitudes and beliefs. These structures are stored in memory, and, more importantly, due 
to the interconnectedness of concepts in these structures, activating one element in an 
attitudinal structure can facilitate the retrieval of other related attitudes and beliefs (Judd, 
Drake, Downing, & Krosnick, 1991). For example, Tourangeau et al.’s (1991) 
participants were asked to respond to different questions regarding two topics:abortion 
and welfare. The results indicated that participants responded to a question faster when it 
was preceded by a question on the same topic as opposed to a different one. 
Despite the centrality of attitude structures for persuasion research, few attempts 
have been made to integrate a structural approach to attitudes with persuasion (Dinauer, 
2003). Many researchers, following McGuire’s (1969) conceptualization, view 
persuasive messages as disturbances to attitudinal structures that initiate movement 
within those structures (Dinauer, 2003). However, as Dinauer pointed out, the majority of 
persuasion research explains this movement without the specification of attitude 
structures. 




attitude structures and persuasion can be found in Woelfel and Fink (1980) and Woelfel 
and Saltiel (1988). Referred to as Galileo theory, this framework allows for the 
examination of global mental structures of beliefs and attitudes (Gordon, 1988), and the 
observation of changes in attitudes over time (Gillham & Woelfel, 1977). In addition to 
other theories based on the examination of global structures of attitudes and beliefs (such 
as balance and other consistency theories), Galileo theory provides an elegant and precise 
method for the representation of those structures. 
At the heart of the theory is the idea that concepts can be represented in cognitive 
space (Kaplowitz et al., 1983). This space is “a set of concepts that have location and 
mass” (Kaplowitz et al., 1983, p. 234). Distances between the concepts allow for 
inferences of similarity and dissimilarity (Gillham & Woelfel, 1977). The t ory posits 
that estimating distances is inherent in human judgment; therefore, estimating dis ances 
between concepts and classes of concepts is a reliable method of measuring attitudes 
(e.g., Gordon, 1988). 
Attitudes can be inferred from the relative position of the individuals’ self-
referent terms (often denoted by the concept me; see, e.g., Neuendorf, Kaplowitz, Fink, & 
Armstrong, 1987). In the attitudinal structure, concepts that individuals consider 
important, good, and desirable are located close to a self-referent term (se Barn tt, 
Serota, & Taylor, 1976; Neuendorf et al., 1987; Serota, Cody, Barnett, & Taylor, 1977). 
Similarly, the concepts located further away from the self-referent terms are those that are 
viewed as less important, worse, and less desirable.  
Attitudinal positions closest to self-referent terms are more likely to be accepted 




candidates closest to the concept me are more likely to be supported in elections. As 
Barnett et al. (1976) pointed out, an effective strategy to maximize preference for the 
candidate is to identify vectors that “will enable the candidate’s point to converge with 
Me” (p. 230). In addition to attitudes, behavioral intentions can be inferred from the 
location of the self-referent and the behavior-related concept (Woelfel & Fink, 1980). For 
example, if me is located closer to voting, an intention to vote in upcoming elections can 
be inferred. Understanding objects’ locations and the distances between them allows 
researchers to design persuasive appeals attempting to shorten the distance between th  
self-referent and the attitude- or behavior-related object proposed in the message. 
There are many advantages to employing the Galileo theory in attitude change 
research. First, it provides a framework for examining attitude concepts systemically. As 
Dinauer and Fink (2005) indicated, the examination of changes in an attitude object 
targeted by a persuasive appeal may lead to changes in attitude concept not mentioned in 
the message. Second, employing the Galileo theory makes finding cognitive change 
possible without active control of the answers on the part of participants. Because the 
estimation of distances is an indirect measure (Fink, Monahan, & Kaplowitz, 1989), it 
allows the representation of individuals’ attitudes without participants trying to control 
the representation of their self-image, which would result in a social desirability bias. 
Methodological Framework 
Galileo theory is related to Torgerson’s (1958) work on multidimensional scaling 
(MDS). Torgerson’s conceptualization rests on an assumption that part of any perception 
is the process of differentiating. Objects are differentiated from each other bas d on their 
dissimilarities on one or more underlying characteristics. MDS represents a combination 




Similar to semantic-differential scales that allow representation of meaning in 
(typically) three-dimensional space, MDS allows for exploration of individuals’ cognitive 
maps in a multidimensional space without presupposing the number of dimensions. To 
determine cognitive maps, individuals are asked to estimate pairwise differnces of 
concepts of interest as ratios of distances (see Gillham & Woelfel, 1977). Judgments are 
obtained using a magnitude scaling approach: Participants are provided with an arbitr ry 
standard (i.e., a yardstick) relative to which they make their judgments (Gillham & 
Woelfel, 1977).  
In analytical terms, MDS is an application of principal components analysis to a 
matrix derived from pairs of dissimilarity scores (Torgerson, 1958). Given the 
assumptions underlying principal components analysis (see Pett, Lackey, & Sullivan, 
2003), using ratio-type measures (to estimate distances between concepts as discussed 
above) offers several advantages over traditional (e.g., Likert-type) measures (Gordon, 
1988).7 The dissimilarity judgments are unbounded at the top (i.e., can theoretically range 
from zero without an upper bound) and are relatively continuous. Evidence for the 
effectiveness of the MDS approach is substantial (e.g., Barnett, & Kincaid, 1983; Dinauer 
& Fink, 2005; Gillham & Woelfel, 1977; Gordon, 1988; Kincaid, Yum, & Woelfel, 1983; 
Neuendorf et al., 1987; Fink et al., 1989; Woelfel, Holmes, Newton, & Kincaid, 1988). 
Research has demonstrated the “precision, stability, and equivalence” of MDS when 
compared to more traditional measures (Gillham & Woelfel, 1977, p. 222). In addition, 
Gillham and Woelfel have shown that MDS can be used successfully when examining 
attitude change over time. 




The purpose of this study is to examine participants’ cognitive structures und r 
different conditions of threat to freedom measured over time. To have a meaningful 
trajectory, at least three points in time must be examined. (In this study, time was treated 
as a between-subjects effect.) Reactance was induced through the combination of 
language intensity and the presence of persuasive intent. Specifically, the persuasive 
intent in the message was made clear, and participants were told that they must perform 
the advocated behavior.  
A 2 (Threat to freedom: low threat vs. high threat) x 2 (Restoration postscript: 
present vs. filler postscript) x 3 (Time: immediate-time measurement vs. one-minute 
delay vs. two-minute delay) plus 3 (control groups for each time point: immediate-time 
measurement vs. one-minute delay vs. two-minute delay) between-participants design (15 
conditions total) was employed. The control conditions were not fully crossed in the 
proposed design because for the purposes of establishing a baseline, having three control 
conditions measuring the effects of reactance at three different times was ufficient. In all 
conditions, but at different points in time (depending on the time condition, which was a 
between-subject effect), participants were asked to estimate distance  between pairs of 
concepts related to the topic of the persuasive message (determined from a pilt test) and 
also including such concepts as me, good, bad, and angry. Bad and angry represent the 
negatively valenced cognitive and affective elements that characterize reactance. Me and 
good were included to help determine the behavioral intention and positive attitude 
towards the concepts in the cognitive structure (see Woelfel & Fink, 1980). 
Hypotheses 
To illustrate spatial configurations under different levels of threat, an approch 




representations for the hypotheses (see below). Note that a positive attitude in the 
hypotheses is inferred from the distance between the concept of interest and good: The 
closer the distance between the concept of interest and good, the more positive the 
attitude toward the concept of interest. A negative attitude is inferred from the distance 
between the concept of interest and bad: The closer the distance between the concept of 
interest and bad, the more negative the attitude toward the concept of interest. A 
behavioral intention is inferred from the distance between the concept of interest and me: 
The closer the distance between the concept of interest and me, the greater the behavioral 
intention regarding the concept of interest. Finally, the amount of anger toward the 
concept of interest is inferred from the distance between the concept of interest and 
anger: The closer the distance between the concept of interest and anger, the greater the 
anger toward the concept of interest.  
Because traditional reactance research does not address the dynamics of 
reactance, the initial tests of reactance (i.e., H1 through H4, and RQ1 and RQ2) are based 
on the immediate-time measurement. Note that the predictions in H1-H4 deal only with 
the target concept. Recall that the target concept is defined as a concept that was targeted 
by the persuasive message. The rationale for the first set of hypotheses is presented 
below. 
Hypothesis 1 predicted a particular spatial configuration for the target concept 
across the three levels of threat to freedom. H1 is represented by Figure 1. Recall that 
three conditions are involved in determining the effects of reactance: a control condition, 
a low threat to freedom condition, and a high threat to freedom condition. To establish 




is required. To demonstrate a boomerang effect (i.e., to demonstrate movement of 
attitudes in the direction opposite to the initial position), attitudes and behavioral 
intentions in the high threat to freedom condition have to be compared to the control 
condition. Finally, reduced persuasion in the high threat condition (as compared to the 
low threat condition) implies that in the absence of a high threat to freedom component of 
a message, there is persuasion (i.e., an attitude change or a change in a behavioral 
intention in the direction of the position advocated in the message). To determine that th  
low threat to freedom message was indeed persuasive, a comparison of attitudes and 
behavioral intentions in the low threat to freedom condition versus the control condition 
is required.  
Taken together, the three effects described above (i.e., reduced persuasion, 
boomerang effect, and increased persuasion) can be represented as an inverted-U-shaped 
effect of the amount of threat on positive attitudes and behavioral intentions. Based on 
existing reactance research, the most positive attitude and greater behavioral intention are 
expected in the low threat to freedom condition as compared to both the control and the 
high threat to freedom conditions. However, in the high threat condition the amount of 
positive attitude and behavioral intention is expected to be significantly less as compared 
to the control condition. For negative attitude and anger towards the target concept (as 
determined from the distances between negatively valenced concepts such as anger nd 
bad and the target concept), the opposite pattern is predicted: a U-shaped effect of the 
amount of threat on negative attitude and anger. The least negative attitude and anger are 
expected in the low threat to freedom condition as compared to both the control and the 




negative attitude and anger is expected to be significantly greater as compared to the 
control condition. Recall that in terms of distances, less distance indicates greater 
closeness of the concepts to each other, thus the following generic hypothesis is 
proposed: 
H1: At the immediate time measurement, a U-shaped effect of the threat to 
freedom on positive attitude and behavioral intention is proposed such that the 
least distance between the target concept and me and the target concept and good 
is expected when threat to freedom is low as compared to both the control 
condition and when threat to freedom is high. However, the distance between the 
target concept and me and the target concept and good is expected to be 
significantly greater when threat to freedom is high as compared to the control 
condition. An inverted-U-shaped effect of the threat to freedom on negative 
attitude and anger is proposed such that the most distance between the target 
concept and bad and the target concept and anger is expected when threat to 
freedom is low as compared to both the control condition and when threat to 
freedom is high. However, the distance between the target concept and bad and 
the target concept and anger is expected to be significantly smaller when threat to 
freedom is high as compared to the control condition. 
 Hypotheses 2 through 4 are planned comparisons designed to test specific effects 
that are part of the generic prediction posited in H1. Specifically, H2 predicts reduced 
persuasion in the high threat to freedom condition as compared to the low threat to 
freedom condition; H3 hypothesizes a boomerang effect when comparing the high threat 




the low threat to freedom condition as compared to the control condition. In terms of 
distances between concepts, these predictions are further explicated below.   
 
Figure 1. Representation of H1. The arrow represents the movement of the target concept
across three conditions. 
 
H2 deals with predictions regarding the reduced persuasion effect.  H2 is 
represented by Figure 2. 
H2: At the immediate time measurement a threat to attitudinal or behavioral 
freedom causes reduced persuasion. When freedoms are threatened, (a) the 
concept denoting the attitude or behavior proposed by the message moves further 
away from the me and good (as compared to when threat to freedom is low); and 
(b) the concept denoting the attitude or behavior proposed by the message moves 




following planned comparisons are presented. When threat to freedom is high, 
distances between the target concept and me and the target concept and good are 
larger as compared to when threat to freedom is low. Conversely, when threat to 
freedom is high, distances between the target concept and good and the target 
concept and anger are smaller as compared to when threat to freedom is low. 
 
 
Figure 2. Representation of H2. The arrow represents the movement of the target concept 
across two conditions. 
 
Reduced persuasion is the minimum requirement to show the outcomes of 
reactance, but the presence of a boomerang effect makes a stronger case for reactance. 
Therefore, it is predicted that a boomerang effect results from a threat o freedom 






Figure 3. Representation of H3. The arrow represents the movement of the target concept 
across two conditions. 
 
H3: At the immediate time measurement a threat to attitudinal or behavioral 
freedom causes a boomerang effect: When freedoms are threatened, (a) the 
concept denoting the attitude or behavior proposed by the message moves further 
away from me and good (as compared to the control condition); and (b) the 
concept denoting the attitude or behavior proposed by the message moves closer 
to and clusters around the concepts of badand angry (as compared to the control 
condition). Thus, the following planned comparisons are presented. When threat 
to freedom is high, distances between the target concept and me and the target 




when threat to freedom is high, distances between the targ t concept and good 
and the target concept and anger are smaller as compared to the control condition. 
H4 examined an increase in positive attitude and behavioral intention as a result 
of the message in the low threat to freedom condition. To be able to determine whether a 
message resulted in persuasion, attitudes (both positive and negative), behavioral 
intention, and anger towards the target concept can be compared across the low threat to 
freedom condition and the control condition. H4 is represented by Figure 4. Thus,  
 
 
Figure 4. Representation of H4. The arrow represents the movement of the target concept 
across two conditions. 
 
H4: At the immediate time measurement, low threat to attitudinal or behavioral 




freedom is low, (a) the concept denoting the attitude or  behavior targeted by the 
message moves closer towards the concepts me and good (as compared to the 
control condition); and (b) the concept denoting the attitude or behavior targeted 
by the message moves further away from badand angry (as compared to the 
control condition). Thus, the following planned comparisons are presented. When 
threat to freedom is low, distances between the target concept and me and the 
target concept and good are smaller as compared to the control condition. 
Conversely, when threat to freedom is high, distances between the target concept 
and good and the target concept and anger are larger as compared to the control 
condition. 
Hypothesis 5 focuses on the effects of restoration paired with freedom-limiting 
messages on persuasion. The rationale for this prediction is based on C. H. Miller et al.’s 
(2007) finding that using a restoration postscript (i.e., a suggestion that it is ultimately up 
to message recipients to decide whether or not to perform the behavior advocated in the 
message) may counteract the effects of the high threat to freedom. Further, adding a 
restoration postscript is expected to reduce threats to freedoms even when a threat to 
freedom is low. As discussed above, any attempt at persuasion may be perceived as 
freedom threatening (Burgoon, Alvaro, Grandpre, et al., 2002); however, as C. H. Miller 
et al. (2007) suggested, when a restoration postscript follows a persuasive appeal, the 
persuasive intent of the message appears less explicit. Thus, it is likely that restoration 
postscripts are effective for both low and high threat to freedom messages becau e in the 
case of the former, a restoration postscript ameliorates the mild threat to freedom that 




the effects of reactance.  
In sum, across the two levels of threat to freedom, adding a restoration postscript 
to a persuasive message is expected to result in an increase in positive attitud nd 
behavioral intention as compared to the no-restoration condition. As a result, in the high 
threat without restoration condition, less positive attitude and behavioral intentio  is 
expected as compared to the high threat with restoration condition. However, adding  
restoration postscript to a high threat message might not fully remove the effects o  high 
threat to freedom (thereby making the effects of a high threat with restoration message 
similar to a low threat without restoration message). Therefore, less positive attitude and 
behavioral intention are expected in the high threat with restoration condition as 
compared to the low threat without restoration condition. Finally, the most positive 
attitude and the greatest behavioral intention (as compared to high threat without 
restoration condition, high threat with restoration condition, and low threat without 
restoration condition) are expected in the low threat with restoration condition. In sum, 
the entire prediction in H5 can be presented as two linear effects (one for positive att ude 
and the other for behavioral intention). Recall that, in terms of distances, more behavioral 
intention (as determined from the distance between the targ t concept and me) and 
positive attitude (as determined from the distance between the target concept and good) 
indicate less distance between concepts. The following hypothesis is proposed:  
H5: At the immediate time measurement, the distance between the target concept 
and good, and the target concept and me, from least to most, is: low threat to 
freedom with restoration condition, low threat to freedom without restoration 




freedom without restoration condition.  
The next two research questions explore the idea that there is more to persuasion 
than changes in the target concept (Dinauer & Fink, 2005). Some evidence indicates that 
persuasive messages may have a greater effect on other attitude concepts in the cognitive 
structure than on the attitude targeted by the message (Dinauer & Fink, 2005). Similar 
processes are likely for reactance: Because individuals focus their efforts to restore 
freedom on the target concept, other related concepts may be indirectly affected by the 
message. Recall that the concept targeted by the persuasive message is referr d to as the 
target concept, and the concept associated with the target concept in the cognitive 
structure is referred to as the related concept. (Note that the association of concepts is 
assessed by the speed of concept retrieval from memory.) 
Two research questions are posed: 
RQ1: At the immediate time measurement, what are the motions associated with a 
related concept? Specifically, how does reactance affect the relatd attitude 
concept?  
RQ2: At the immediate time measurement, what are the effects of restoration 
postscript on a related concept? 
Finally, the study proposes investigating the configurations of cognitive structures 
at three points in time. There is no agreement in attitude change research on the time
points that are the best for detecting changes in individuals’ attitude over time. R. L. 
Miller (1976) increased the amount of exposure to experimental materials over time, and, 
once the reactance manipulation was over (at the post-test), there was a reduction in the 




increased over time but remains constant. Therefore, it is likely that the magnitude of 
reactance at the second time measurement (one-minute delay) will be less than at the 
immediate time measurement, and it will reduce further at the third time measurement 
(two-minute delay):  
H6: There is a decay of reactance that takes place over time. 
Finally, because the effects of restoration over time are unknown, a research 
question is posited: 





Chapter 3: Method 
In the third chapter of this dissertation, first, the approaches to data collection and 
analysis are discussed, including data trimming, data transformation and the approach to 
index formation. Then, four pilot studies conducted prior to the main experiment are 
presented and their results are discussed. Finally, the method of the main experimnt is 
described, including the participants, study design, procedures, instrumentation and the 
analytical strategy used to generate cognitive maps and to determine significance in the 
movement of concepts across experimental conditions.  
Data Collection and Analysis 
Before collecting the data for the proposed experiment, four pilot studies were 
conducted. The purpose of the first pilot study was to select a topic for the main 
experiment. In the second pilot study, concepts to include in cognitive maps were 
determined. In the third pilot study, the key concepts for the messages were generated; 
and in the final pilot study, messages were tested for their ability to induce psy hological 
reactance. The purpose of the main experiment was to examine the effect of rea anc  at 
three points in time and to document changes in the configurations of cognitive spaces 
under different threat to freedom and restoration conditions. Data collection for this 
dissertation was approved by the University of Maryland Institutional Review Board 
(date of approval: November 20, 2007). All of the pilot test measures were based on 
printed questionnaire responses. The final experiment was conducted on laptops, using 
MediaLab (Jarvis, 2004) and DirectRT (Jarvis, 2006) software packages. All four pilot 





The data in each segment of this dissertation were first examined for the presence 
of outliers. An outlier is defined as an observation that substantially deviates from other 
observations in a given sample (Grubbs, 1969). Because magnitude scales are bounded at 
zero and unbounded at the top, the scores obtained through this method of scaling are 
likely to be positively skewed and contain outliers. The presence of outliers was 
determined by examining the descriptives and the histograms (with a normal curve) of a 
given variable. If outliers were present, the data were trimmed by recoding that variable’s 
scores to a lower value. (Note that none of the cases were deleted as a result ofthi  
procedure.) Two strategies for dealing with outliers were utilized in the present 
dissertation. In Pilot Study 3, all values that were above 1000 were trimmed by recoding 
them to be equal to 1000. This approach is rather crude; therefore, in the main experiment 
a more conservative approach was used. An attempt was made to trim as little as 
possible. To ensure conservative trimming, the following steps were used. The 
distribution of each variable was first examined based on the frequencies of scores and 
the histogram. If outliers were present, percentile values associated with the ninety-fifth, 
the ninetieth, the eighty-fifth and the eightieth percentile were generated. Trimming the 
scores to the highest percentile was considered first. If the outliers were still present after 
trimming the data to the eightieth percentile, the scores were further transformed using 
nonlinear transformations (see below). In addition to the examination for the presence of 
outliers, the variables were also examined for their approximate normality, and if the 
violation of normality assumption was present, those variables were transformed. Data 
transformations are further discussed below.  
Data Transformation 




that the residuals of the dependent variables are approximately normal (Bauer & Fink, 
1983; Fink, 2009). To help meet this assumption, if a continuous dependent variable 
appeared relatively non-normal, it was transformed. The transformations used improved 
the skewness of the continuous dependent variables.8 Some of the variables required a 
constant first be added to the original score because nonlinear transformations cnnot be 
performed on zero values. The choice of a constant and the specific transformation was 
done through trial and error. The initial and post-transformation means, standard 
deviations, skewness and kurtosis values for all continuous dependent variables 
(transformed as necessary) are summarized in the Tables 1 through 3 (presented after the 
endnotes in this manuscript). 
Index Formation 
Trimmed and transformed (as necessary) data were used to form indexes. All 
indexes in this dissertation were formed by saving the first unrotated principal 
component. This is a commonly used procedure (see Afifi, Clark, & May, 2004), which 
involves using principal component analysis and an unrotated one-component solution; 
standardized regression component scores are then calculated for each participant. 
Because each item is weighted proportionally to its contribution to the principal 
component, using these procedures produces a better index as compared to simple 
summation or averaging of the items. 
Pilot Study 1 
The purpose of this pilot study was to select a topic for the main experiment. The 
selected topic had to meet a few initial requirements. The selected topic had to be 
proattitudinal, following Worchel and Brehm’s (1970) contention that having 




avoid pretesting participants’ initial attitude towards the topic, only the topics that are 
likely to be uniformly proattitudinal (i.e., the majority of research participants were likely 
to be favorably predisposed towards these issues) were considered. For example, topics 
like legalizing marijuana would not be selected as there are likely to be participan s for 
whom this is a proattitudinal topic and those for whom this is a counterattitudinal issue. 
Materials for Pilot Study 1 are provided in Appendix A. 
Participants 
A sample of 45 students was recruited from undergraduate communication 
courses at the University of Maryland. Forty-nine percent (n = 22) were male. The mean 
age was 19.71 (Mdn = 20.00; SD = 1.84), with ages ranging from 18 to 29 years of age. 
Forty-seven percent (n = 21) of participants were non-Jewish Caucasian, 27% (n = 12) 
were Jewish Caucasian, 11% (n = 5) were African-American, 13% (n = 6) were Asian, 
and the remaining participants (1%) did not fit into the provided categories. Twenty-nine 
percent (n = 13) were freshmen, 22% (n = 10) were sophomores, 27% (n = 12) were 
juniors, and 22% (n = 10) were seniors. All students received extra-credit in a 
communication course for their participation. 
Procedures 
Participants were invited into the experimental laboratory and were asked to list 
five issues that they often hear about from their parents, media, friends, or other sourc s. 
They were informed that there were no right or wrong answers and that the researcher 
was just interested in their views. The data were then coded for frequencies by the author. 
Results and Discussion 
The results indicated that out of 45 participants, 18 mentioned the Iraq war, 14 




eight mentioned abortion, and seven mentioned discrimination and tuition. The remaining 
issues were mentioned by fewer than five participants and, therefore, were not 
considered.  
Next, consistent with Worchel and Brehm’s (1970) assertion that a proattitudinal 
topic is required for a reactance induction, topics were examined with regard to whether 
or not they were likely to be proattitudinal. Based on these criteria, three topics were 
selected: global warming, discrimination, and tuition.9 Campus housing was not selected 
because it only applied to a narrow segment of students living on campus (freshmen and 
sophomores) and excluded juniors and seniors. The issues of the war in Iraq, election, 
and abortion were not selected due to the likely difference in opinions on these issues 
among college students.  
Although each of the three remaining topics (i.e., global warming, discrimination, 
and tuition) was a plausible option, a decision was made to select a topic that is likely to 
have a simple recommended behavior that can be advocated in the message (i.e., a 
behavior that has the most efficacy, meaning that a student is likely to perceive that a 
recommended behavior is easy to do and it can help reduce the effects of climate chang ; 
for a discussion of efficacy, see Bandura, 1997, and Witte, 1992). It is likely that in te 
cases of discrimination and college tuition, student participants might perceive low l vels 
of efficacy in their ability to influence solutions to these issues. Conversely, in the case of 
global warming, a range of simple behaviors, such as changing light-bulbs in the house, 
conserving water, or recycling, should be easy behaviors for students to do.  
The fact that the topic of global warming has multiple simple behaviors that can 




cognitive structures, having multiple simple behaviors allows for comparison of locations 
of the concepts associated with these simple behaviors. As a result, the location of the 
concept targeted by the freedom-limiting message and the one that was not a part f the 
message can be compared. The rationale for the possible differences in concept locations 
stems from Dinauer and Fink’s (2005) argument that the change for the target conc pt 
might not be as pronounced as a change in location of a non-target concept (referred to 
here as a related concept). Thus, receiving freedom-limiting communicatio  regarding a 
target concept (e.g., recycling) may lead to reduced persuasion or a boomerang eff ct, but 
more positive attitudes toward related concepts (e.g., conservation of water or changing 
light-bulbs in the house) may be observed in the same high threat to freedom condition. 
Based on the results of Pilot Study 1, global warming was selected as the general
topic for this study. The purpose of the second pilot study was to determine the concepts 
in individuals’ cognitive structures regarding the topic of global warming. 
Pilot Study 2 
In determining the concepts to use in the MDS procedure, it is recommended that 
the concepts should not be imposed by the researcher but instead be derived from the 
population being examined (Neuendorf et al., 1987). Therefore, the purpose of the second 
pilot study was to determine the concepts in the individuals’ cognitive structures 
regarding the issue of global warming. Materials for Pilot Study 2 are provided in 
Appendix B.  
Participants 
A sample of 43 students was recruited from undergraduate communication 
courses at the University of Maryland. Fifty-six percent (n = 24) were male. The mean 




Forty-two percent (n = 18) of participants were non-Jewish Caucasian, 23% (n = 10) 
were Jewish Caucasian, 14% (n = 6) were African-American, 12% (n = 5) were Asian, 
5% (n = 2) were Indian, and the remaining participants did not fit into the provided 
categories. Forty-four percent (n = 19) were freshmen, 37% (n = 16) were sophomores, 
12% (n = 5) were juniors, and 7% (n = 3) were seniors. All students received extra-credit 
in a communication course for their participation. 
Procedures 
To ascertain the concepts that people associate with the topic of global warming, 
participants were asked to make a list of all possible associations that they may have with 
the phrase global warming. Participants were instructed to write down a list of either 
words or short phrases to make the derived data appropriate for concept mapping. The 
participants were timed to ensure that everybody had the same amount of time to activa e
topic-relevant constructs: Participants were given one minute to complete this task.  
Results and Discussion 
Participant responses were analyzed in terms of frequencies. Different concepts 
representing the same general theme were grouped together by the author for these 
analyses. Participants generated 207 global-warming-related words and word 
combinations. Among the 17 themes that emerged, the following themes, presented in 
descending order, were most frequent (note that ns represent the number of total 
responses that fit this particular theme): (1) ice- and ice-melting-related concepts (e.g., 
ice melting, Antarctica, snow; n = 33, representing 16% of total responses); (2) Al-Gore-
related concepts (e.g., Al Gore, The Inconvenient Truth; n = 21, representing 10% of total 
responses); (3) temperature- and temperature-increase-related concepts (e.g., heat, 




pollution-related concepts (e.g., pollution, emissions, carbon-dioxide; n = 20, 
representing 10% of total responses); (5) ozone- and ozone-depletion-related concepts 
(ozone, ozone depletion, radiation; n = 16, representing 8% of total responses); (6) 
solution-related concepts (e.g., recycling, alternative fuel, energy conservation; n = 16, 
representing 8% of total responses). The remaining themes had less than 8 percent of 
responses, and therefore were not considered further. These six general themes were 
further narrowed down into six concepts to be used in the main experiment: elting ice, 
Al Gore, rising temperature, pollution (CO2), conservation of energy, and recycling. To 
infer attitudes and to interpret the effects of reactance on cognitive structures, five 
additional items were included: me, good, bad, angry and my freedom.  
In summary, based on the results of the Pilot Study 2, the concepts for the main 
experiment were selected. These 11 concepts were: melting ice, Al Gore, rising 
temperature, pollution (CO2), energy conservation, recycling, me, good, bad, angry, and 
my freedom.10  
From the list of the 11 concepts, two concepts were considered as potential 
message topics: recycling and energy conservation. Recycling was selected as the target 
concept, meaning that in the main experiment the pro-recycling position will be 
advocated in the message; and e ergy conservation was selected as the related concept, 
which although will not be targeted in the message, but the attitude toward and 
behavioral intention regarding this concept will be assessed in the main experiment. This 
assessment will be done to ascertain the effects of freedom threatening communication on 
the concept related to recycling in the attitude structure. Note that the conclusion 




concepts were retrieved from participants’ memory in the close proximity to each other 
within a relatively short time frame (1 minute). This conclusion is consistent with 
existing research on attitude accessibility (e.g., Tourangeau et al., 1991).  
Pilot Study 3 
The purpose of Pilot Study 3 was to create a pro-recycling persuasive message. 
Galileo software has procedures designed to help generate a persuasive mesage strategy. 
Generating a message strategy commonly involves associating concepts with certain 
attributes (Woelfel, 1990). In the context of this study, the focus was to create more 
positive attitudes to recycling by connecting recycling with good. Automated Strategy 
Generator (ASG; Woelfel, 1990) is designed to calculate the links that need to b  
strengthened to connect two concepts (referred to as the target pair; i.e., recycling and 
good in this study). ASG reads the coordinates generated from the participants’ average 
of pairwise comparisons, and then calculates the projected effects of every possible 
strategy for repositioning these two concepts in the Galileo space (Woelfel, 1990). As an 
output, the program generates a list of concepts that need to be addressed in the 
persuasive message that are predicted to bring the concepts in the target pair closer 
together. Materials for Pilot Study 3 are provided in Appendix C. 
Participants 
A sample of 29 students was recruited from undergraduate communication 
courses at the University of Maryland. Eighty three percent (n = 25) were female. The 
mean age was 22.72 years (Mdn = 22.00; SD = 4.46), with ages ranging from 20 to 45 
years of age. Eighty percent ( = 24) of participants were non-Jewish Caucasian, 10% (n 
= 3) were African-American, 3% (n = 1) were Hispanic and the remaining participants 




participants were juniors, and 73 % (n = 22) were seniors. All students received extra-
credit in a communication course for their participation.  
Procedures and Instrumentation 
When participants came to the lab, the experimenter (i.e., the author) explained 
how to respond to magnitude scale questions, and then participants did a practice exercis
(see Appendix C for the materials). The experimenter discussed the results of the practice 
exercise with the participants to make sure that the instructions were adequately 
understood. Next, participants were asked to respond to all possible comparison pairs (55 
comparison pairs total) derived from the 11 concepts (see Pilot Study 2) and to complete 
a demographic questionnaire. To control for outliers, all comparison pairs were first 
trimmed to a lower value. Trimmed values were then transformed by adding a constant 
and taking the natural logarithm: transformed variable = ln(trimmed original variable + 
100). Means, standard deviations, skewness and kurtosis for all the variables before and 
after transformations are summarized in Table 1.  
Results and Discussion 
To create individuals’ cognitive maps, a mean response of transformed values for 
each pair was calculated. Then, the means were anti-transformed to retain th  original 
metric in which the pairwise dissimilarities estimates were made. Th  anti-transformation 
involved exponentiating the value obtained through transformation and subtracting 100. 
These anti-transformed means were entered into the Galileo software to obtain 
coordinates. The ASG was performed to generate a message strategy. For the present 
study, the criterion pair (i.e., the pair of concepts that it was decided to bring closer 
together) was recycling and good. However, the results indicated that recycling and good 




Test 2, it was impossible to bring them any closer: The output indicated that the 
remaining distance to bring concepts together was around zero. Therefore, a new criterion 
pair was selected. The subsequent analyses examined the strategy of bringing recycling 
and me closer together. The results indicated that the following concepts needed to b  
included into the message to bring the target pair closer together: melting ice, rising 
temperature, CO2, and good.  
Pilot Study 4 
The purpose of Pilot Study 4 was to ascertain the effectiveness of the reactanc  
manipulation. 
Participants 
A sample of 40 students was recruited from undergraduate communication 
courses at the University of Maryland. Forty percent (n = 16) were male. The mean age 
was 20.38 (Mdn = 20.00; SD = 4.45), with ages ranging from 18 to 46 years of age. Fifty-
eight percent of participants (n = 23) were non-Jewish Caucasian, 10% (n = 4) were 
Jewish Caucasian, 10% (n = 4) were African-American, 7.5% (n = 3) were Asian, 2.5% 
were Hispanic (n = 1), 2.5% (n = 1) were South Asian (i.e., Indian or Pakistani), and the 
remaining participants (10%; n = 4) did not fit into the provided categories. All students 
received extra-credit in a communication course for their participation. 
Design and Procedures 
A 2 (Threat to freedom: low threat to freedom vs. high threat to freedom) x 2 
(Restoration postscript: present vs. absent) plus 1 (No-message condition) independent 
group experimental design was employed. The dependent variables for the manipulatio  
checks were perceptions of threat and anger induced by the message.  




First, the participants completed a practice exercise in which the experimenter went over 
the instructions of how to respond to magnitude scales; the explanation of the instructions 
was followed by two examples (instructions and examples were identical to the opinion 
instructions for Pilot Study 3; see Appendix C).  
First, the participants in all conditions were asked a few questions about their 
attitude about recycling. Next, all of the participants (except for those in th  o-message 
condition) read statements regarding global warming. Reactance was induced through a 
combination of language intensity and intent to persuade. In this study, source credibility 
was held constant and a highly credible source regarding the environmental issues wa  
selected. Source selection was made on the basis of Fink, Bessarabova, and Cai’s (2007) 
pilot test that examined the credibility of eight weather- and climate-related 
organizations. Their results indicated that, as compared to other seven organizations in 
this pilot study, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was rated as having 
one of the highest levels of credibility. Thus, the EPA was selected as the message source 
for the study. Both messages (high threat to freedom and low threat to freedom) were of 
identical length (118 words). In the low-threat condition the participants read: 
It is important to know about the benefits of recycling: Recycling is good and, 
moreover, it works! 
Recycle! Recycle! Recycle! Recycle! 
Below is some important information about the benefits of recycling that we 
would like you to consider: 
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has shown that carbon dioxide 




global temperatures. Based on EPA data, recycling works! Recycling significantly 
decreases carbon dioxide pollution: The EPA found that manufacturing from the 
recycled paper provides a considerable reduction in CO2 emissions.  
Recycle! Recycle! Recycle! 
Do not ignore this very important message. It cannot be stressed enough, 
recycling is important: You can definitely do something to help! 
In the high threat condition the participants read: 
The information you must know about the benefits of recycling: Recycling is 
good, and it works! 
There’s really no choice when it comes to recycling: You simply have to do it! 
The information about the importance of and benefits of recycling that you must 
know: 
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has shown that carbon dioxide 
pollution (CO2) has resulted in melting of the ice masses and the rising of the 
global temperatures. Based on EPA data, recycling works! Recycling significantly 
decreases carbon dioxide pollution: The EPA found that manufacturing from the 
recycled paper provides a considerable reduction in CO2 emissions.  
You must recycle, there’s no other choice!  
Do not ignore this message.  Recycling is important: You must help! 
Immediately after the message, the participants received either a restoration or a 
filler postscript. Both postscripts were written in smaller font and were of identical length 
(53 words). The restoration postscript was as follows: 




course, you don’t have to listen to any of them. You know what is best for 
yourself. We all make our own decisions and you make your own decisions too. 
The choice is yours. You’re free to decide for yourself. 
Participants receiving a filler postscript read the following: 
You’ve probably heard a lot about recycling. You’ve probably heard a lot of 
messages telling you that recycling is important. You’ve probably even heard
messages similar to this. These messages are designed to be able to communicate 
with many different types of people. Different people will read the message that 
you’ve read today. 
After reading the message the participants responded to series of magnitude 
scales. In the no-message condition, the participants only responded to the questions 
about threat and anger perception: All questions specific to the message were not 
included. Finally, all participants provided their demographic information.  
Instrumentation 
Means, standard deviations, skewness, and kurtosis for all the variables before 
and after transformations are summarized in Table 2. None of the variables in Pilot Study 
4 required trimming.  
Manipulation check: Perceptions of threat to freedom. The perception of threat to 
freedom index comprised two items: the perception of being manipulated and the 
perception of being pressured. These items came from Dillard and Shen (2005; see also
C. H. Miller et al., 2007).11 Participants’ level of threat to freedom was measured by 
asking “how much do you feel that the message tried to manipulate you?” and “how 
much do you feel that the message tried to pressure you?” The response option was a 




indicating that their freedom was moderately threatened. Both items were transformed as 
follows: item transformed = ln(original item + 1). The mean for the perception of threat 
to freedom index was 5.84 (SD = 4.51; Cronbach’s alpha = .89). 
Manipulation check: Anger. The anger index comprised four items: irritated, 
angry, annoyed, and aggravated (Dillard & Shen, 2005; C. H. Miller et al., 2007). The 
response option was a magnitude scale with 0 indicating that the participants were not 
angry at all and 100 indicating that they were moderately angry. All the items were 
transformed as follows: item transformed = ln(original item + 1). The mean for the anger 
index was 6.63 (SD = 8.02; Cronbach’s alpha = .92) 
Involvement. Involvement was measured by asking participants to indicate how 
much they cared about recycling. They were asked to provide a magnitude scale stimate 
with 0 indicating that they did not care about recycling at all and 100 indicating that they 
cared about recycling moderately. This item was transformed: transformed variable = 
ln(original variable + 1). S. S. Brehm and Brehm (1981) argued that for psychological 
reactance induction individuals have to be moderately issue-involved, thus the effect of 
involvement was controlled in this pilot study by using it as a covariate in the analyses 
that follow. 
Results and Discussion 
All of the analyses were done on the transformed variables. To examine the 
effects of the threat induction on the perceptions of anger and threat to freedom (i.e., 
manipulation checks), two univariate ANCOVAs were performed. Based on S. S. Brehm 
and Brehm’s (1981) assertion that moderate issue involvement is required to induce 
psychological reactance, all manipulation check analyses were performed with 




as independent variables. Because the no-message condition was not crossed with 
restoration, it was omitted from these analyses.  
First, the perception of threat to freedom was used as the dependent variable (the 
threat to freedom index was formed by saving first unrotated principal component). The 
results of the univariate ANCOVA indicated that only the threat induction (and not 
restoration induction or the interaction of the threat induction with restoration induct on) 
had a significant effect on perceived threat to freedom, F(1, 27) = 24.02, p < .001, partial 
η2 = .47. The R2 for the entire model was .51 (adjusted R2 = .44). The effect of 
involvement as a covariate was significant, F(1, 27) = 6.90, p = .01, partial η2 = .20. 
Thus, these results indicated that the high threat induction (M = 0.69; SD = 0.72; n = 16) 
elicited significantly more perceived threat to freedom as compared to the low threat 
induction (M = -0.40; SD = 0.82; n = 16). 
Second, anger was used as the dependent variable (the anger index was formed by 
saving first unrotated principal component). Similarly, the results of the univariate 
ANCOVA indicated that only the threat induction (and not restoration induction or the 
interaction of the threat induction with restoration induction) was significantly related to 
anger, F(1, 27) = 7.35, p = .01, partial η2 = .21. The R2 for the entire model was .25 
(adjusted R2 = .14). The effect of the covariate was not significant, F(1 27) = 0.37. Thus, 
these results indicated that the high threat induction (M = 0.50; SD = 1.08; n = 16) 
elicited significantly more anger as compared to the low threat induction (M = -0.38; SD 
= 0.71; n = 16). 
Finally, the existence of a linear effect as opposed to a curvilinear eff ct on 




performed with threat induction, including the no-message condition (coded as 0), low 
threat to freedom condition (coded as 1) and high threat to freedom condition (coded as 
2) used as the independent variable. Here as well, involvement was used as a covariate 
(see S. S. Brehm & Brehm, 1981). To examine the proposed linearity of the induction on 
the manipulation checks, polynomial contrasts were used.  
First, the perception of threat to freedom was used as the dependent variable (the 
threat to freedom index was formed by saving first unrotated principal component). The 
overall ANOVA, which has 2 degrees of freedom, indicated that the effect of the threat o 
freedom induction on the perception of threat to freedom was significant, F(2, 35) = 
18.64, p < .001, partial η2 = .52. The significant linear contrast, which has 1 degree of 
freedom (contrast estimate = 1.24 [SE = .23], p < .001), indicated that the three levels of 
the threat induction formed a line and not a quadratic curve (i.e., the quadratic effect was 
not significant), meaning that the means of perceived threat in the no-message condition 
(M = -0.89; SD = 0.75; n = 7), low threat condition (M = -0.40; SD = 0.82; n = 16) and 
the high threat condition (M = 0.69; SD = 0.72; n = 16) were in the predicted order. The 
R2 for the entire model was .53 (adjusted R2 = .49). The effect of involvement as a 
covariate was significant, F(1, 35) = 7.44, p = .01, partial η2 = .18. 
Second, anger was used as the dependent variable (the anger index was formed by 
saving first unrotated principal component). The overall ANOVA, which has 2 degrees of 
freedom, indicated that the effect of the threat to freedom induction on anger was 
significant, F(2, 35) = 4.57, p < .05, partial η2 = .21. The significant linear contrast, 
which has 1 degree of freedom (contrast estimate = .70 [SE = .29], p = .02), indicated that 




quadratic curve (i.e., the quadratic effect was not significant), meaning that the means of 
anger in the no-message condition (M = -0.51; SD = 0.74; n = 7), low threat condition (M 
= -0.38; SD = 0.71; n = 16), and the high threat condition (M = 0.50; SD = 1.08; n = 16) 
were in the predicted order. The R2 for the entire model was .22 (adjusted R2 = .16). The 
effect of the covariate was not significant, F(1, 35) = .04. 
Based on these results, it was concluded that the manipulations were successful.  
The Main Experiment 
The purpose of this experiment was to examine the effects of reactance at three 
different points in time and to document the configurations of cognitive spaces under 
different threat to freedom and restoration conditions. 
Participants 
A sample of 439 students was recruited from undergraduate communication 
courses at the University of Maryland. Thirty-four percent (n = 151) were male. The 
mean age was 20.03 years (Mdn = 20.00; SD = 2.70), with ages ranging from 18 to 53 
years of age. Forty-eight percent ( = 209) of participants were Non-Jewish Caucasian, 
12% (n = 51) were Jewish Caucasian, 11% (n = 48) were African-American, 13% (n = 
56) were Asian or Asian-American, 4% (n = 17) were Hispanic; 4% (n = 16) were South-
Asian (Indian or Indian-American or Pakistani or Pakistani-American), one partici nt 
was Native-American, one participant was Arab or Arab-American, 3% (n = 11) did not 
fit into the provided categories, and the remaining participants (7%; n = 29) did not 
respond to this demographic question. All students received extra-credit in a 
communication course for their participation. 
Design and Procedure 




present vs. filler postscript) x 3 (Time: immediate-time measurement vs. one-minute 
delay vs. two-minute delay) plus 3 (control groups for each time point: immediate-time 
measurement vs. one-minute delay vs. two-minute delay) design (15 conditions total) was 
employed. The manipulations of threat and restoration were identical to those used in
Pilot Study 4. Time was manipulated using DirectRT (Jarvis, 2006) and is described 
below.  
Participants were invited into the experimental laboratory, where they first 
completed consent forms (in the waiting area) and then were seated at a computer. 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the 15 experimental conditions. Data were 
collected in small groups with no more than eight people at a time. Participants could not 
see each other as they participated in the experiment because partition screens eparated 
each computer station. First, the participants completed a practice exeris  in which the 
experimenter (i.e., the author) explained the instructions regarding how to respond to 
magnitude and multidimensional scales. (These instructions were identical to those used 
in Pilot Study 3; see Appendix C). This explanation was followed by two examples for 
each type of response scale.  
Next, the participants in all conditions answered survey questions measuring their 
attitude toward recycling, and then the participants read recycling messages identical to 
those used in Pilot Study 4. However, for the main experiment all of the materials were 
presented on personal computers using the MediaLab software (Jarvis, 2004). The 
participants in the immediate-time condition were asked to perform an MDS task (i.e., 
estimation of pairwise dissimilarities between concepts) immediately ft r reading the 




received the following message designed to improve the plausibility of the time 
manipulation:  
Please wait for the next section of the study to upload. Sometimes, if the server i 
overloaded it can take up to a couple of minutes. Please be patient.  
This message remained on the screen for either one or two minutes (depending on the 
time condition), after which the participants were asked to complete the MDS task and 
manipulation check measures. At the end of the study, the participants were debriefe  
about the purpose of the experiment.  
Instrumentation 
The distribution of all continuous variables was examined for their approximate 
normality (see data transformation section above). If, as assessed by the variable’s 
skewness, a continuous variable appeared relatively non-normal, it was transformed. 
Prior to transformations, the items were first trimmed to a smaller valueto control for 
outliers.12 Means, standard deviations, skewness, and kurtosis, before and after 
transformation (trimmed as necessary), are summarized in Table 3. All of the analyses 
were performed on the transformed variables. Indexes were formed by saving the first 
unrotated principal component (Means, standard deviations and Cronbach’s alphas for 
the indexes using transformed data when necessary, are provided below). 
 Comparison pairs. To measure participants’ attitudes in the format appropriate for 
magnitude scaling, participants were asked to estimate the pairwise dissimilarities 
between all possible pairs of concepts. The instructions were identical to those used in 
Pilot Study 3 (see Appendix C). In addition to the 11 concepts derived from Pilot Study 2 
(i.e., melting ice, Al Gore, rising temperature, CO2, conservation of energy, recycling, 




in the MDS comparisons, creating 66 comparison pairs in all. The order following rder 
of comparison pairs was used: the EPA, melting ice, Al Gore, rising temperature, CO2, 
conservation of energy, recycling, me, good, bad, angry, and my freedom; the comparison 
questions were asked in the order they appeared below the diagonal in the symmetrical 
matrix of all possible pairwise comparisons.  
All derived pairwise dissimilarity estimates were examined for the presence of 
outliers. If outliers were present, these items were first trimmed to a lower value. (Note 
that none of the cases were deleted as a result of this procedure.) When trimming the 
data, an attempt was made to be conservative and trim as little as possible. To ensure 
conservative trimming, the following approach was used. The distribution of each 
variable was first examined based on the frequencies of scores and the histogram. If 
outliers were present, percentile values associated with the ninety-fifth, the ninetieth, the 
eighty-fifth and the eightieth percentile were generated. Trimming the scor s to the 
highest percentile was considered first. If the outliers were still present after trimming the 
data to the eightieth percentile, the scores were further transformed using nonlinear 
transformations (see below). The majority of the estimates were trimmed to the ninetieth 
percentile of the original value except for ice and my freedom, ice and anger, 
temperature and my freedom, energy conservation and bad, recycle and anger, good and 
anger, bad and my freedom, my freedom and anger, EPA and bad, and EPA and anger, 
which were trimmed to the eighty-fifth percentile. The items recycle and bad and good 
and bad were trimmed to the eightieth percentile. All the items were then transformed by 
adding the same constant to each trimmed variable and taking the natural logarithm of the 




because logarithmic transformations cannot be performed on zero values. The specific
constant was determined through trial and error.  
 Involvement.  Involvement was measured by asking participants to indicate how 
much they cared about recycling. They were asked to provide a magnitude scale stimate 
with 0 indicating that they did not care about recycling at all and 100 indicating that they 
cared about recycling moderately. This item was first trimmed to the ninetieth percentile 
and then transformed: transformed variable = ln(trimmed original variable + 100). S. S. 
Brehm and Brehm (1981) argued that to induce psychological reactance individuals have 
to be moderately issue-involved, thus the effect of involvement was controlled in this 
pilot study by using it as a covariate in the analyses that follow. 
Manipulation check: Perception of threat to freedom. In addition to the items 
used in Pilot Study 4 (How much do you feel that the message tried to manipulate you? 
and How much do you feel that the message tried to pressure you?), two additional items 
(How much did the message threaten your freedom to make a decision yourself? and How 
much did the message try to make a decision for you?) were included in the perception of 
threat to freedom index. A magnitude scale was used with 0 indicating that participants’ 
freedom was not threatened at all and 100 indicating that their freedom was moderately 
threatened. All the items were first trimmed to the ninetieth percentile and then 
transformed as follows: item transformed = (trimmed original item +10).4. The mean for 
the perception of threat to freedom index was 20.68 (SD = 7.52; Cronbach’s alpha = .86) 
Manipulation check: Anger. As in Pilot Study 4, the anger index (M = 11.20; SD 
= 4.11; Cronbach’s alpha = .87) comprised four items: irritated, angry, annoyed, and 




response option, where 0 indicated that the participants were not angry at all and 100 
indicated that they were moderately angry. All the items were transformed as follows: 
item transformed = ln(trimmed original item +5). In addition, a single-item measure, 
irritated at the source of the message, was included. This item was trimmed to th  90th 
percentile. Based on the skewness and kurtosis values for this variable, transforming this 
variable was not necessary. 
Manipulation check: Negative thoughts.  Relevant negative thoughts were derived 
through a thought-listing procedure. Following Dillard and Shen (2005), affective 
thoughts were considered redundant with the participants’ responses to the affective 
magnitude scale items, therefore affective thoughts were identified and removed from 
further analyses (i.e., affective thoughts were not counted as negative relevant thoughts). 
Affective thoughts were identified by using a list of affective terms (e.g., angry, guilty, 
happy) compiled by Shaver, Schwartz, Kirson, and O’Connor (1987). A thought was 
classified as affective whenever those terms appeared and as cognitive otherwise. An 
undergraduate research assistant was recruited to help with this coding. To make sure that 
this coding was reliable, another undergraduate research assistant was recruited to code 
20 percent of the data (Scott’s pi = .90). 
The remaining thoughts were coded in terms of valence (positive, negative, or 
neutral) and relevance to the message (relevant or irrelevant) by two undergraduate 
research assistants. Negative relevant thoughts were defined as responses that expressed 
disagreement with the message, revealed a negative intention to comply with the 
message, indicated that a participant was intending to do something contrary to the 




boring or stupid), or disagreed with the tone of the message (e.g., the message was 
pushy). To calculate inter-coder reliability, twenty percent of the data were coded by the 
two coders (Scott’s pi = .80). Any disagreement between coders was resolved through 
discussion. The number of relevant negative thoughts was transformed: transformed 
number of relevant negative thoughts = ln(original variable + 1.70).  
Analytical Strategy 
Generating cognitive maps. The derived transformed pairwise dissimilarity 
estimates in each experimental condition were first averaged, and then anti-transformed 
to preserve the original measurement units. The anti-transformation involved 
exponentiating the value obtained through transformation and subtracting 50. Next, the 
anti-transformed means were entered into Galileo Software (Woelfel, 1993)and the 
coordinates establishing the locations of the 12 concepts in the cognitive space were 
generated. To generate the coordinates, Simplified Process for Entering Data (SPED) and 
Microgal procedures were used (Woelfel, 1993). Galileo researchers (e.g., Woelfel, 1990) 
warn against comparing cognitive maps derived from Microgal generated coor inates. 
Woelfel showed that using Microgal generated coordinates may lead to space differences 
that are artificial and are merely a result of the algebraic algorithms used to generate the 
coordinates. To remedy this, a rotation to congruence is recommended. This rotation 
involves selecting some arbitrary reference points (here, all concepts in a space in a 
particular condition) and rotating concepts in other spaces to the concepts in the reference 
space. Spaces were rotated to least-squares best fit (i.e., congruence) usi g Intergal and 
V56 procedures of the Galileo program (Woelfel, 1993). 
In this study rotation was performed based on the specific hypotheses. If a given 




in a time-series fashion (i.e., time two was rotated to time one, and time three was rotated 
to time two); but if a given hypotheses dealt with a comparison across the threat to 
freedom and restoration conditions, then a rotation was performed based on the maps of 
interest that were a part of a given hypothesis. For example, H1 through H4 required 
comparing spaces in the low threat to freedom, control, and the high threat to freedom 
conditions. As a result, at the immediate time measurement the coordinates in the co trol 
condition were rotated to the coordinates in the low threat to freedom condition and the 
coordinates in the high threat to freedom condition were rotated to the coordinates in th  
control condition. Using such a rotation makes sense because comparing the control 
condition to the low threat to freedom condition establishes whether or not the 
participants who received a persuasive message (as compared to those who did not) 
exhibited more attitude change or greater behavioral intentions as a result of the message; 
comparing the high threat to freedom condition to the control condition allows 
determining whether participants exhibited a boomerang effect as a result of the high 
threat to freedom induction.  
Determining the number of dimensions. For any k concepts included in a 
cognitive space (12 in the present study), there are k – 1 possible dimensions. Not all of 
these dimensions should be included in the analyses as some of these k – 1 dimensions do 
not explain a substantial amount variance and may also be imaginary (i.e., the dimensions 
that have negative eigenvalues and emerge as a result of pairwise dissimilarities violating 
the triangle inequality; Woelfel, 1990). Therefore, the next step was to determine wh ch 





Based on the eigenvalues generated by the Galileo software (Woelfel, 1993), 
scree plots were generated, and the traditional approach to the examination of scree plots 
was applied (i.e., the presence of significant bend was interpreted as a cut-off point). In 
addition, the sum of all the real eigenvalues was divided by the number of all real
dimensions. Positive eigenvalues larger than the average were interpreted as xplaining a 
substantial amount of variance. Based on the examination of all the spaces in this study, 
two real dimensions predominated (but see Barnett & Woelfel, 1979). An illustration of 
this process is provided in the Appendix D: The eigenvalue scree plots rotated in a time-
series fashion are presented in Figures D-1 through D-15 and the calculations used to 
determine averages are presented in Table 4.   
Determining motion of concepts across cognitive spaces. The motion of concepts 
across cognitive spaces was determined using the two dimensions as establish d above. 
Note that in this dissertation, the motion of concepts across conditions is a between-
participants effect. The word motion is used to indicate differences in distances across 
conditions. Here, motion is a descriptive term; it should not be inferred that motion was 
measured as a within-participants effect. Galileo output allows determining the location 
and motion for any concept across experimental conditions. However, for this 
dissertation the main focus was determining how the distances for the pairs of concepts 
change across the conditions of interest. For example, to be able to infer reduced 
persuasion in the case of attitude toward recycling when threat to freedom is high (as 
compared to when threat to freedom is low), the distances between recycling and good in 





To calculate the distance (the notation for the distances between concepts used 
below is Dij, indicating that D is the distance between concept i and concept j)
 between 
the two concepts in the same space (i.e., condition), the coordinates in two spaces of 
interest and across the two dimensions have to be located and their distance found. To do 
so, a Pythagorean Theorem approach (i.e., a square of the hypotenuse is equal to the sum 
of the squares of the sides) was applied and the following formula to calculate dist nces 
was used:  
Dij
2 = (the location of concept A in space A in dimension 1 – the location of 
concept B space A in dimension 1)2+ (the location of concept A in space A 
dimension 2 – the location of concept B space A dimension 2) 2.  
To get the value for the actual distance, the square root of Dij
2was used.  
Once the distance between two concepts was calculated in one space, a similar set of 
calculations was performed to determine the distance between the same set of concepts in 
another space. A simple subtraction was used to determine the magnitude of the 
difference.  
Significance testing. To test whether the differences between the pairs of concepts 
across conditions were statistically significant, a specific analytic  strategy was 
developed. Because the dimensionality of the pairwise comparisons was important to this 
research, the selected strategy required that the dimensionality of the data be t ken into 
consideration. Two data sources were available to calculate statistical significance: first, 
the data that derived from the participants’ pairwise dissimilarity estimates of the 12 
concepts; and second, the data obtained from the Galileo-rotated to congruence 




significance posed some problems, which are discussed below.   
If using the data derived from the participants’ pairwise dissimilarity estimates of 
the 12 concepts, a reasonable approach may be to perform univariate ANOVAs using the 
pairwise estimates as the dependent variables. However, in light of the aforementioned 
eigenvalue analysis and the examination of scree plots revealing that in these data a two-
dimensional solution appeared plausible, performing univariate ANOVAs with depen nt 
variables using all k – 1 dimensions was deemed not to be appropriate. Therefore, this 
approach to significance testing had to be modified.  
Contrary to the ANOVA analyses discussed above, the data obtained from the 
Galileo-rotated to congruence coordinates did take dimensionality into consideration, but 
because the generated coordinates came from aggregate data, there were no variability 
measures around each concept in the cognitive spaces. Using aggregate data was 
appropriate for the space- and coordinate-generation analyses, but the lack of variability 
measures around the means made significance testing impossible. Therefore, to use these 
data, a strategy had to be developed to allow generating measures of variability to e 
included in the analyses.  
To remedy the lack of dimensionality information in the ANOVA, an approach 
was developed allowing the amount of variance explained by each of the two dimensions 
to be taken into account. To do so, the transformed scores derived from the participants’ 
pairwise dissimilarity estimates for a specific cognitive space (i.e., condition) were 
multiplied by the ratio of eigenvalue for that dimension to the total eigenvalues for all 
dimensions in that particular space.13 The same procedures were repeated for both 





To resolve the lack of variability information around the means obtained through 
the Galileo method, an approach developed by Fink and Chen (1995) was used. This 
approach represents a modified version of the jackknife procedure reported in Mosteller 
and Tukey (1977). The essence of any jackknife procedure is that when variability 
information is unavailable, these procedures allow drawing a number of subsamples from 
a given sample and provide steps to determine pseudo-variability measures that can be 
subsequently used to calculate pseudo-t tests or analyses of variance. A modified version 
of the jackknife procedure used by Fink and Chen (1995) involved selecting three 
subsamples containing two-thirds of the data and generating the pseudo-values from 
these three subsamples.  
The complexity of the data in the present study posed additional difficulties as, 
before calculating the pseudo-t tests, the same steps that were used to generate the rotated 
coordinates have to be performed for each of the three subsamples in each of the 15 
conditions. Specifically, the data from all the participants in a given condition (i.e., 66 
pairs of all concepts) have to be first selected and manually reentered into SPED: The 
format of the Galileo data files does not allow for cutting and pasting from the SPSS or 
Excel files. Next, Microgal syntax has to be run to generate an initial set of coordinates. 
For the 15 conditions, these steps have to be repeated 60 times.14 Th n, based on the 
hypotheses, coordinates in specific conditions have to be selected and rotated to 
congruence (e.g., if concepts in the low threat to freedom condition have to be compared 
to a high threat to freedom condition, each jackknifed subsample has to be rotated to 




performed for each of the jackknifed subsamples and one rotation has to be performed for 
the transformed full set of data. The generated rotated coordinates can then be entered 
into the SPSS or Excel to generate pseudo-significance tests.  
The essence of significance testing based on the modified jackknife procedure 
involves estimating how much each concept moved on each of the two dimensions across 
the conditions of interest, and then based on the pseudo-variability values, calculating 
pseudo-t tests. To calculate pseudo-values for one concept of interest, the following steps 
have to be followed: 
1. Rotated coordinates of interest have to be found. For example, to test the 
amount of variability around recycling when threat to freedom was low as 
opposed to the control condition, the coordinates for recycling in both 
conditions have to be generated. The coordinates of interest have to be 
generated in the three jackknifed subsamples and the full data set.  
2. Differences in locations for a concept of interest between the two 
conditions in dimension one have to be calculated. (These procedures have 
to be repeated for the three jackknifed subsamples and the full data set.) 
The results of these calculations can be used as a proxy for standard 
deviations. Following Mosteller and Tukey’s (1977) procedure, the 
following formula can be used to calculate a pseudo-mean for each 
concept of interest on the first dimension: [N (y all)] – [(N -1) (y jk)], where 
N is the number of all jackknifed subsamples, y all is the location 
difference for the concept of interest on dimension one between the two 




and y jk is the location difference on dimension one between the two 
conditions of interest for the concept of interest using the coordinates 
derived from each jackknifed subsample. To obtain the mean for the 
concept of interest, the outcome of this formula for each jackknifed 
subsample has to be averaged.  
3. To obtain a pseudo standard error, the following formula was used: 
SD/√N.  
4. Then, a confidence interval was computed, where the t value with 
appropriate degrees of freedom and alpha level was used.  
5. These procedures have to be performed for all the concepts of interest for 
a given hypothesis for both dimension one and dimension two.  
It is obvious from the steps described above that the jackknife procedure is 
cumbersome, time-consuming, and has a high likelihood of error (because the Galileo
software does not automate this procedure). Therefore, a decision was made to test for 
statistical significance using the ANOVA approach that adjusts for the amount of 
variance explained by a given dimension, as described at the beginning of this section.
(From now on this procedure will be referred to as variance-adjusted ANOVA). To cross-
validate the variance-adjusted ANOVA approach, a modified jackknife procedure was 
performed to test a few selected predictions. Although both procedures (i.e., variance-
adjusted ANOVA and jackknife) approach significance testing somewhat differently, the 
convergence of the results from both methods can be viewed as an adequate way to cross-
validate these procedures. The results of the cross-validation are reported in th  results 




Planned comparisons: Overcoming the lack of orthogonality. To test significance 
across specific pairs of conditions, variance-adjusted t- st analyses (similar to variance-
adjusted ANOVAs described above) may be performed. For some hypotheses (e.g., H1-
H4), the significance tests across specific pairs of conditions were predicted as planned 
comparisons. In some cases, these planned comparisons were nonorthogonal. For 
example, planned comparisons for H1 through H4 involved comparing the low threat 
condition to the control condition (H4), the control condition to the high threat condition 
(H3) and the high threat condition to the low threat condition (H2). To remedy this lack 
of orthogonality, a correction for nonorthogonality can be used. In this dissertation, a 
Bonferroni correction was used that adjusts the significance level for the number of 
comparisons to be made. For example in H1-H4, there were three planned comparisons, 





Chapter 4: Results 
In Chapter 4 the results of the main experiment are presented. The chapter starts 
with a description of the manipulation checks for perceptions of threat to freedom, anger, 
and negative relevant thoughts. Then, the results of the method cross-validation for 
significance testing are presented. Finally, the results for the hypotheses and research 
questions are detailed. 
Manipulation Checks 
Manipulation Check: Perceptions of Threat to Freedom 
Manipulation checks were only performed on the fully crossed part of the design. 
A univariate ANCOVA was performed to ascertain the effect of threat manipul tion on 
perceived threat with involvement used as a covariate. Threat, time, and restoration 
inductions were used as the independent variables, and the perceived threat was used as 
the dependent variable (the threat to freedom index was formed by saving the first 
unrotated principal component). The R2 for the entire model was .08 (adjusted R2 = .04). 
The effect of the covariate was not significant, F(1, 341) = 0.32. The results indicated 
that the effect of the threat induction was significant, F(1, 341) = 19.64, p < .001, partial 
η2 = .05. The individuals in the low threat condition perceived significantly less threat to 
freedom (M = -0.11; SD = 0.92; n = 179) than individuals in the high threat condition (M 
= 0.35; SD = 1.06; n = 175). Neither the effect of restoration induction, F(1, 341) = 0.26, 
nor the time induction, F(2, 341) = 0.14, was significant. Further, there were no 
significant interactions between the independent variables. Based on these results it was 
concluded that the effect of the threat to freedom manipulation on perceived threat to 




Manipulation Check: Anger 
A univariate ANCOVA was performed to determine the effect of threat 
manipulation on perceived anger with involvement used as a covariate. Threat, time, and 
restoration inductions were used as the independent variables. Anger was used as the 
dependent variable (the anger index was formed by saving first unrotated principal 
component). The R2 for the entire model was .05 (adjusted R2 = .02). The effect of the 
covariate was significant, F(1, 341) = 5.09, p = .03, partial η2 = .02. The effects of threat, 
F(1, 341) = 1.27, restoration, F(1, 341) = 0.99, and time, F(2, 341) = 1.25, were not 
significant. 
The participants were also asked how irritated they were at the message source.15 
Therefore, participants’ level of irritation at the source of the messag  w s also 
considered as a manipulation check for perceived anger. Once again, a univariate 
ANCOVA was performed with involvement as a covariate. Threat, time, and restoration 
inductions were used as the independent variables, and the perceived irritation at the 
source of the message was used as the dependent variable. (Recall that this variable is a 
single item measure that did not require transformation). The R2 for the entire model was 
.05 (adjusted R2 = .02). The effect of the covariate was significant (one-tailed test), F(1, 
341) = 2.60, p = .108 (two-tailed), partial η2 = .01. The effect of the threat manipulation 
on perceived irritation at the source of the message was significant, F(1, 341) = 8.29, p = 
.004, partial η2 = .02. Specifically, in the low threat condition (M = 22.40; SD = 35.66; n 
= 179), the participants were significantly less irritated at the message ource as 
compared to high threat condition (M = 34.14; SD = 40.92; n = 175). The effects of 
neither restoration, F(1, 341) = 0.73, nor of time, F(2, 341) = 0.43, were significant. 




on these results it was concluded that the effect of threat manipulation based on how 
irritated the participants were at the source of the message was succesf l.  
Manipulation Check: Negative Relevant Thoughts 
A univariate ANCOVA was performed to ascertain the effect of threat 
manipulation on negative relevant thoughts, with involvement used as a covariate. The 
threat, time, and restoration inductions were used as the independent variables and 
negative relevant thoughts were used as the dependent variable (this variable is a 
transformed number of negative relevant thoughts). The R2 for the entire model was .05 
(adjusted R2 = .02). The effect of the covariate was not significant, F(1 341) = .004. The 
results indicated that threat induction was significant, F(1 341) = 4.88, p < .05, partial η2 
= .02. Specifically, individuals in the low threat condition had significantly fewer 
negative relevant thoughts (M = 0.99; SD = 0.50; n = 179) than individuals in the high 
threat condition (M = 1.11; SD = 0.53; n = 175). The effect of the restoration induction 
was not significant, F(1, 341) = 1.36, and there were no significant interactions between 
the independent variables. However, the effect of the time induction was significant, F(2, 
341) = 5.01, p < .01. A polynomial contrast revealed a significant negative linear effect 
for time. Specifically, study participants had more negative relevant thoughts in the 
immediate-time condition (M = 1.17; SD = 0.53; n = 115) than in the one-minute-delay 
condition (M = 0.99; SD = 0.50; n = 119), and there was no difference in negative 
relevant thoughts reported in the one-minute-delay condition as compared to th  two-
minute-delay condition (M = 1.00; SD = 0.51; n = 120). Based on these results it was 
concluded that the effect of threat manipulation on the generated negative relevant 





Notation and Preliminary Remarks 
Recall that the notation for the distances between concepts used in this 
dissertation is D i, j , indicating the distance between concept i and concept j. Distances 
between concepts were calculated using the Pythagorean approach described above. All 
of the values in the graphs below are presented in the original measurement units (100 
units represent a moderate-level difference) because all of these graphs were generated on 
the anti-transformed data. Significance testing was performed on the transformed data. 
Significance Testing: Cross Validation 
To cross-validate the approaches to significance testing (i.e., to compare the 
results of variance-adjusted ANOVAs and t tests to the results of the modified jackknife 
procedure), significance testing was done for the first generic hypothesis (H1) and one of 
the planned comparisons that is part of H1. In selecting a planned comparison, a decision 
was made to cross-validate the predictions in which less dramatic change was expected: 
Specifically, the most motion was expected between the low threat and the high threat 
conditions (i.e., reduced persuasion), and less motion was expected between the low 
threat and the control conditions or the high threat and control conditions. To make cross-
validation more convincing, showing the results converge in the case where more subtle 
differences were expected was selected for the analyses: Indeed, if both approaches are 
capable of detecting smaller differences between conditions as significant, using one less 
labor-intensive approach may be sufficient. Thus, the motion between low threat to 
freedom condition and control condition (i.e., H4) was examined for cross-validation.  
First, the significance for H1 was tested by eight different ANOVAs (one for each 
concept pair for each dimension).16 The threat to freedom induction was used as the 




recycling and me, recycling and bad, and recycling and anger (adjusted for the variance 
accounted for by each dimension as described above) wer  used as the dependent 
variables. To establish the sign of the relationship between the independent and 
dependent variables, a correlation between the threat induction and each dependent 
variable was calculated (from a positive correlation between variables, a po itive 
relationship was inferred, and from a negative correlation, a negative relationship was 
inferred).  
The results of the overall variance-adjusted ANOVAs, which have 2 degrees of 
freedom, and bivariate correlations between the threat induction and each dependent 
variable are presented in Table 6. The results of the polynomial contrasts, which have 1 
degree of freedom, indicated that, on dimension one, a significant positive (as inferred 
from positive correlations between threat induction and each dependent variable) linear 
effect of the threat to freedom induction was found for all four dependent variables: 
recycling and good (contrast estimate = .30 [SE = .08], p < .001), recycling and me 
(contrast estimate = .39 [SE = .06], p < .001), recycling and bad (contrast estimate = .57 
[SE = .09], p < .001), and recycling and anger (contrast estimate = .40 [SE = .10], p < 
.001).  
The results of variance-adjusted ANOVAs on dimension two yielded a significa t 
negative (as inferred from negative correlations between the threat induction and each 
dependent variable) linear effect of the threat to freedom induction on recycling and me 
(contrast estimate = -.13 [SE = .03], p < .001), recycling and good (contrast estimate = -
.15 [SE = .04], p = .001), recycling and bad (contrast estimate = -.12 [SE = .05], p = .01), 




results, it was concluded that the motion described in H1 was statistically significant.  
To examine whether the motion of concepts across the low threat to freedom and 
the control condition was significant (i.e., to test significance for H4), variance- djusted t 
tests were performed.17 The details of the variance-adjusted  tests are presented in Table 
7. Note that because the comparisons for H1 through H4 are nonorthogonal, a Bonferroni 
correction was used that adjusts the significance level for the number of comparisons to 
be made. There were three planned comparisons in H1-H4, thus the significance level for 
those analyses was (.05/3) or .017. The t-test results indicated that across the low threat 
and control conditions, the changes in distances between recycling and good, recycling 
and bad, and recycling and anger were statistically significant only on dimension two, 
but not dimension one. The mean distances on dimension two indicated that greater 
motion occurred in the control condition as compared to the low threat condition (see 
Table 7 and Figure 5). The distance between r cycling and me on dimension two was not 
significant, but on dimension one it approached significance (at p = .045) based on a one-
tailed test. (Note that because planned comparisons in this study were directional, one-
tailed tests are appropriate). The mean distances on dimension one indicated that grea er 
motion occurred in the low threat condition as compared to the control condition (see 
Table 7 and Figure 5). Based on these results it was concluded that the motion for the 
concepts of interest in H4 was significant.  
Next, to cross-validate the results obtained from the variance-adjusted ANOVs 
and t test, the analyses based on the jackknife approach were conducted. The calculations 
required for the jackknife approach are summarized in Tables 8 through 11. The results 




condition as compared to the control condition was significant. As inferred from Figure 
5, in the low threat condition, good moved in a less positive direction on dimension one 
as compared to the control condition. For dimension two, recycling exhibited significant 
movement. Figure 5 indicates that in the low threat condition, recycling moved in a more 
positive direction on dimension two as compared to the control condition. Taken 
together, these results indicated that as recycling moved on dimension two, only go d 
(but none of the other concepts) exhibited significant motion on dimension one. In sum, 
similarly to variance-adjusted ANOVAs, using the jackknife approach deemed the 
motions of some concepts across conditions significant. 
The variance-adjusted ANOVAs and t tests reported above and the results of the 
modified jackknife procedure are different approaches to examining statistical 
significance. However, the fact that both show evidence of statistically significant 
differences in motion across conditions validates the variance-adjusted ANOV  and t-
test approach that takes the variance explained by a particular dimension into 
consideration. Thus, to determine significance in all hypotheses tested in this study, the 
variance-adjusted ANOVA and t-test approach was used.18  
Hypotheses 1-4 
In light of the significant differences between the conditions of interest in H1 (see 
Table 6), the specific planned comparisons and the results based on Galileo analyses are 
further discussed below. The graphic representations of H1 through H4 are presented in 
Figures 5 and 6.  
First, the reduced persuasion effect proposed in H2 was examined. To test 
whether the differences in distances for the concepts of interest in the high threat to 




variance-adjusted t tests were performed. The details of the variance-adjusted t tests are 
presented in Table 12. Recall that because the comparisons for H2 are nonorthogonal, a 
Bonferroni correction was used that adjusts the significance level for the number of 
comparisons to be made. There were three planned comparisons in H1-H4, thus the 
significance level for these analyses was (.05/3) or .017. The variance-adjusted t te  
results indicated that across the low threat and high threat conditions, the distance 
between recycling and me changed significantly on both dimensions: The mean distances 
on dimension one indicated that greater motion occurred in the high threat condition as 
compared to the low threat condition, and on dimension two greater motion occurred in 
the low threat condition as compared to the high threat condition (see Table 12 and 
Figure 5). The distance between recycling and good, recycling and bad, and recycling 
and anger changed significantly only on dimension one but not dimension two. The mean 
distances on dimension one indicated that across these three dependent variables, greater 
motion occurred in the high threat condition as compared to the low threat condition (see 
Table 12 and Figure 5). Based on these results it was concluded that the motion for the 
concepts of interest in H2 was significant.  
Next, the reduced persuasion effect based on Galileo analyses was examined. To 
do so, at the immediate time measurement the distances between me andrecycling as 
well as recycling and good at high versus low threat to freedom were compared. Recall 
that the data for Galileo analyses were anti-transformed (i.e., the distance  reported below 
are in the original metric). The results confirmed the existence of the reduced persuasion 
effect: When threat to freedom was high, recycling was located 49.46 units further away 




= 105.21), as compared to when threat to freedom was low (D recycling, me = 118.31 
and D recycling, good = 64.47).  
 
 
Figure 5. Concept location in two-dimensional space (the X axis represents the first real 
dimension, and the Y axis represents the second real dimension) for H1-H4 at the 
immediate time measurement. The distances were derived from the two-dimensional 
solution using the Galileo analyses.19 Distances were anti-transformed. 
 
The distances between recycling and bad and recycling and anger at low and high 




was high, recycling (D recycling, bad = 346.00) was not perceived more negatively than 
when threat to freedom was low (D recycling, bad = 281.62). Instead, recycling was 
viewed as 64.39 units less negative when threat to freedom was high as compared to 
when threat to freedom was low. Similarly, and contrary to what was expected, wh n 
threat to freedom was high, recycling moved 10.54 units further away from anger (D 
recycling, anger = 263.15) as compared to when threat to freedom was low (D recycling, 
anger = 252.61). Thus, H2 was partially supported. 
 
 
Figure 6. The distances for the listed pairs (derived from the two-dimensional solution 
using the Galileo analyses) in the low threat, control, and high threat conditions at the 
immediate time measurement. The graph represents the reduced persuasion, a boomerang 
effect, and an increase in persuasion predicted in H2 through H4. Smaller numbers 
indicate less distance. Distances were anti-transformed.20 
 




the concepts of interest in the high threat to freedom condition as compared to the control 
condition were statistically significant, variance-adjusted t tests were performed. The 
details of the variance-adjusted t tests are presented in Table 13. Recall that because the 
comparisons for H1-H4 are nonorthogonal, a Bonferroni correction was used that adjusts
the significance level for the number of comparisons to be made. There were three 
planned comparisons in H1-H4, thus the significance level for these analyses was (.05/3) 
or .017. The variance-adjusted t-test results indicated that across the high threat and 
control conditions, the distance between r cycling and me, recycling and good, recycling 
and bad, and recycling and anger changed statistically significantly on both dimensions. 
The mean distances on dimension one for all four dependent variables indicated that 
greater motion occurred in the high threat condition as compared to the control condition, 
and on dimension two, greater motion occurred in the control condition as compared to 
the high threat condition (see Table 13 and Figure 5). Based on these results it was 
concluded that the motion for the concepts of interest in H3 was significant.  
Next, the results based on Galileo analyses were examined. Recall that the d ta 
for Galileo analyses were anti-transformed (i.e., the distances reported below are in the 
original metric). H3 posited that at the immediate time measurement, a threat to 
attitudinal or behavioral freedom causes a boomerang effect. In the context of present 
research, it was proposed that the boomerang effect will manifest itself in the following 
way: When freedom is threatened, recycling was expected to move further away from me 
and good (as compared to the control condition) and move closer to and cluster around 
bad and angry (as compared to the control condition).  




from me when threat to freedom was high (D recycling, me = 167.77) as compared to 
when no message or a freedom threat were present (D recycling, me = 142.79). Similarly, 
the distance between recycling and good increased 15.48 units when threat to freedom 
was high (D recycling, good = 105.21) as compared to the control condition (D recycling, 
me = 89.72). This motion away from individuals’ initial position confirms the predicted 
boomerang effect for the positively valenced dependent variables (i.e., recycling and me 
and recycling and good).  
Recycling was also predicted to move closer to bad and anger in the high threat 
condition as compared to the control condition. The results indicated that when threat to 
freedom was high, contrary to this prediction, recycling moved 27.33 units away from 
bad (D recycling, bad = 346.00) as compared to the control condition (D recycling, bad = 
318.68), whereas recycling and anger, as predicted, moved 19.37 units closer together (D 
recycling, anger = 263.15) as compared to the control condition (D recycling, anger = 
282.52). Based on these results, the predictions regarding negatively valenced pairs of 
concepts (recycling and bad and recycling and anger) were only partially supported. 
Overall, H3 was partially supported.  
H4 was examined next. H4 predicted that at the immediate time measurement, 
low threat to attitudinal or behavioral freedom leads to persuasion as compared to the 
control condition. Recall that the statistical significance of the motion of concepts across 
these two conditions was determined in the cross-validation section of this chapter (see 
above; for the variance-adjusted t-tests results, see Table 7). Because the motion across 
conditions was deemed significant, the results based on Galileo analyses were xamined 




transformed (i.e., the distances reported below are in the original metric). In terms of 
distances, H4 predicted that when threat to freedom is low, (a) the concept denoting the 
attitude or behavior targeted by the message moves closer towards the concepts me and 
good (as compared to the control condition); and (b) the concept denoting the attitude or 
behavior targeted by the message moves further away from bad and angry (as compared 
to the control condition). Consistent with this prediction, when threat to freedom was 
low, the distance between recycling and me decreased by 24.48 units, and the distance 
between recycling and good decreased by 25.25 units as compared to the control 
condition. 
Contrary to the prediction regarding negatively valenced concepts, the distances 
between recycling and bad and recycling and angry did not increase in the low threat 
condition as compared to the control condition. Instead, the results indicated that when 
threat to freedom was low, recycling and bad moved 37.06 units closer (D recycling, bad 
= 281.62) as compared to the corresponding distance in the control condition (D 
recycling, bad = 318.68), and recycling and anger moved 29.91 units closer (D recycling, 
anger = 252.61) as compared to the corresponding distance in the control condition (D 
recycling, anger = 282.52). Based on these results, the predictions regarding negatively 
valenced pairs of concepts (recycling and bad and recycling and anger) were only 
partially supported. Overall, H4 was partially supported.  
In sum, the results for H1 through H4 confirmed the predicted boomerang effect 
(H3) and reduced persuasion (H2) when threat to freedom was high for positive att ude 
(as determined form the distance between recycling and good) and behavioral intention 




the control condition, receiving a pro-recycling message when threat to freedom was low 
resulted in an increase in positive attitude and behavioral intention (H4). The overall U-
shape of the effect of freedom threat on the distances between recycling and good and 
recycling and me predicted in H1 was also supported (see Figure 6): As a result of the 
threat to freedom induction, the least distance between recycling and me and the 
recycling and good was found when threat to freedom was low as compared to both the 
control condition and when threat to freedom was high. However, the distance between 
recycling and me and recycling and good was significantly greater when threat to 
freedom was high as compared to the control condition. These effects are not as clear for
negatively valenced pairs (i.e., recycling and anger and recycling and bad); potential 
explanations for these results are addressed in the discussion chapter.  
Hypothesis 5 
This hypothesis explored the effects of a restoration postscript on persuasion. H5 
posited that at the immediate time measurement, the distance between the recycling and 
good and the recycling and me from least to most is: low threat to freedom with 
restoration condition, low threat to freedom without restoration condition, high treat to 
freedom with restoration condition, and high threat to freedom without restoration 
condition. Univariate variance-adjusted ANOVAs with polynomial contrasts were
conducted to test for statistical significances. To represent the predicted linear effect, a 
variable was created, for which the low threat with restoration condition was coded as 1, 
low threat without restoration condition was coded as 2, high threat with restoration 
condition was coded as 3, and high threat without restoration condition was coded as 4; 
this variable was used as the independent variable. The dimension-specific distan es 




for by each dimension as described above) w re used as the dependent variables. The 
details of the variance-adjusted ANOVAs and the bivariate correlations between the 
independent (with conditions coded linearly) and the dependent variables are presented in 
Table 14. The results indicated that, for dimension one, a linear effect of the independent 
variable (with conditions coded linearly) on positive attitude (i.e., recycling and good) 
and behavioral intention (i.e., recycling and me) was supported; and, for dimension two, 
the linear effect was not significant.  
For recycling and me (see Figures 7 and 8), the predicted linear pattern of amount 
of persuasion held for all conditions except for low threat with restoration condition: The 
presence of the restoration postscript resulted in greater behavioral intentio s (i.e., 
reduced the amount of reactance) in all conditions except for when low threat message 
was paired with restoration. Specifically, in the high threat with restoration condition, the 
distance between recycling and me was 30.57 units less (D recycling, me = 136.95) as 
compared to the distance between r cycling and me (D recycling, me = 167.53) in the 
high threat without restoration condition, but in the low threat with restoration condition, 
the distance between recycling and me increased by 9.25 units (D recycling, me = 136.95) 
as compared to the distance between recycling and me (D recycling, me = 123.11) the 
low threat without restoration condition.21 In the case of attitudes, in the low threat with 
restoration condition, the distance between r cycling and good (D recycling, good = 
107.28) increased by 26.39 units as compared to the distance between recycli g and good 
(D recycling, good = 80.89) in the low threat without restoration condition. However, in 
the high threat with restoration condition, the distance between recycling and good (D 








Figure 7. Concept location in two-dimensional space (the X axis represents the first real 
dimension, and the Y axis represents the second real dimension) for H5 at the immediate 
time measurement across different threat and restoration conditions. The distances were 






Figure 8. The distances for the listed pairs (derived from the two-dimensional solution 
using the Galileo analyses) in the low threat with restoration, low threat without 
restoration, high threat with restoration, and high threat without restoration conditions at 
the immediate time measurement (H5). The order of the conditions was coded to 
represent the linear effect tested in this hypothesis. Smaller numbers indicate less 
distance. Distances were anti-transformed. 
 
Figure 9 contains an alternative representation of H5. In this figure, the findings 
for H5 are presented as an interaction between threat to freedom and restoration on the 
distances between recycling and me and recycling and good. These results indicate that 
there appears to be an interaction between threat to freedom and restoration on the 
distances between recycling and me and recycling and good. In the absence of a 
restoration postscript, the distance between recycling and me and recycling and good was 
always smaller in the low threat condition as compared to the high threat condition: 




condition was 167.53 units, and the corresponding distance in the low threat without 
restoration condition was 123.11 units. Similarly, the distance between recycling and 
good in the high threat without restoration condition was 107.74 units, and the 
corresponding distance in the low threat without restoration condition was 80.89 units.  
 
 
Figure 9. Alternate representation of H5 as an interaction between threat to freedom and 
restoration on the distances between r cycling and me and recycling and good (derived 
from the two-dimensional solution using the Galileo analyses). Smaller numbers indicate 
less distance. Distances were anti-transformed. 
 
Interestingly, adding a restoration postscript made the distances between recycling 
and me across the two levels of threat almost the same: The distance between recycling 
and me in the high threat with restoration condition was 136.95 and the distance between 
recycling and me in the low threat with restoration condition was 132.36. However, the 
distance between recycling and good was 37.04 units larger in the low threat with 




distance in the high threat with restoration condition (D recycling, good = 70.24), 
indicating that adding a restoration postscript to a persuasive message decreased the 
positive attitude in the low threat to freedom condition as compared to the high threat to 
freedom condition.  
A trend is evident here: Pairing a low threat to freedom message with a restoration 
postscript led to a reduction in positive attitude (as determined from an increase in 
distance between recycling and good) and behavioral intention (as determined from an 
increase in distance between recycling and me) as compared to when a restoration 
postscript was not included into the low threat message. However, when threat to 
freedom was high, the presence of a restoration postscript led to a considerable incease 
in both positive attitude (as determined from a decrease in distance between recycling 
and good) and behavioral intention (as determined from a decrease in distance between 
recycling and me). Based on these results, H5 was partially supported.  
The rationale for the next set of tests is based on Dinauer and Fink’s (2005) 
suggestion that there is more to attitude change than simply changes in the target at itude 
concept (here, recycling), and the motion for other related concepts associated with the 
target attitude concept (here, energy conservation) should be examined.  
Research Question 1 
RQ1 asked about the motions associated with the related concept at the immediate 
time measurement. Recall that the related concept is defined as a concept associated with 
the concept targeted by a persuasive message. In the present research, th  related concept 
was energy conservation. The patterns for energy conservation at the immediate time 
measurement are summarized in Figures 10 and 11.  




recycling) were examined for the related concept (i.e., energy conservation). Once again, 
univariate variance-adjusted ANOVAs with planned comparisons (similar to theests 
used for H1-H4) were performed. For these analyses, the threat to freedom induction was 
used as the independent variable, and the dimension specific distances between energy 
conservation and good and energy conservation and me (adjusted for the variance 
accounted for by each dimension as described above) wer  used as the dependent 
variables.  
The results of the overall variance-adjusted ANOVAs, which have 2 degrees of 
freedom, are presented in Table 15. The results of the polynomial contrasts, which have 1 
degree of freedom, indicated that, for dimension one, a significant positive (as inferred 
from positive correlations between the threat induction and each dependent variable) 
linear effect of the threat to freedom induction was found for both dependent variables: 
energy conservation and me (contrast estimate = .35 [SE = .08], p < .001) and energy 
conservation and good (contrast estimate = .32 [SE = .08], p < .001). 
The results of variance-adjusted ANOVAs on dimension two yielded a significant 
negative (as inferred from negative correlations between the threat induction and each 
dependent variable) linear effect of the threat to freedom induction on recycling and me 
(contrast estimate = -.15 [SE = .04], p = .001) and recycling and good (contrast estimate 
= -.14 [SE = .04], p = .002). Based on these results, it was concluded that the overall 
motion explored in RQ1 was statistically significant. 
To examine whether a pattern of motion observed for energy conservation across 
the control, low threat, and high threat conditions was similar to the pattern of moti n 




conducted for H2 through H4 were performed. Statistical significance for the differences 
in the distances across conditions of interest was tested by variance-adjust d t te ts. 
Recall that because these planned comparisons are nonorthogonal, a Bonferroni 
correction was used that adjusts the significance level for the number of comparisons to 
be made. There were three planned comparisons, thus the significance level for these 
analyses was (.05/3) or .017. The details of the variance-adjusted t tests are presented in 
Table 16. 
First, it was tested whether the distances between en rgy conservation and me and 
energy conservation and good across the high threat to freedom and the control 
conditions were significant. The variance-adjusted t-test results indicated that across the 
high threat and control conditions, the distances between en rgy conservation and good 
and energy conservation and me changed significantly on both dimensions. The mean 
distances on dimension one for all four dependent variables indicated that greater motion 
occurred in the high threat condition as compared to the control condition, and on 
dimension two, greater motion occurred in the control condition as compared to the high 
threat condition (see Table 16 and Figure 10). 
Second, variance-adjusted t tests were performed to tests whether the differences 
in distances between energy conservation and me and energy conservation and good 
across the high threat and low threat conditions were significant. The -test results 
indicated that across the high and low threat conditions, the distance between nergy 
conservation and good and energy conservation and me changed statistically significantly 
only on dimension one, but not on dimension two. The mean distances on dimension one 




threat condition (see Table 16 and Figure 10). 
Finally, the differences in distances between nergy conservation and me and 
energy conservation and good across the low threat to freedom and the control condition 
were examined. The t-test results indicated that neither distances were significantly 
different. (Note that because these analyses were conducted for a research question, one-
tailed tests are not appropriate). The results for RQ1 based on the Galileo analyses were 
examined next.  
First, the differences between the high threat to freedom and the control 
conditions were examined. Recall that the data for Galileo analyses were anti-
transformed (i.e., the distances reported below are in the original metric). The results of 
the Galileo-derived analyses indicated that for behavioral intention, there was no 
boomerang effect: When threat to freedom was high, the distance between nergy
conservation and me (D energy conservation, me = 137.40) reduced by 11.21 units (D 
energy conservation, me = 148.61) as compared to when the freedom-threatening 
message was absent. There was, however, a reduced persuasion effect: When threat to 
freedom was low, the distance between nergy conservation and me (D energy 
conservation, me = 98.53) reduced by 38.87 units (D energy conservation, me = 137.40) 
as compared to when threat to freedom was high. Receiving a pro-recycling message 
resulted in an increase in behavioral intention for energy conservation in the low threat 
condition: As compared to the control condition, the low threat to freedom message 
moved energy conservation and me 50.08 units closer to each other.22 This distance is 
almost twice as much as the amount of persuasion related to r cycling (i.e., the target 








Figure 10. Concept location in two-dimensional space (the X axis represents the first ral 
dimension, and the Y axis represents the second real dimension) for RQ1 at the 
immediate time measurement. The distances were derived from the two-dimensional 






Figure 11. The distances for the listed pairs (derived from the two-dimensional solution 
using the Galileo analyses) in the low threat, control and high threat conditions at the 
immediate time measurement (RQ1). Smaller numbers indicate less distance. Distances 
were anti-transformed. 
 
A similar increase in positive attitude resulted in the case of energy conservation 
and good, although to a much smaller degree: As compared to the control condition (in 
which D energy conservation, good = 97.06), the distance between ergy conservation 
and good in the low threat to freedom condition decreased by 11.94 units (D energy 
conservation, good = 88.82).23 However, this difference is only about a half of the 
amount of persuasion related to recycling: As a result of a pro-recycling message, the 
distance between recycling and good increased by 25.25 units when threat to freedom 
was low as compared to the control condition, indicating that the change in the concept 
targeted by a message were greater in magnitude as compared to the change in the related 
concept.  




positive attitudes: Instead of having the largest distance between en rgy conservation and 
good being in the high threat condition (as compared to the low threat and the control 
conditions), this distance was the smallest, 76.88 units (as compared to 88.82 units in the 
low threat condition and 97.06 units in the control condition). It also should be noted that 
the differences between these numbers are small (and the distances across the low threat 
and the control condition were not significant based on variance-adjusted t tests reported 
above), indicating the lack of drastic fluctuations between conditions.  
In sum, the results for RQ1 have shown that the patterns for the target attitude 
concept (i.e., recycling) do not replicate for the related concept (i.e., energy 
conservation). Instead of a boomerang effect present in the case of recycling and me and 
recycling and good at the high level of threat, there was a reduced persuasion effect for 
the intention to conserve energy (which still resulted in an increased intention to cserve 
energy as compared to the control condition), and there was an increase in positive 
attitude to energy conservation (as compared to the low threat and control conditions). 
Next, RQ2 was examined. 
Research Question 2 
RQ2 asked about the effects of a restoration postscript on energy conservation at 
the immediate time measurement (see Figures 12 and 13). Univariate variance- djusted 
ANOVAs with polynomial contrasts were performed. To examine whether the linear
effect (i.e., that at the immediate time measurement the amount of reactance from least to 
most is: low threat with restoration condition, low threat without restoration condition, 
high threat with restoration condition, and high threat without restoration condition) 
predicted for the target concept (i.e., r cycling) also held for energy conservation, linear 




representing conditions coded linearly (the low threat with restoration condition coded as 
1, low threat without restoration condition coded as 2, high threat with restoration 
condition coded as 3, and high threat without restoration condition coded as 4). The 
dimension-specific distances between energy conservation and good and energy 
conservation and me (adjusted for the variance accounted for by each dimension as 
described above) were used as the dependent variables. The details of the variance-
adjusted ANOVAs and the bivariate correlations of the independent and the dependent 
variables (computed to determine the sign of the relationship between the independent 
and dependent variables) are summarized in Table 17. The results showed a signific nt 
positive (as determined from a positive correlation between the independent variable and 
each dependent variable) linear effect of the independent variable (with conditions coded 
linearly) on both attitude and behavioral intention for dimension one. For dimension two, 
the linear effect was not significant.  
In sum, based on the results of variance-adjusted ANOVAs, it was concluded that 
the differences in motion of energy conservation and me and energy conservation and 
good across the low threat with restoration condition, low threat without restoration 
condition, high threat with restoration condition, and high threat without restoration 
condition were statistically significant. The details of the Galileo analyses are further 
discussed next. The Galileo results are represented by Figures 12 and 13. Figure 14 
represents the results of RQ2 as an interaction between the threat induction and 
restoration. Recall that the data for Galileo analyses were anti-trsformed (i.e., the 






Figure 12. Concept location in two-dimensional space (the X axis represents the first ral 
dimension, and the Y axis represents the second real dimension) for RQ2 at the 
immediate time measurement. The distances were derived from the two-dimensional 
solution using the Galileo analyses. Distances were anti-transformed. 
 
Based on the Galileo analyses, when a high threat to freedom message was paired 
with the restoration postscript, the results were different from the ones found for the
target concept (i.e., recycling): Contrary to reactance reduction as a result of a restoration 




regarding the attitude to energy conservation and a very small increase in reactanc  
regarding the intention to conserve energy were observed: For positive attiude, he 
presence of a restoration postscript when threat to freedom was high increased th  
distance between energy conservation and good by 12.50 units (compare D energy 
conservation, good = 82.72 in the high threat without restoration condition vs. D energy 
conservation, good = 95.22 in the high threat with restoration condition); for behavioral 
intention, this increase was substantially smaller 3.63 units (compare: D energy 
conservation, me = 135.63 in the high threat without restoration condition vs. D energy 
conservation, me = 139.25 in the high threat with restoration condition).24  
 
 
Figure 13. The distances for the listed pairs (derived from the two-dimensional solution 
using the Galileo analyses) in the low threat with restoration, low threat without 
restoration, high threat with restoration and high threat without restoration conditions a  
the immediate time measurement (RQ2). Smaller numbers indicate less distance. 




When examining the distances for energy conservation and me and energy 
conservation and good across the low threat without restoration and low threat with 
restoration conditions, results similar to the ones found for recycling emerged: For both 
positive attitude and behavioral intention, a decrease in positive attitude (as determined 
from an increase in distance between nergy conservation and good) and behavioral 
intention (as determined from an increase in distance between energy conservation and 
me) was found when a low threat message was paired with a restoration postscript. 
Specifically, the distance between ergy conservation and me in the low threat without 
restoration condition (D energy conservation, me = 97.28) increased by 36.76 units as 
compared to the distance between these concepts in the low threat with restoration 
condition (D energy conservation, me = 134.04). The distance between ergy 
conservation and good in the low threat without restoration condition (D energy 
conservation, good = 96.05) also increased by 9.11 units as compared to the distance 
between these concepts in the low threat with restoration condition (D e ergy 
conservation, good = 105.16).25 
Figure 14 contains an alternative representation of RQ2. In this figure, the 
findings for RQ2 are presented as an interaction between the threat to freedom induction 
and restoration on the distances between energy conservation and me and energy 
conservation and good. These results indicate that there appears to be no interaction 
effect between the threat to freedom induction and restoration on the distance betwe n 
energy conservation and good. Adding a restoration postscript to either the high or low 
threat message did not affect the positive attitude to energy conservation. Regardless of 




conservation and good was always less in the high threat condition as compared to the 
low threat condition. Specifically, in the high threat without restoration condition the 
difference between energy conservation and good was 13.32 units smaller (D energy 
conservation, good = 82.76) than the distance in the low threat without restoration 
condition (D energy conservation, good = 96.05); similarly, in the high threat with 
restoration condition the difference between nergy conservation and good was 9.94 units 
smaller (D energy conservation, good = 95.22) than the distance in the low threat without 
restoration condition (D energy conservation, good = 105.16).  
 
 
Figure 14. Alternate representation of RQ2 as an interaction between threat to freedom 
and restoration on the distances between energy conservation and me and energy 
conservation and good (derived from the two-dimensional solution using the Galileo 
analyses). Smaller numbers indicate less distance. Distances were anti-t ansformed. 
 
However, there appears to be an interaction between the threat to freedom 




absence of a restoration postscript, the distance between en rgy conservation and me in 
the high threat without restoration condition was 135.63 and the distance between nergy 
conservation and me in the low threat without restoration condition was 97.28, indicating 
the distance between energy conservation and me in the low threat without restoration 
condition was 38.5 units larger than the distance in the low threat without restoration 
condition. Adding a restoration postscript made the distances between en rgy
conservation and me across the two levels of threat almost the same: The distance 
between energy conservation and me in the high threat with restoration condition was 
139.25 and the distance between energy conservation and me in the low threat with 
restoration condition was 134.04. (Recall that the same pattern was observed for 
recycling and me.) 
Taken together, these results indicate that, when threat to freedom was high, 
adding a restoration postscript affected energy conservation (i.e., the related concept) 
differently than recycling (i.e., the target concept): Instead of increasing positive attitude 
and behavioral intention (i.e., reducing reactance) in the high threat condition, a 
restoration postscript resulted in virtually no change for behavioral intention and some 
decrease in positive attitude (i.e., an increase in reactance). When threat to freedom was 
low, the effect of restoration for the related concept was similar to the effects of 
restoration for the target concept (i.e., r cycling): In the case of energy conservation, 
adding a restoration postscript resulted in some reduction in positive attitude (as 
determined from an increase in distance between energy conservation and good) and a 
substantial reduction in behavioral intention (as determined from a substantial incre se in 




is discussed next. 
Hypothesis 6 
The final set of tests dealt with the dynamics of reactance. H6 predicted tha there 
is a decay of reactance that takes place over time. Thus, in the context of these data, a 
negative linear effect of time on positive attitude (i.e., r cycling and good) and behavioral 
intention (i.e., recycling and me) was tested. Univariate variance-adjusted ANOVAs were 
performed to test significance for the motion described in H6. To test the linear effect of 
time, an independent variable was created, in which the high threat at the immediate time 
condition was coded as 1, high threat at a one-minute-delay condition was coded as 2, 
and the high threat at a two-minute-delay condition was coded as 3. The dimension 
specific distances between recycling and good and recycling and me (adjusted for the 
variance accounted for by each dimension as described above) for each of the two 
dimensions were used as the dependent variables. When threat to freedom was high, the
results of the univariate variance-adjusted ANOVAs for dimension one supported the 
negative (as determined from a significant negative correlation between im  and each 
dependent variable) linear effect of time on both behavioral intention and positive att ude 
(see Table 18). For dimension two, a positive linear effect emerged for behavioral 
intention and an inverted-U-shaped effect was found for positive attitude. In the secion 
below the results for H6 based on the Galileo analyses are discussed. 
To interpret Galileo results of H6, the trajectories in the high threat to freedom 
condition had to be examined in the context of the trajectories in the low threat to 
freedom and the control conditions; therefore, Figures 15 through 18 include the time 
trajectories for the low threat and the control conditions. Recall that the data for G lileo 




metric). The results for behavioral intention (i.e., r cycling and me) were examined first. 
 
 
Figure 15. Recycling and me locations in two-dimensional space (the X axis represents 
the first real dimension, and the Y axis represents the second real dimension) for H6 
measured at three points in time across low threat, high threat and control conditions. The 
distances were derived from the two-dimensional solution using the Galileo analyses. 





Figure 16. The distances for recycling and me (derived from the two-dimensional 
solution using the Galileo analyses) in the low threat, control, and high threat conditions 
at the immediate time measurement, one-minute, and two-minute delay (H6). Smaller 
numbers indicate greater less distance. Distances were anti-transformed. 
 
For behavioral intention (see Figures 16 and 17), as predicted, the high threat to 
freedom induction yielded a boomerang effect at the immediate time measurement: The 
boomerang effect was inferred from recycling being located 24.19 units closer to mein 
the control at the immediate time condition (D recycling, me = 141.37) as compared to 
the high threat at the immediate time condition (D recycling, me = 165.56). The 
boomerang effect persisted and became more pronounced at a one minute delay, resulting 
in 83.01 units decrease in behavioral intention in the high threat condition (D recycling, 
me = 192.01) as compared to the control condition (D recycling, me = 109.01). At a two-
minute delay the boomerang effect dissipated as determined from recycling being located 




compared to the control condition (D recycling, me = 225.74). At a two-minute delay, the 
reduced persuasion effect was evident, with recycling being located 26.42 units closer to 
me in the low threat to freedom condition (D recycling, me = 112.39) as compared to the 
distance between these two concepts in the high threat condition (D recycling, me = 
138.81). The distance between recycling and me (D recycling, me = 138.81) in the high 
threat condition measured at a two-minute delay was almost identical to the distance 
between these two concepts (D recycling, me = 141.37) in the control condition taken at 
the immediate time measurement.  
In sum, the results in the high threat condition indicated a boomerang effect at the 
immediate time, an increase in boomerang effect at a one-minute delay, and a dissip tion 
of the effect at a two-minute delay. At a two-minute delay the behavioral intent on to 
recycle in the high threat condition was almost identical to the behavioral intention in the 
no-message condition at the immediate time measurement. However, at a two-minute 
delay the behavioral intention to recycle was still less in the high threat condiion than in 
the low threat condition. Thus, for behavioral intention, H6 was partially supported. 
For positive attitude (see Figures 18 and 19) at the immediate time measurement, 
the data revealed a reduced persuasion effect as determined from the distance between 
recycling and good in the high threat condition (D recycling, me = 120.54) being 56.07 
units greater than in the low threat condition (D recycling, me = 64.47). However, there 
was no boomerang effect (the distances between r cycling and good were almost 
identical in the high threat condition, D recycling, me = 120.54, and the control condition, 
D recycling, me = 118.80).26 At a one-minute and a two-minute delay, the effects of 




attitude to recycling): In the high threat condition, the distance between recycling and 
good was 20.63 units larger at the immediate time measurement (D recycling, me = 
120.54) as compared to the corresponding distance measured at a one-minute delay (D 
recycling, me = 99.91), and at a two-minute delay this distance reduced further by 4.21 
units (D recycling, me = 95.70) as compared to the corresponding distance at a one-
minute delay.27 Although in the high threat condition there was an overall increase in 
positive attitude (as determined from a decrease in distance between recycling and good) 
over time, attitudes in the low threat condition across three points in time were alays 
more positive than attitudes in the high threat condition, indicating that a reduced 
persuasion effect persisted across the three points in time. Overall, the results for attitude 
offer only partial support for H6.  
 
Figure 17. The distances between recycling and good (derived from the two-dimensional 
solution using the Galileo analyses) in the low threat, control, and high threat conditions 
at the immediate time measurement, one-minute, and two-minute delay (H5). Smaller 






Figure 18. Recycling and good locations in two-dimensional space (the X axis represents 
the first real dimension, and the Y axis represents the second real dimension) for H6 
measured at three points in time across low threat, high threat and control conditions. The 
distances were derived from the two-dimensional solution using the Galileo analyses. 
Distances were anti-transformed. 
 
Research Question 3 




restoration. To represent the linear effect of time, a variable was created in which the 
high threat at the immediate time condition was coded as 1, high threat at a one-minute 
delay condition was coded as 2, and the high threat at a two-minute delay condition was 
coded as 3; this variable was used as the independent variable. The dimension-specific 
distances between recycling and me and recycling and good were used as the dependent 
variables. First, temporal trajectories in the high threat with restoration condition across 
the three points in time were examined (see Table 19). The results of the univariate 
variance-adjusted ANOVAs revealed that for dimension one, there was a significant 
curvilinear (an inverted-U-shaped) effect of time on both dependent variables (i.e., 
recycling and me and recycling and good); for dimension two, there was a significant 
negative linear effect of time on both dependent variables. Second, temporal trajectories 
in the low threat with restoration condition were examined (see Table 20). The results of 
the ANOVAs revealed that on dimension one there was a significant positive linear effect 
of time on both dependent variables (i.e., r cycling and me and recycling and good), and 
on dimension two there was a significant negative linear effect of time on both dependent 
variables. Based on the results of variance-adjusted ANOVAs, it was concluded that the 
differences in motion across the three points in time were statistically significant. The 
results of the Galileo analyses were examined next. 
Based on Galileo results, first, the temporal effects in the high threat with 
restoration condition were examined. The patterns are presented in Figures 19 and 20. 
Recall that the data for Galileo analyses were anti-transformed (i.e., the distances 
reported below are in the original metric). The pattern in the high threat with restoration 




(inverted-U) shape. When threat was high and the message was paired with a restoration 
postscript, there were more positive attitude toward recycling (D recycling, good = 60.52) 
and greater behavioral intention to recycle (D recycling, me = 130.22) at the immediate 
time measurement, as compared to one-minute delay condition: At a one-minute delay, 
the distance between recycling and good increased by 52.30 units (D recycling, good = 
112.18) and the distance between r cycling and me increased by 15.31 units (D recycling, 
me = 145.54). At a two-minute delay in the high threat with restoration condition, both 
recycling and me and recycling and good moved closer to each other: The distance 
between recycling and good decreased by 49.75 units (D recycling, good = 63.06), and 
the distance between recycling and me decreased by 18.04 units (D recycling, me = 
127.50). It should be noted that at a two-minute delay in the high threat with restoration 
condition, the distance between recycling and me and recycling and good became almost 
identical to the distance between these concepts taken at the immediate time 
measurement.  
Second, when a low threat message was paired with restoration postscript, 
trajectories for attitude and behavioral intention were not uniform as compared to the 
high threat with restoration condition. In the low threat with restoration condition, 
trajectories for behavioral intention were linear and flat: The distances between recycling 
and me were essentially identical at the immediate time measurement (D recycling, me = 
132.36) and at a one-minute delay (D recycling, me = 132.34), and there was a 9-unit 
increase in distance at a two-minute delay (D recycling, me = 141.24).28 Temporal 
trajectories for positive attitude in the low threat with restoration conditi were U-




recycling, good = 107.28) was 12.04 units greater than at a one-minute delay (D 
recycling, good = 95.24); and the distance at a one-minute delay was 24.47 units smaller 
than at a two-minute delay (D recycling, good = 119.71). 
 
 
Figure 19. Concept locations in two-dimensional space (the X axis represents the first 
real dimension, and the Y axis represents the second real dimension) for RQ3 measured 
at three points in time across low threat with restoration and high threat with restoration 
conditions. The distances were derived from the two-dimensional solution using the 





In comparing the effect of restoration across the two threat to freedom conditions 
(low versus high), a few differences in dynamics are notable. For both attitude and 
behavioral intention, oscillatory patterns were present in the high threat with restoration 
condition.  However, in the low threat with restoration condition, an oscillation was 
present only in the case of positive attitude, and a very small change was apparent across 
the three points in time in the case of the behavioral intention. 
 
Figure 20. The distances for the listed pairs (derived from the two-dimensional solution 
using the Galileo analyses) in the low threat with restoration and high threat with 
restoration conditions at three points in time (RQ3). Smaller numbers indicate less 




Chapter 5:  Discussion 
This dissertation examined the effects of freedom-limiting communication on 
attitude structures at three points in time. The results replicated the findings of the 
existing research on reactance by showing that at immediate time measurement when 
threat to freedom was high, a boomerang effect emerged leading to change in attitude nd 
behavioral intention in the direction opposite to the one advocated in the message. This 
study also advanced the theory of reactance by documenting how threat to freedom 
affects both the focal attitude concept targeted by the message (here, recycling) as well as 
a related attitude concept (here, energy conservation). In addition, the effects of pairing 
different levels of threat to freedom with a restoration postscript were examined: The 
findings indicated that adding a restoration postscript to low threat to freedom messages 
might be detrimental to persuasion as compared to adding a restoration component whe 
threat to freedom was high. Finally, the effects of threat to freedom and restoration ver 
time were considered: The results suggest that reactance effects may not persist over time 
and may actually be undone to result in more persuasion. These results are further 
discussed below. 
H1 through H4 tested traditional reactance predictions, focusing on reactance 
effects at an immediate time measurement. The results confirmed the existence of the 
reduced persuasion effect (H2): When threat to freedom was high, the distance betwe n 
recycling and me and the distance between recycling and good increased as compared to 
when threat to freedom was low, indicating a significant reduction in positive atttude and 
behavioral intention to recycle as a result of freedom-threatening communicatio . 




boomerang effect (H3): When threat to freedom was high, the distance betwen recycling 
and me and the distance between recycling and good increased as compared to the control 
condition, indicating that freedom threat resulted in motion away from the initial attitude 
and behavioral intention regarding recycling. There was also an increase in persuasion in 
the low threat to freedom condition as compared to the control condition (H4): When 
threat to freedom was low, recycling and me and recycling and good moved closer to 
each other as compared to the control condition, indicating a significant increase in 
positive attitude and behavioral intention to recycle when low threat to freedom message 
was received. Interestingly, the magnitude of change in the low-threat condition (as 
compared to the control condition) was identical for both positive attitude (i.e., recycling 
and good) and behavioral intention (i.e., recycling and me). 
Overall, a U-shaped effect of the threat to freedom induction on positive attitude 
and behavioral intention emerged (as predicted in H1): As a result of the threat to 
freedom induction, the least distance for recycling and me and for recycling and good 
was found when threat to freedom was low as compared to both the control condition and 
when threat to freedom is high. However, the distance between recycling and me and the 
distance between recycling and good was significantly greater when threat to freedom 
was high as compared to the control condition. Taken together, the results for positive 
attitude and behavior intention replicated the effects found in earlier research. Such 
replication is critical: It attests to the success of this study even though a novel method 
was used and it also supports the results of the past research on reactance, suggesting that 
reactance effects can be assessed with different methods. The section below discusses the 




Although in the traditional conceptualization of the reduced persuasion and 
boomerang effects, only positive attitude (here, the distance between recycling and good) 
and behavioral intention (here, the distance between r cycling and me) are considered; 
the distances between recycling and bad and recycling and anger were also examined. 
The results indicated that when threat to freedom was high, recycling was not perceived 
more negatively than when threat to freedom was low (contrary to H2). Instead, recycling 
was viewed as substantially (64.39 units) less negative and somewhat (10.54 units) less 
angering when threat to freedom was high as compared to when threat to freedom was 
low. Recycling was also predicted to move closer to bad and anger in the high threat 
condition as compared to the control condition (H3). This prediction only held for anger, 
which, as predicted, was located closer to recycling in the high threat condition as 
compared to the control condition. However, contrary to H3 prediction, recycling moved 
further from bad when threat to freedom was high as compared to the control condition. 
A similar lack of support was also found for H4: Contrary to the predicted greater 
distance between recycling and bad and recycling and anger in the low threat condition 
as compared to the control condition, the opposite was observed as the distance between 
these concepts was smaller in the low threat condition as compared to the control 
condition.  
These results indicate that despite the traditional conceptualization of g od and 
bad as the end points of an evaluative continuum, this does not seem to hold for the 
present results. These data suggest that perceiving things as being not good does not 
always imply that those things are automatically evaluated as being bad (a similar




phenomena such as reactance, positive and negative attitudes about the concepts targeted 
in the message should be examined separately. In addition, it might be the case that 
reactance only persists for the concepts that are simultaneously evaluated s less positive 
and more negative, indicating that these concepts are perceived as equally bad across 
both positive (as determined from the distance between the targ t concept and good) and 
negative (as determined from the distance between the targ t concept and bad) evaluative 
dimensions; and reactance effects may be less stable for the concepts that are perceived 
less positively, but not more negatively. In addition to the effects of reactance, the effects 
of restoration on persuasion were examined. These results are discussed below. 
In H5, the effects of a restoration postscript were proposed. H5 posited that at the 
immediate time measurement the amount of positive attitude (as determined from the 
distance between recycling and good) and behavioral intention (as determined from the 
distance between recycling and me) from least to most is: high threat to freedom without 
restoration condition, high threat to freedom with restoration condition, low threat to 
freedom without restoration condition, low threat to freedom with restoration condition. 
Simply put, a restoration postscript was expected to alleviate the effects o  reactance in 
the high threat condition, and in the low threat condition, restoration was expected to 
reduce any effects of threat to freedom that may be due to persuasion (see Burgoon, 
Alvaro, Grandpre, et al.’s, 2002, contention than any persuasive attempt may be freedom 
threatening). Based on these data, the restoration postscript was indeed effective at 
reducing reactance in the high threat to freedom condition: When a restoration postscript 
was paired with a high threat message, the attitude to recycling and behavioral intention 




of the high threat with restoration message became either closer to (as in the case of 
behavioral intention) or better (as in the case of attitude) than the effect of the low threat 
without restoration message.  
However, pairing a restoration postscript with a low threat to freedom message 
reduced message effectiveness by reducing behavioral intention and making attitudes 
toward the target concept less positive as compared to the effects of low threat withou
restoration message. One possible explanation for these effects is that at high levels of 
threat, a simple acknowledgement that it is still up to the individuals to make up th ir 
minds alleviates the effects of reactance. However, at low levels of threat, the restoration 
postscript perhaps points to the fact that the message is trying to overtly influence 
people’s opinions and as a result triggers greater reactance. These results ar  consistent 
with Bessarabova, Turner, and Fink (2007), who found that certain message components 
(e.g., including a guilt appeal in a message) may increase the realization th t a message is 
manipulative and may subsequently result in reactance manifested as reduced persuasion. 
The results regarding the effects of reactance on the attitude concept related to the target 
concept are discussed below.  
In addition to examining the effects of reactance on the target concept, changes in 
the location of the related concept (here, energy conservation) were examined. The 
rationale for these tests came from Dinauer and Fink’s (2005) suggestion that there is 
more to attitude change than simply changes in the target attitude concept, and the motion 
of other concepts associated with the target attitude concept should be considered. A 
research question (RQ1) was posed about the motions at the immediate time 




that the patterns found for the target attitude concept (i.e., recycling) were not found for 
the related concept (i.e., energy conservation). Instead of the boomerang effect evident 
for recycling and me and recycling and good at the high level of threat, there was a 
reduced persuasion effect for the intention to conserve energy (which resulted in an 
increased intention to conserve energy as compared to the control condition; i.e., there 
was no boomerang effect); and there was an increase in positive attitude to energy 
conservation (as compared to both the control condition and the low threat condition).  
Overall, for behavioral intention, receiving a high threat message was better (in 
terms of pro-energy-conservation attitude change) than receiving no message; but 
receiving a low threat message was still better than receiving a high threat message. The 
positive attitude for energy conservation was most positive in the high threat condition, 
followed by the low threat and then the control conditions (but recall that the difference 
between the low threat condition and the control condition was not significant). These 
results suggest that the detrimental effects of reactance are only applicable to the target 
attitude concept, and other related concepts may instead show an increase in positive 
attitude and behavioral intention as a result of a reactance-inducing communication.  
In sum, the results of RQ1 were consistent with Dinauer and Fink’s (2005) 
findings showing that targeting some attitudes by persuasive messages led to changes in 
other related concepts despite the fact that the message did not explicitly target those 
related concepts. More research is needed to test these relationships. Because attitude 
structures appear to be sensitive to the changes in any of its components, it is likely that 
in addition to the effects of the threat to freedom, the inclusion of a restoration 




examined in RQ2. 
 RQ2 asked about the effects of a restoration postscript on the related attitude 
concept energy conservation at the immediate time measurement. RQ2 results indicated 
that when threat to freedom was high, adding a restoration postscript affected energy
conservation (i.e., the concept related to the target attitude concept) differently than 
recycling (i.e., the target concept): Instead of increasing positive attitude and behavioral 
intention (i.e., reducing reactance), a restoration postscript resulted in a decre se in 
positive attitude (i.e., an increase in reactance) and no change in behavioral intention. 
When threat to freedom was low, the effects of restoration for the related attiu e concept 
were similar to the effects of restoration for the target concept: In the case of energy 
conservation, adding a restoration postscript resulted in some reduction in positive 
attitude (as determined from an increase in distance between energy conservation and 
good) and a substantial reduction in behavioral intention (as determined from an increase 
in distance between energy conservation and me), indicating an increase in reactance. 
Further, for the intention to conserve energy, adding a restoration postscript erased the 
differences between the low threat and high threat messages and made the magnitude of 
distance between energy conservation and me in the low and high threat with restoration 
conditions the largest as compared to other conditions (although the magnitude of 
difference in distances between the high threat without restoration and a high threat with 
restoration conditions was almost the same). These results indicate that a restor tion 
postscript had adverse effects on the attitude concept related to the target attitude
concept: Including a restoration postscript consistently resulted in a decreas  in positive 




magnitude of change for behavioral intention in the high threat with restoration condition 
as compared to the high threat without restoration condition suggests that the adverse 
effects of the restoration postscript in this case were rather small. The reasons for these 
adverse effects are unclear. Further research is required to understand the mechanisms 
leading to these effects.  
The final set of analyses dealt with the dynamics of reactance. H6 predicted that 
there is a decay of reactance that takes place over time. For behavioral intention, as 
predicted, the high threat to freedom caused a boomerang effect at the immediate time 
measurement, but, contrary to prediction, the boomerang effect persisted and became
more pronounced at a one-minute delay. At a two-minute delay the boomerang effect 
dissipated and only a reduced persuasion effect was present. These results indicate the 
presence of an oscillation in behavioral intention as a result of reactance-inducing 
communication: a boomerang effect at the immediate time measurement, an increase in 
boomerang effect at a one-minute delay, and a dissipation of the effect at a two-minute 
delay. At a two-minute delay the behavioral intention to recycle was almost identical to 
the behavioral intention in the no-message condition at the immediate time measureent. 
However, at a two minute delay the behavioral intention to recycle was still less in the 
high threat condition as compared to the low threat condition.  
For positive attitude at the immediate time measurement, the data revealed a 
reduced persuasion effect, but not a boomerang effect. At a one-minute and a two-minute 
delay, the effects of reactance were gradually declining (i.e., the distances showed 
gradual movement toward more positive attitude to recycling). Although in the hig 




the low threat condition were always more positive than attitudes in the high threat 
condition, indicating that a reduced persuasion effect persisted across the three points in 
time.     
RQ3 asked about temporal trajectories in the target attitude concept as a result of 
restoration. The patterns in the high threat with restoration condition for both attitude and 
behavioral intention were similar and curvilinear (U-shaped).29 When threat to freedom 
was high and the message was paired with a restoration postscript, there were both a 
more positive attitude toward ecycling (as determined from a decrease in distance 
between recycling and good) and a greater behavioral intention to recycle (as determined 
from a decrease in distance between r cycling and me) at the immediate time 
measurement and at a two-minute delay as compared to the one-minute delay. At a two-
minute delay in the high threat with restoration condition, the positive attitude and 
behavioral intention were almost identical to the positive attitude and behavior intentio  
recorded at the immediate time measurement, suggesting that at a two-minute delay both 
attitude and behavioral intention returned to their initial position after an oscillation.  
When a low threat message was paired with a restoration postscript, temoral trajectories 
for attitude and behavioral intention were not uniform as compared to the high threat with 
restoration condition. In the low threat with restoration condition, temporal trajectories 
for behavioral intention were linear and somewhat flat, showing no change between the 
immediate time measurement and a one-minute delay, and then a decrease in behavioral 
intention at a two-minute delay. Temporal trajectories for positive attitude n the low 
threat with restoration condition were curvilinear (inverted-U-shaped), showing a more 




recycling and good) at a one-minute delay and a less positive attitude (as determined 
from an increase in distance between r cycling and good) at the immediate time 
measurement and a two-minute delay.30 
Overall, across the two levels of threat to freedom (low vs. high), restoration 
(absent vs. present) and three points in time, attitudes to recycling were great r in 
magnitude as compared to behavioral intentions, indicating that attitudes may be more 
malleable and easier to change as compared to behavioral intentions. In addition, the 
magnitude of change was greater for attitudes as compared to the behavioral intentions. It 
is likely that when an individual’s attitudinal position is being considered, a greater 
number of possible attitudinal positions may come to mind, which makes greater 
fluctuations in attitudinal positions possible. An intention to perform a behavior might be 
more restricting, because it is more grounded in objective reality and involves specific 
steps of planning and implementation. 
In addition to the hypothesis tests, another issue that merits discussion is the time 
of manipulation checks, specifically the time of manipulation check for anger. Although a 
pilot test (see Pilot Study 4) indicated that the threat manipulation was successf l with 
regard to its anger-inducing ability, the traditional manipulation check for anger 
conducted in the main study did not yield a significant difference in anger for high threat 
versus low threat inductions. A potential explanation for this failure of the threat 
manipulation to affect perceived anger is the time when the manipulation check was 
administered in the main experiment. Traditionally, reactance research mploys 
manipulation checks immediately after the threat induction (e.g., Dillard & Shen, 2005), 




message. This delay was because the participants were asked to estimate pa rwise 
dissimilarities between the concepts first, which made sense because individuals’ 
attitudes structures were the focus of the study. It is likely that emotional states are more 
volatile as compared to the opinions regarding whether or not the participants felt 
pressured by the message. Moreover, the question was worded as How angry do you feel 
after reading the message?, which might have been interpreted as inquiring about 
participant’s current emotional state. (Note that this wording is consistet with the 
wording typically used in manipulation check questions inquiring about emotional states;
see, e.g., Mitchell, Brown, Morris-Villagran, & Villagran, 2001.) 
It should be noted, however, that when the participants were asked how irritated 
they were at the message source, the results indicated that the manipulation check for t  
threat to freedom induction on perceived irritation was successful. A potential 
explanation for why this induction check was successful comes from the research on 
emotion indicating that angry people (as opposed to people in other emotional states) are 
always aware of the source of their anger (e.g., Nabi, 2002). Thus, connecting the source 
of the message with anger (or, in this case, irritation) became a better manipulation check 
item at a more delayed time point. 
This lack of the effect of threat to freedom induction on anger measured 10 
minutes after the receipt of the message also raises an interesting question regarding the 
persistence of reactance effects. The dynamics of reactance explored in this study 
indicate the reduction in reactance effects at a two-minute delay (as evident from the 
presence of a reduced persuasion effect, not a boomerang effect), but because only thr e 




effects of reactance. However, the difficulty in finding anger effects after 10 minutes may 
suggest that at least some of the effects of reactance may not persist. The implications of 
these effects are further discussed below. 
Implications 
This study has several important implications for future research directions. 
Although much research involving reactance begins with the discussion of adverse 
effects that are due to reactance, no attempts have been made to examine whether these 
effects persist beyond the initial measurement. The Galileo-derived trajctories explored 
in this study point to an overall decrease in reactance at a two-minute delay for both 
attitude and behavioral intention. These temporal patterns and the reduction of anger 10 
minutes after the threat to freedom induction imply that although boomerang effects may 
be of concern at the immediate time, the over-time effects might not be as detrimental 
(i.e., leading to a reduction in positive attitudes and behavioral intentions) as the initial 
effects might suggest. Furthermore, the effect of the threat to freedom on the rela ed 
attitude concept that resulted in more positive behavioral intention (as compared to no-
message control) and the greatest amount of positive attitude (as compared to the low 
threat and the control conditions) suggest that for a related concept, receiving a freedom-
threatening message may result in persuasion. The present results, however, only offer 
initial evidence of a reduction of reactance over time and is far from definitive: More 
time points (i.e., examining reactance at more than three time points) and longer time 
periods (i.e., examining reactance days and weeks after the induction) need to b  
explored in the future.  




role of anger in reactance, particularly over time. Dillard and Shen (2005) proposed that 
anger and negative cognitions are an amalgam consisting of two different indica ors (i.e., 
cognitive and affective) when measured immediately after the threat to freedom 
induction. The results of the manipulation checks indicate that perception of threat,
negative cognitions, and irritation at the source of the message did persist for ome time 
after the reactance induction, but feelings of anger were not reported after 
(approximately) a 10-minute delay. Even if reactance-related anger dissipates over time, 
the initial feeling of anger might increase message-consistent attitudes and behavior 
change. Because anger is argued to increase attention (Turner, 2007) and cognitive 
elaboration (e.g., Nabi, 1999, 2002), it likely that if a message advocates some specific
behavior, those recommendations will be better remembered if there is a high threat to 
freedom message as compared to a low threat to freedom message. Examining the effects 
of anger over time will help shed light on the temporal effects of reactance. This study 
also offers insights regarding restoration effects on reactance, which are discussed next. 
The results of this study suggest that restorations should be used with caution because
they may not yield the expected results. Undoubtedly, restorations achieved through the 
inclusion of additional information designed to restore individuals’ freedoms are 
tempting techniques to use for researchers and practitioners alike: As C. H. Miller et al. 
(2007) noted, restorations are simple and seem to be an easy solution to reducing 
reactance. The results of this study offer mixed support for the effectiveness of 
restoration postscripts: In this study, a restoration postscript resulted in pro-recycling 
change (as determined from a decrease in distance between recycling and good and 




attitude (as determined from an increase in distance between recycling and good) and a 
decrease in behavioral intention  (as determined from an increase in distance between
recycling and me) when threat to freedom was low. Moreover, including a restoration 
postscript was detrimental to the related attitude concept (i.e., en rgy conservation) 
across both high and low threat to freedom conditions because it resulted in less positive
attitude toward energy conservation and a decrease in behavioral intention to conserve 
energy (as compared to when high and low threat messages were not paired with 
restoration).31 These results, however, only address one type of restorations; more 
research is needed to compare different types of restoration and to examine their effects 
on both the target and related attitude concept.  
In addition to the theoretical implications, the results of this study are relevant for 
practitioners in the areas of message design and persuasion. First, this study suggests that 
exploring target audiences’ attitudes in the context of cognitive structures is important 
because it allows for determining the effects of a persuasive message on oth r related 
concepts in those structures. Second, the study shows that practitioners should be 
cautious about including restoration components as a means of preemptive reactance 
control, because the effects of such restorations may lead to reduce persuasion or 
boomerang effects for both target concepts as well as other related concepts i  the 
attitude structure.  
Limitations 
There are a few limitations of this dissertation that merit discussion. First, a single 
topic was used (see Jackson, 1992, for a discussion of the effects of a single-topic use on 




found had the topic been different. Although research reactance and resistance shows 
consistent effects across topics (see e.g., Dillard & Shen, 2005; Pfau et al., 2009; Rains & 
Turner, 2007), differences in message topic might lead to differences in persuasion. For 
example, Fink et al. (2006) examined the effect of topic on information integration: 
Different information integration approaches were found based on whether a topic was 
optative (i.e., indicating a desire, such as a tuition decrease) versus indicative (i.e., 
indicating a non-evaluative belief, such as global warming). Previous research on 
reactance has shown that a few requirements have to be met for a topic to be appropriate 
for a reactance induction: The topic has to be pro-attitudinal (Worchel & Brehm, 1970) 
and at least somewhat involving (S. S. Brehm & Brehm, 1981). Beyond these two 
concerns, differences in topic have not been explored. Based on Fink et al.’s (2006) 
results, examining the differences based on whether a topic represents a fact (i.e., is 
indicative) versus a desire (i.e., is optative) makes sense: It might be harder to induce 
reactance if a message deals with facts as opposed to desires. 
Second, only one attitude object related to the target concept was explored in this 
dissertation. There may have been different results had a different concept been selected. 
In this study, a related concept equivalent to recycling was used. Rains and Turner (2007) 
provided some evidence that a different attitude concept might have been affected 
differently by reactance. One of the relationships that Rains and Turner examin d was the 
effect of the magnitude of the request on reactance: Their results indicated that reactance 
increased when the request was large and reduced when the request was small. The 
authors suggested that an increase in reactance was due to a perceived imposition on 




was organizing a pro-recycling rally instead of energy conservation, the related attitude 
concept might have been more affected by reactance-inducing communication. Fu ure 
research needs to systematically vary the features of a related attiu e concept (including 
a magnitude of the request) to examine whether these features in a related attitude 
concept make as much difference as they make in the target attitude concept.  
Finally, although analytical difficulties were successfully resolved in the present 
study, the analytical strategy used in this study is cumbersome. Collaboration be ween 
Galileo researchers and software developers is required to automate the process of 
significance testing to make it more user-friendly and to encourage further research in the 
realm of the Galileo theory and modeling. 
In conclusion, this study was a successful attempt at examining the effects o  
freedom-limiting communication on attitude structures at three points in time. The results 
replicated the findings of the existing research on reactance. In addition, this study 
advanced the theory of reactance by examining threat to freedom effects on related
concepts (in addition to the target concept). This study also contributed to reactanc 
research by testing the effects of restoration on reactance. In sum, the present research is 
important for both theorists and practitioners of attitude change and resistance; however, 




                                                
Endnotes 
1 There are many kinds of boomerang effects (for details, see Quick & 
Stephenson, 2007b). 
2 In the studies referred to in this sentence the effect of reactance was determin d 
from the negative coefficients between reactance and the attitude concept. 
3 The association between concepts is assessed by the retrieval of concepts from 
memory; the faster the retrieval, the stronger the association (e.g., Anderson, 1983).  
4 The behaviors that people lack awareness of or lack the ability to execute are not
free behaviors.  
5 In R. L. Miller’s study, reactance was inferred from the reduced attitude ratings 
as compared to the control group’s ratings.  
6 Explaining his findings, R. L. Miller mistakenly labeled his results in the 
overexposure condition a boomerang effect. However, the examination of his means 
suggests that attitude change in the direction opposite to the position advocated in the 
message did not occur. 
7 The scores derived from these averaged measures may have to be transformed 
depending on the extent to which the data meet the assumptions necessary for data 
analysis. 
8 For example, in the Pilot Study 4 one of the variables measuring anger (namely, 
How irritated do you feel after reading the message?) had a skewness value of 3.73 (SE = 
0.37, n = 40), indicating that the assumption of normality appeared implausible. After 




                                                                                                                                                 
9 Although people may differ in their beliefs regarding global warming, the 
majority of individuals in the U.S. do believe that global warming exists. The Pew 
Research Center for the People and the Press (2008) survey data from a large n tionwide 
sample indicated that in the beginning of 2007 (when the data for this study were 
collected) 77% of Americans believed that “there is solid evidence of higher global 
temperatures” (p. 2).  
10 More topic-relevant concepts could have been generated. However, adding 
more concepts to the cognitive space may increase the dimensionality of that space; and 
completing all possible pairwise comparisons of a large number of concepts can be taxing 
for research participants. Therefore, it is reasonable to keep the overall number of 
concepts around 10. 
11 In Dillard and Shen (2005) as well as C. H. Miller et al. (2007), a three-item 
threat index was used. Based on the reliability analysis performed in this dissertat on, the 
item asking participants how much the message threatened their freedom to make a
decision themselves was not included into the final index. 
12 None of the cases were dropped as a result of the trimming.  
13 To take variance explained by a particular dimension into consideration at least 
three different approaches were possible: (1) using the total of eigenvalues for all 
dimensions in a particular space; (2) using the sum of positive eigenvalues only; or (3) 
using the sum of the eigenvalues for the two dimensions only. Any one of the three 
alternatives was appropriate. For this analysis, however, the first option was used. Using 
the total of eigenvalues for a particular space is a more conservative approach: Instead of 




                                                                                                                                                 
eigenvalues are meaningful, the information from all dimensions was used.  
14 The estimate that these steps have to be repeated 60 times was determined by 
multiplying fifteen conditions total by four (i.e., three jackknifed subsamples and one 
sample including all the data that were transformed). To be able to generate spaces in the 
original metric (where 100 indicated moderate difference), the data had to be anti-
transformed. Therefore, this fourth set of data necessary for the calculations of the 
pseudo-variability information could not have been derived from the previous analyses.  
15 This connection of anger with the particular source causing these angry feelings 
is also consistent with the research on emotion indicating that angry people (as opposed 
to people in other emotional states) are always aware of the source of their anger (see, 
e.g., Nabi, 2002). 
16 Recall that H1 proposed an inverted-U-shaped effect of the amount of threat on 
positive attitude and behavioral intention. (In terms of distances, this effect has a U-
shape.) 
17 The same approach was applied here as in the case of variance-adjusted 
ANOVAs. Specifically, to remedy the lack of dimensionality information in the 
ANOVAs and t tests, an approach was developed allowing the amount of variance 
explained by each of the two dimensions to be taken into account. To do so, the 
transformed scores derived from the participants’ pairwise dissimilarity estimates for a 
specific cognitive space (i.e., condition) were multiplied by the ratio of eigenvalue for 
that dimension to the total eigenvalues for all dimensions in that particular space. The 
same procedures were repeated for both dimensions for all conditions. The calculations 




                                                                                                                                                 
18 Recall that, as discussed in the method chapter, hypotheses in this dissertation 
were tested using the Pythagorean approach that allows calculating distances between 
concepts of interest in two-dimensional space. However, based on the significance-testing 
strategy reported in the method chapter, performing variance-adjusted ANOVs and t 
tests determines significant motion of concepts across conditions for each of the two
dimensions separately. A similar approach, in which the motion on each dimension is 
determined separately, was used in the modified jackknife procedure. Therefore, two 
pieces of evidence were considered to ascertain whether the motion across conditions was 
significant. First, it was established whether there was a statisticlly significant motion on 
at least one dimension as determined from the variance-adjusted ANOVAs and t tests. 
Second, the magnitude of the difference across conditions, as determined from the 
Pythagorean approach, was examined: A 10-unit difference was selected as an arbitrary 
cut-off point. If a difference between conditions was less than 10 units and the motion on 
neither dimension was not significant, such difference was considered not significant. In 
the case of contradictory results (e.g., a lack of significance on either dimension as 
determined from the variance-adjusted ANOVAs and t tests, but a substantial magnitude 
of difference based on the Pythagorean approach), the Pythagorean approach results was 
given more weight. Note that this issue arose only once in this dissertation when RQ1 
was tested. Because the magnitude of difference based on the Pythagorean approach was 
substantial (i.e., 50.08 units), this difference was considered significant. 
19 The figures for H1 (i.e., Figure 4 and Figure 5) are the only two figures that are 
represented on a different scale. Specifically, Figure 4 showing concept lo ation in two-




                                                                                                                                                 
figures of the same type, which range from -150 to 100 on both X and Y axes. This 
change in range is because including negatively valenced concepts such as bad andanger 
required that the scale be expanded to represent these concepts (which were located 
further away from other concepts in this study). Presenting other figures showing concept 
location in two-dimensional space on the same scale as Figure 4 was problematic because 
changing the scale substantially decreased the readability of these graphs. The parameters 
for Figure 5 are represented in the note below. 
20 As noted above, the scale for Figure 5, representing distances between the 
concepts of interest, has a different scale as compared to other figures of th  same type.  
Specifically, the scale for the dependent variable (i.e., Y axis) in Figure 5 ranges from 0 
to 400, as compared to other figures of the same type, which range from 0 to 250 on Y 
axis. This change in range is because including negatively valenced concepts su h a bad 
and anger required that the scale be expanded to be able to include these concepts (which 
were located further away from other concepts in this study). Presenting other figures 
showing distances between the concepts of interests on the same scale as Figure 5 was 
problematic because changing the scale substantially decreased the readability of these 
graphs. 
21 Variance-adjusted t tests were performed to examine whether this 9.25-unit 
difference in distance was statistically significant. On dimension one, the mean distance 
between recycling and me in the low threat with restoration condition (M = 3.39; SD = 
0.31; n = 28) was significantly different, (57) = 3.77, p < .001, from the mean distance in 
the low threat without restoration condition (M = 3.70; SD = 0.32; n = 31). On dimension 




                                                                                                                                                 
condition (M = 3.13; SD = 0.20; n = 28) was also significantly different, t(57) = 2.08, p = 
.04, from the mean distance in the low threat without restoration condition (M = 2.03; SD 
= 0.17; n = 31). Thus, it was concluded that the 9.25-unit difference in distance between 
recycling and me across the low threat with restoration and the low threat without 
restoration conditions was statistically significant. 
22 Recall that based on variance-adjusted t tests, changes in distances between 
energy conservation and me and energy conservation and good across the low threat and 
control conditions were not significant. The magnitude of change (50.08 units) derived 
from the Galileo-based analyses makes this finding noteworthy. The discrepan y in the 
results is likely because somewhat different approaches were used to calculate statistical 
significance. 
23 Two pieces of evidence were used to determine whether the change of 11.94 
units was meaningful: (1) the magnitude of change, which was small (less than 12% of a 
moderate difference as determined by the yardstick used in this study); and (2) the results 
of variance-adjusted t tests, which indicated that the differences in distances across the 
two conditions on were not significant on either dimension one or dimension two. Based 
on this information it was concluded that this change was not statistically significant.  
24 Due to a rather small magnitude of change for the behavioral intention, the 
change in distance between ergy conservation and me across the high threat without 
restoration and high threat with restoration conditions should not be given much weight. 
25 Variance-adjusted t tests were performed to examine whether this 9.11-unit 
difference was statistically significant. On dimension one, the mean distace between 




                                                                                                                                                 
0.42; n = 28) was not significantly different, t(57) = 1.40, from the mean distance in the 
low threat without restoration condition (M = 3.29; SD = 0.40; n = 31). However, on 
dimension two, the mean distance between nergy conservation and me in the low threat 
with restoration condition (M = 1.97; SD = 0.26; n = 28) was significantly different, (57) 
= 2.56, p = .01, from the mean distance in the low threat without restoration condition (M 
= 1.81; SD = 0.22; n = 31). Thus, it was concluded that the 9.11-unit difference in 
distance between energy conservation and me across the low threat with restoration and 
the low threat without restoration conditions should be taken into account. 
26 This finding is inconsistent with the results found for H1 and H4. The 
difference is likely because different rotations were performed to test H1 and H4 versus 
H6: For H1 and H4, rotations across different levels of threat to freedom were performed, 
and for H6 time-series rotations were conducted.  
27 Due to its rather small magnitude, the difference of 4.21 units should not be 
given much weight.  
28 Variance-adjusted t tests were performed to examine whether the 9.00-unit 
difference in distance between recycling and me was statistically significant. On 
dimension one, the mean distance between r cycling and me in the low threat with 
restoration condition measured at a one-minute delay (M = 3.76; SD = 0.39; n = 30) was 
significantly different, t(58) = 7.35, p < .001, from the mean distance in the low threat 
with restoration condition measured at a two-minute delay (M = 4.51; SD = 0.40; n = 30). 
On dimension two, the mean distance between r cycling and me in the low threat with 
restoration condition measured at a one-minute delay (M = 1.55; SD = 0.18; n = 30) was 




                                                                                                                                                 
restoration condition (M = 1.65; SD = 0.21; n = 30). Thus, it was concluded that 9.00-unit 
difference in distance between recycling and me across the low threat with restoration 
and the low threat without restoration conditions should be taken into account. 
29 In the results section the opposite effect is reported (i.e., an inverted-U-shaped 
effect). This is because when reporting distances, a smaller distance indicates greater 
amount of attitude, and the opposite is true for attitudes and behavioral intentions.  
30 See above. 
31 With regard to behavioral intention, the magnitude of change in the high threat 
with restoration condition as compared to the high threat without restoration condition 
suggests that the effects of the restoration postscript were in the same direction (i.e., 
indicating a reduction in behavioral intention), but this change is rather small and should 




Table 1. Means, Standard Deviations, Skewness, and Kurtosis for All Pilot Study 3 




























Ice and Al Gore 181.27 189.36 1.60 2.78 5.45 0.60 0.39 -0.67 
Ice and Temperature 45.60 81.00 2.24 5.06 4.88 0.42 1.43 1.24 
Ice and CO2 88.50 82.25 0.82 -0.19 5.15 0.42 0.26 -1.13 
Ice and Energy Conservation 99.57 96.83 1.57 2.55 5.20 0.43 0.49 -0.06 
Ice and Recycling 150.67 163.29 1.46 1.37 5.36 0.57 0.59 -0.53 
Ice and Me 218.50 193.10 1.75 4.14 5.61 0.55 0.21 -0.16 
Ice and Goodd 248.67 218.34 1.95 4.78 5.69 0.57 -0.02 0.41 
Ice and Bad 111.30 152.79 1.76 2.27 5.16 0.59 0.87 -0.17 
Ice and My Freedom 283.67 205.62 0.97 0.77 5.81 0.55 -0.24 -0.34 
Ice and Anger 239.67 201.94 1.00 0.55 5.66 0.61 -0.11 -0.72 
Al Gore and Temperature 181.67 156.33 0.89 -0.35 5.50 0.54 0.25 -1.08 
Al Gore and CO2 124.83 110.85 0.84 -0.21 5.30 0.48 0.18 -1.08 
Al Gore and Energy Conservation 85.70 82.76 1.29 1.29 5.14 0.41 0.47 -0.42 
Al Gore and Recycling 101.47 90.37 0.72 -0.47 5.21 0.44 0.14 -1.18 
Al Gore and Me 299.17 202.41 1.11 1.21 5.87 0.48 0.26 -1.04 
Al Gore and Good 174.73 191.92 2.27 6.26 5.45 0.56 0.72 0.34 




Al Gore and My Freedom 243.67 167.66 0.72 0.21 5.72 0.51 -0.18 -0.78 
Al Gore and Anger 165.67 108.49 0.21 -0.88 5.49 0.45 -0.49 -0.60 
Temperature and CO2d 113.00 114.40 2.74 10.90 5.26 0.44 0.59 1.13 
Temp. and Energy Conservation 113.83 101.65 1.33 1.45 5.27 0.43 0.47 -0.42 
Temperature and Recycling 132.50 116.20 1.24 0.37 5.35 0.45 0.61 -0.40 
Temperature and Me 158.17 115.75 1.00 0.92 5.46 0.44 0.04 -0.40 
Temperature and Good 246.67 233.57 1.87 3.45 5.68 0.57 0.53 0.13 
Temperature and Bad 100.90 119.22 1.99 4.22 5.18 0.49 0.81 0.28 
Temperature and My Freedom 270.00 174.00 0.95 1.48 5.80 0.49 -0.35 -0.05 
Temperature and Anger 192.17 156.64 0.98 0.52 5.54 0.54 -0.05 -0.69 
CO2 and Energy Conservation 176.33 138.70 0.72 -0.40 5.50 0.52 -0.09 -0.83 
CO2 and Recycling 200.90 204.10 1.59 3.31 5.51 0.63 0.25 -0.81 
CO2 and Me 170.83 186.91 2.49 7.45 5.45 0.52 0.98 0.85 
CO2 and Goodd 475.83 284.55 0.90 -0.52 6.25 0.47 0.25 -0.73 
CO2 and Bad 21.87 54.64 2.72 6.62 4.74 0.32 2.43 4.82 
CO2 and My Freedomd 225.00 197.72 2.19 7.28 5.64 0.54 0.15 0.16 
CO2 and Anger 137.50 88.02 0.61 -0.52 5.40 0.38 -0.14 -0.23 
Energy Conserv. and Recycling 57.17 77.61 1.32 0.40 4.96 0.42 0.97 -0.52 
Energy Conservation and Me 80.83 65.17 0.71 -0.43 5.14 0.35 0.17 -0.95 
Energy Conservation and Good 15.33 42.24 3.47 13.05 4.71 0.26 2.84 8.09 
Energy Conservation and Badd 403.33 264.55 1.15 0.54 6.09 0.52 -0.31 1.24 
Energ. Conserv. and My Freedomd 202.50 211.76 2.35 6.72 5.54 0.57 0.55 0.52 
Energy Conservation and Anger 217.50 133.77 0.40 -0.40 5.66 0.47 -0.57 0.01 
Recycling and Me 71.17 69.51 1.01 0.43 5.07 0.38 0.37 -0.83 




Recycling and Badd 408.33 262.64 0.76 -0.04 6.09 0.58 -0.81 1.20 
Recycling and My Freedomd 203.73 188.31 2.73 10.55 5.58 0.51 0.41 0.97 
Recycling and Angerd 299.17 196.14 1.63 4.48 5.88 0.48 -0.27 1.03 
Me and Good 56.00 108.53 2.96 9.82 4.91 0.47 1.71 2.71 
Me and Badd 253.50 230.83 1.67 3.05 5.70 0.58 0.37 -0.37 
Me and My Freedom 49.72 65.88 2.02 6.21 4.93 0.37 0.82 0.21 
Me and Anger 216.50 135.48 0.33 -0.31 5.65 0.49 -0.65 -0.20 
Good and Badd 468.33 314.72 0.67 -0.79 6.19 0.58 -0.15 -0.94 
Good and My Freedom 25.86 46.92 2.32 5.96 4.79 0.29 1.66 2.17 
Good and Angerd 289.31 200.78 1.83 4.88 5.85 0.48 -0.10 1.11 
Bad and My Freedomd 297.90 189.22 1.77 5.83 5.89 0.47 -0.42 1.40 
Bad and Anger 64.66 106.76 2.99 10.12 4.98 0.44 1.62 2.92 
My Freedom and Angerd 269.03 226.86 1.96 4.45 5.76 0.55 0.07 0.78 
Note. Nmin = 29, Nmax = 30. 
aThe transformation used for all of these variables was: transformed variable = 
ln(trimmed original variable + 100).  
bThe standard error of skewness was 0.43. 
cThe standard error of kurtosis ranged from 0.83 to 0.85. 




Table 2. Means, Standard Deviations, Skewness, and Kurtosis for All Pilot Study 4 
























Irritated 93.88 220.16 3.73 13.94 2.25 2.45 0.38 -1.54 
Angry 41.38 158.73 5.94 36.55 1.27 2.00 1.22 0.12 
Annoyed 89.50 222.76 3.67 13.50 1.92 2.46 0.69 -1.25 
Aggravated 53.33 176.40 4.61 22.82 1.19 2.10 1.47 0.71 
Manipulate 122.20 234.51 2.92 8.81 2.75 2.45 0.08 -1.55 
Pressure 110.78 184.71 3.29 13.63 3.09 2.29 -0.27 -1.46 
Note.  N = 40. None of the variables in Pilot Study 4 were trimmed.  
aThe transformation used for all of these variables was: item transformed = ln(original 
item + 1).  
bThe standard error of skewness was 0.37. 




Table 3. Means, Standard Deviations, Skewness, and Kurtosis for All Main Experiment 
Variables Before and After Transformations 
 
  
 Trimmed Untransformeda 
 
Transformedb 
























Care 176.02 95.54 500.00 0.47 -0.76 5.56 0.36 -0.20 -0.43 
EPA & Ice 205.32 163.58 500.00 0.76 -0.76 4.82 0.61 0.23 -1.01 
EPA & Al Gore 65.94 60.16 400.00 1.05 0.09 4.65 0.53 0.18 -1.13 
EPA & Temperature 89.94 60.45 300.00 0.55 -0.70 4.65 0.51 0.19 -1.05 
EPA & CO2 97.68 62.71 400.00 0.36 -0.98 4.65 0.52 0.25 -1.00 
EPA & Energy Conservation 133.08 92.16 250.00 0.52 -0.85 4.42 0.44 0.36 -1.28 
EPA & Recycling 227.28 154.13 200.00 0.61 -0.84 4.35 0.41 0.49 -1.24 
EPA & Me 175.65 152.26 600.00 0.96 -0.20 5.20 0.56 -0.16 -0.38 
EPA & Good 214.02 153.50 300.00 0.72 -0.65 4.44 0.45 0.24 -1.39 
EPA & Bad 330.95 218.56 665.00 0.39 -1.03 5.69 0.66 -0.49 -0.23 
EPA & My Freedom 301.05 194.58 600.00 0.25 -1.25 5.34 0.71 -0.01 -0.67 
EPA & Anger 169.67 154.53 700.00 1.04 -0.08 5.63 0.69 -0.31 -0.46 
Ice & Al Gore 163.79 154.21 500.00 1.12 0.07 5.33 0.67 -0.07 -0.95 
Ice & Temperature 98.85 91.68 300.00 1.07 0.02 4.63 0.48 0.34 -0.88 
Ice & CO2 97.44 84.69 400.00 0.92 -0.32 4.84 0.45 -0.19 -0.75 
Ice & Energy Conservation 200.92 148.56 300.00 0.94 -0.30 4.90 0.46 -0.35 -0.70 




Ice & Me 220.52 154.25 500.00 0.73 -0.74 5.46 0.61 -0.38 -0.34 
Ice & Good 246.06 183.53 600.00 0.70 -0.70 5.19 0.69 -0.06 -0.83 
Ice & Bad 268.94 205.34 700.00 0.91 -0.31 5.40 0.63 -0.33 -0.37 
Ice & My Freedom 71.44 60.84 700.00 0.92 -0.11 5.73 0.71 -0.78 0.14 
Ice & Anger 62.21 47.17 600.00 0.50 -0.89 5.66 0.69 -0.75 -0.07 
Al Gore & Temperature 93.79 76.79 700.00 0.86 -0.43 5.15 0.70 0.11 -0.95 
Al Gore & CO2 152.40 118.33 700.00 0.92 -0.20 5.12 0.70 0.18 -0.93 
Al Gore & Energy Conserv. 129.41 91.42 500.00 0.66 -0.60 4.83 0.58 0.25 -0.89 
Al Gore & Recycling 150.51 115.77 500.00 0.93 -0.12 4.84 0.56 0.16 -0.94 
Al Gore & Me 261.00 195.71 500.00 0.57 -1.00 5.36 0.59 0.03 -0.58 
Al Gore & Good 233.02 172.41 500.00 0.68 -0.81 4.97 0.55 0.01 -0.72 
Al Gore & Bad 75.56 63.01 500.00 0.83 -0.38 5.43 0.60 -0.29 -0.25 
Al Gore & My Freedom 74.73 62.84 600.00 0.84 -0.40 5.48 0.68 -0.32 -0.55 
Al Gore & Anger 162.31 148.24 700.00 1.20 0.41 5.55 0.67 -0.17 -0.49 
Temperature & CO2 250.18 188.51 300.00 0.67 -0.86 4.68 0.48 0.17 -0.90 
Temp. & Energy Conservation 102.34 97.75 230.00 0.95 -0.31 4.63 0.43 -0.05 -1.11 
Temperature & Recycling 277.67 232.24 400.00 1.13 0.28 4.83 0.52 0.11 -0.89 
Temperature & Me 250.14 210.27 500.00 0.99 -0.17 5.14 0.60 -0.13 -0.54 
Temperature & Good 50.31 48.96 500.00 0.85 -0.48 5.05 0.54 -0.30 -0.50 
Temperature & Bad 112.76 89.87 500.00 0.92 -0.17 5.14 0.59 -0.15 -0.47 
Temperature & My Freedom 50.36 64.76 600.00 1.35 0.60 5.51 0.72 -0.41 -0.60 
Temperature & Anger 371.31 286.53 554.00 0.77 -0.64 5.44 0.67 -0.32 -0.53 
CO2 & Energy Conservation 224.81 180.87 300.00 0.91 -0.37 4.71 0.49 0.10 -0.95 
CO2 & Recycling 308.38 239.53 300.00 0.89 -0.34 4.70 0.49 0.15 -0.97 




CO2 & Good 41.87 62.92 600.00 1.66 1.48 5.49 0.69 -0.32 -0.57 
CO2 & Bad 365.95 229.78 500.00 0.21 -1.28 4.83 0.63 0.16 -1.06 
CO2 & My Freedom 246.54 210.55 800.00 1.02 -0.11 5.54 0.73 -0.19 -0.39 
CO2 & Anger 343.82 250.52 700.00 0.71 -0.75 5.46 0.73 -0.14 -0.60 
Energy Conserv. & Recycling 52.37 48.31 201.70 0.97 0.72 4.50 0.47 0.31 -1.14 
Energy Conservation & Me 262.03 239.08 500.00 1.25 0.37 4.94 0.55 -0.03 -0.66 
Energy Conservation & Good 35.93 40.07 300.00 0.67 -1.21 4.44 0.55 0.75 -0.75 
Energy Conservation & Bad 186.02 155.00 900.00 0.95 -0.26 5.78 0.77 -0.44 -0.31 
Energy Conserv. & My Freed. 460.14 370.95 600.00 0.43 -1.38 5.40 0.68 -0.14 -0.60 
Energy Conservation & Anger 51.95 63.06 800.00 1.26 0.52 5.65 0.72 -0.31 -0.34 
Recycling & Me 301.48 212.86 400.00 0.56 -1.01 4.82 0.46 -0.22 -0.66 
Recycling & Good 389.92 288.61 250.00 0.70 -0.80 4.35 0.54 1.09 -0.10 
Recycling & Bad 62.09 63.35 700.00 1.02 -0.02 5.83 0.71 -0.87 0.28 
Recycling & My Freedom 293.60 222.40 700.00 0.71 -0.77 5.44 0.73 -0.11 -0.67 
Recycling & Anger 99.13 94.24 800.00 1.02 -0.11 5.75 0.72 -0.46 -0.15 
Me & Good 69.85 64.75 200.00 0.86 -0.38 4.52 0.46 0.14 -1.02 
Me & Bad 69.50 63.19 807.00 0.89 -0.26 5.48 0.73 0.13 -0.57 
Me & My Freedom 70.24 64.86 300.00 0.93 -0.32 4.35 0.44 0.43 -1.46 
Me & Anger 41.46 41.77 500.00 0.73 -0.90 5.25 0.67 -0.08 -0.71 
Good & Bad 34.44 37.16 1000.00 0.80 -0.86 5.89 0.91 -0.42 -0.87 
Good & My Freedom 160.28 116.47 300.00 0.89 -0.25 4.46 0.54 0.62 -0.90 
Good & Anger 44.32 43.56 671.00 0.62 -1.03 5.65 0.69 -0.44 -0.35 
Bad & My Freedom 309.23 208.59 900.00 0.50 -1.07 5.84 0.75 -0.51 -0.13 
Bad & Anger 214.15 185.85 300.00 1.02 -0.22 4.57 0.53 0.34 -1.08 




Irritated 40.87 41.32 200.00 0.42 -1.49 3.17 1.30 -0.15 -1.71 
Angry 14.28 23.98 100.00 1.45 0.55 2.32 1.05 0.98 -0.80 
Annoyed 37.20 40.65 200.00 0.61 -1.29 3.07 1.28 -0.01 -1.70 
Aggravated 25.09 36.27 150.00 1.21 -0.11 2.65 1.22 0.58 -1.37 
Threat 1 87.79 82.03 500.00 0.69 -0.68 5.60 2.31 0.00 -1.25 
Threat 2 35.73 50.47 200.00 1.24 0.15 4.01 1.85 0.81 -0.88 
Threat 3 79.04 82.40 400.00 0.90 -0.38 5.33 2.33 0.23 -1.22 
Threat 4 96.67 96.14 500.00 0.89 -0.30 5.74 2.48 0.13 -1.16 
Relevant Negative Thoughts 1.30 1.73 n/a 1.26 -0.76 0.96 0.51 0.69 -0.99 
Irritated at Message Sourcee  28.21 38.74 150.00 0.99 -0.76 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Note. Nmin = 437, Nmax = 439.
 
a Because some of untransformed values were quite large, means, standard deviations, 
skewness, and kurtosis for the untransformed data were performed on the variables that 
were trimmed to a lower value (see text).  
b For specific transformations see text. 
c The standard error of skewness ranged from 0.12 to 0.13. 
d The standard error of kurtosis ranged from 0.23 to 0.26. 
e The N for this variable was 354, because the questions regarding whether the 
participants were irritated at the message source was only included in the experimental, 




Table 4. Determining the Number of Dimensions 
 
Space Number/Condition  
Σ of All 
Positive 
Eigenvalues 






1. Low Threat without Restoration at the Immediate Time 192579.74 5 38515.95 101245.70 55577.13 
2. Low Threat without Restoration at a One-Minute Delay 253636.17 5 50727.23 121208.50 86292.30 
3. Low Threat without Restoration at a Two-Minute Delay 125408.38 6 20901.40 63641.82 33407.09 
4. Low Threat with Restoration at the Immediate Time  165662.08 6 27610.35 79096.98 49661.88 
5. Low Threat with Restoration at a One-Minute Delay 216281.82 5 43256.36 122811.10 54756.39 
6. Low Threat with Restoration at a Two-Minute Delay 245603.85 6 40933.98 148788.70 61332.10 
7. High Threat without Restoration at the Immediate Time 192741.92 6 32123.65 108514.50 50123.65 
8. High Threat without Restoration at a One-Minute Delay 235480.83 6 39246.81 116495.00 77378.10 
9. High Threat without Restoration at a Two-Minute Delay 188426.78 6 31404.46 96800.38 56299.10 
10. High Threat with Restoration at the Immediate Time 184292.95 5 36858.59 83635.64 64769.43 
11. High Threat with Restoration at a One-Minute Delay 182847.00 5 36569.40 103574.30 37571.09 
12. High Threat with Restoration at a Two Minute Delay 184836.61 6 30806.10 86826.94 61309.27 




14. Control at a One-Minute Delay 175939.70 7 25134.24 120645.70 29335.35 
15. Control at a Two-Minute Delay 309513.70 5 61902.74 151298.00 105345.00 
a k is a number of dimensions with positive eigenvalues.  




















the Σ of All 
Eigenvalues 




the Σ of All 
Eigenvalues 
1. Low Threat without Restoration at the Immediate Time 101245.70 55577.13 135646.70 0.75 0.41 
2. Low Threat without Restoration at a One-Minute Delay 121208.50 86292.30 182873.10 0.66 0.47 
3. Low Threat without Restoration at a Two-Minute Delay 63641.82 33407.09 87933.30 0.72 0.38 
4. Low Threat with Restoration at the Immediate Time  79096.98 49661.88 111888.90 0.71 0.44 
5. Low Threat with Restoration at a One-Minute Delay 122811.10 54756.39 154053.50 0.80 0.36 
6. Low Threat with Restoration at a Two-Minute Delay 148788.70 61332.10 161095.80 0.92 0.38 
7. High Threat without Restoration at the Immediate Time 108514.50 50123.65 126020.00 0.86 0.40 
8. High Threat without Restoration at a One-Minute Delay 116495.00 77378.10 166774.00 0.70 0.46 




10. High Threat with Restoration at the Immediate Time 83635.64 64769.43 122509.60 0.68 0.53 
11. High Threat with Restoration at a One-Minute Delay 103574.30 37571.09 117397.50 0.88 0.32 
12. High Threat with Restoration at a Two-Minute Delay 86826.94 61309.27 130512.50 0.67 0.47 
13. Control at the Immediate Time 112388.60 65744.88 151870.90 0.74 0.43 
14. Control at a One-Minute Delay 120645.70 29335.35 120517.30 1.00 0.24 





Table 6. Overall Variance-Adjusted ANOVAs and Correlations for H1-H4 
 
Dependent Variablea df 
Mean 






Recycling and Me D1  2, 84 2.35 20.60 < .01 0.33 0.31 .55** 
Recycling and Me D2 2, 84 0.25 7.91 < .01 0.16 0.14 -.38** 
Recycling and Good D1 2, 84 1.97 10.60 < .01 0.20 0.18 .36** 
Recycling and Good D2 2, 84 0.34 6.47 < .01 0.13 0.11 -.35** 
Recycling and Bad D1 2, 84 6.64 30.01 < .01 0.42 0.40 .53** 
Recycling and Bad D2 2, 84 0.32 5.00 < .01 0.11 0.09 -.26** 
Recycling and Anger D1 2, 84 3.32 12.60 < .01 0.23 0.21 .39** 
Recycling and Anger D2 2, 84 0.53 7.29 < .01 0.15 0.13 -.38** 
Note. The bivariate correlations reported in this table are between the independent variable (i.e., amount of threat to freedom) 
and the dependent variable listed in the first column of this table.  
a D stands for dimension.  




Table 7. Variance-Adjusted t Tests for Significance Calculations in H4 
Dependent Variable a Means being compared: control condition vs. low threat conditions t df pb 
Recycling and Me D1 3.56 (SD = 0.30; n = 28) vs. 3.70 (SD = 0.32; n = 31) 1.73 57 .09 
Recycling and Me D2 2.08 (SD = 0.17; n = 28) vs. 2.03 (SD = 0.17; n = 31) 1.13 57 .26 
Recycling and Good D1 3.31 (SD = 0.42; n = 28) vs. 3.25 (SD = 0.41; n = 31) 0.55 57 .58 
Recycling and Good D2 1.94 (SD = 0.24; n = 28) vs. 1.78 (SD = 0.23; n = 31) 2.61 57 .01 
Recycling and Bad D1 4.40 (SD = 0.41; n = 28) vs. 4.34 (SD = 0.55; n = 31) 0.47 57 .64 
Recycling and Bad D2 2.58 (SD = 0.24; n = 28) vs. 2.38 (SD = 0.30; n = 31) 2.81 57 .01 
Recycling and Anger D1 4.29 (SD = 0.46; n = 28) vs. 4.24 (SD = 0.51; n = 31) 0.39 57 .70 
Recycling and Anger D2 2.51 (SD = 0.27; n = 28) vs. 2.33 (SD = 0.28; n = 31) 2.51 57 .02 
a D stands for dimension.  
b Because the comparisons for H1 through H4 are nonorthogonal, a Bonferroni correction was used that adjusts the significance 
level for the number of comparisons to be made. There were three planned comparisons in H1-H4, thus the significance level 















Recycling -76.22 -90.41 -129.83 -137.39 -132.89 -136.95 -93.21 -120.22 
Me -38.06 -33.61 -80.02 -64.58 -88.82 -77.06 -126.60 -92.36 
Good -191.11 -168.03 -196.14 -189.23 -191.93 -171.59 -208.82 -200.07 
Bad 321.62 325.25 322.18 330.74 317.78 313.43 308.24 295.37 
Anger 270.39 265.57 265.94 263.12 280.98 265.68 254.86 257.94 
aNotation all indicates that the data from all participants in a particular condition was used. 
bNotation jk  indicates that the data from two-thirds of the participants in a particular condition was used. A number next to jk 

















Recycling -83.74 -71.32 -102.99 -97.46 -91.29 -95.17 -104.03 -112.20 
Me 201.48 209.85 198.60 211.85 209.18 195.84 175.12 186.00 
Good 88.42 104.31 82.90 94.39 82.77 90.92 26.63 80.62 
Bad 21.45 20.14 34.69 20.53 50.45 47.83 80.01 90.25 
Anger 112.04 121.11 135.76 135.14 115.27 133.29 148.45 177.04 
aNotation all indicates that the data from all participants in a particular condition was used. 
bNotation jk  indicates that the data from two-thirds of the participants in a particular condition was used. A number next to jk 





Table 10. Calculations for Jackknife Procedures to Test Significance of H1-H4: Calculating Significances for the Concepts of 
Interest on Dimension One 









*SEe Range   all jk1 jk2 jk3 jk1 jk2 jk3 
Recycle -14.19 -7.55 -4.06 -27.01 -27.45 -34.44 11.47 -16.81 1.73 24.73 14.28 4.30 61.40 44.60-78.21 
Me 4.45 15.44 11.77 34.24 -17.51 -10.17 -55.13 -27.60 1.73 24.12 13.92 4.30 59.87 32.27-87.48 
Good 23.07 6.91 20.34 8.75 55.4 28.54 51.72 45.22 1.73 14.56 8.41 4.30 36.15 81.37-9.07 
Bad 3.62 8.56 -4.35 -12.87 -6.25 19.58 36.61 6.65 1.73 21.58 12.46 4.30 53.58 70.23-(-36.94) 
Anger -4.83 -2.82 -15.29 3.09 -8.85 16.11 -20.65 -4.46 1.73 18.77 10.84 4.30 46.60 42.13-(-51.06) 
a In this step differences in locations for a concept of interest between th  two conditions in dimension one were calculated. These 
procedures were repeated for the three jackknifed subsamples and the full data set. The results of these calculations were used as a proxy 
for standard deviations.  
b Following Mosteller and Tukey’s (1977) procedure, the following formula can be used to calculate a pseudo-mean for each concept of 
interest on the first dimension: [N (y all)] – [(N -1) (y jk)], where N is the number of all jackknifed subsamples, y all is the location difference 
for the concept of interest on dimension one between the two conditions using the transformed data derived from all the participants, and y 




derived from each jackknifed subsample. To obtain the mean for the concept f interest, the outcome of this formula for each jackknifed 
subsample has to be averaged.  
cN is a number of jackknifed subsamples (N = 3).  
d To obtain a pseudo standard error, the following formula was used: SD/√N.  





Table 11. Calculations for Jackknife Procedures to Test Significance of H1-H4: Calculating Significances for the Concepts of 
Interest on Dimension Two 









*SEe Range  
 all jk1 jk2 jk3 jk1 jk2 jk3   
Recycling 12.42 5.53 -3.88 -8.17 26.19 45.01 53.59 41.60 1.73 14.01 8.09 4.30 34.79 76.39-6.80 
Me 8.37 13.25 -13.34 10.87 -1.39 51.79 3.36 17.92 1.73 29.42 16.99 4.30 73.05 90.97-(-55.13) 
Good 15.89 11.49 8.14 53.98 24.68 31.37 -60.30 -1.42 1.73 51.10 29.51 4.30 126.87 125.45-(-128.29) 
Bad -1.31 -14.16 -2.63 10.25 24.38 1.32 -24.42 0.42 1.73 24.41 14.09 4.30 60.61 61.03-(-60.18) 
Anger 9.07 -0.62 18.02 28.59 28.45 -8.83 -29.97 -3.45 1.73 29.58 17.08 4.30 73.43 69.99-(-76.88) 
a In this step differences in locations for a concept of interest between th  two conditions on dimension two were calculated. These 
procedures were repeated for the three jackknifed subsamples and the full data set. The results of these calculations were used as a proxy 
for standard deviations.  
b Following Mosteller and Tukey’s (1977) procedure, the following formula can be used to calculate a pseudo-mean for each concept of 
interest on the second dimension: [N (y all)] – [(N -1) (y jk)], where N is the number of all jackknifed subsamples, y all is the location 




participants, and y jk is the location difference on dimension two between the two conditions of iterest for the concept of interest using 
the coordinates derived from each jackknifed subsample. To obtain the mean for the c ncept of interest, the outcome of this formula for 
each jackknifed subsample has to be averaged.  
cN is a number of jackknifed subsamples (N = 3).  
d To obtain a pseudo standard error, the following formula was used: SD/√N.  




Table 12. Variance-Adjusted t Tests for Significance Calculations in H2 
Dependent Variable a Means being compared: low threat condition vs. high threat condition t df pb 
Recycling and Me D1 3.70 (SD = 0.32; n = 31) vs. 4.12 (SD = 0.40; n = 28) 4.47 57 < .01 
Recycling and Me D2 2.03 (SD = 0.17; n = 31) vs. 1.90 (SD = 0.18; n = 28) 2.85 57 < .01 
Recycling and Good D1 3.25 (SD = 0.41; n = 31) vs. 3.73 (SD = 0.46; n = 28) 4.24 57 < .01 
Recycling and Good D2 1.78 (SD = 0.23; n = 31) vs. 1.72 (SD = 0.21; n = 28) 1.04 57 = .30 
Recycling and Bad D1 4.34 (SD = 0.55; n = 31) vs. 5.21 (SD = 0.42; n = 28) 6.77 57 < .01 
Recycling and Bad D2 2.38 (SD = 0.30; n = 31) vs. 2.40 (SD = 0.20; n = 28) 0.30 57 = .77 
Recycling and Anger D1 4.24 (SD = 0.51; n = 31) vs. 4.85 (SD = 0.57; n = 28) 4.34 57 < .01 
Recycling and Anger D2 2.33 (SD = 0.28; n = 31) vs. 2.24 (SD = 0.26; n = 28) 1.28 57 = .21 
a D stands for dimension.  
b Because the comparisons for H1 through H4 are nonorthogonal, a Bonferroni correction was used that adjusts the significance 
level for the number of comparisons to be made. There were three planned comparisons in H1-H4, thus the significance level 




Table 13. Variance-Adjusted t Tests for Significance Calculations in H3 
Dependent Variable a Means being compared: control condition vs. high threat condition t df pb 
Recycling and Me D1 3.56 (SD = 0.30; n = 28) vs. 4.12 (SD = 0.40; n = 28) 5.93 54 < .01 
Recycling and Me D2 2.08 (SD = 0.17; n = 28) vs. 1.90 (SD = 0.18; n = 28) 3.85 54 < .01 
Recycling and Good D1 3.31 (SD = 0.42; n = 28) vs. 3.73 (SD = 0.46; n = 28) 3.57 54 < .01 
Recycling and Good D2 1.94 (SD = 0.24; n = 28) vs. 1.72 (SD = 0.21; n = 28) 3.65 54 < .01 
Recycling and Bad D1 4.40 (SD = 0.41; n = 28) vs. 5.21 (SD = 0.42; n = 28) 7.30 54 < .01 
Recycling and Bad D2 2.58 (SD = 0.24; n = 28) vs. 2.40 (SD = 0.20; n = 28) 3.05 54 < .01 
Recycling and Anger D1 4.29 (SD = 0.46; n = 28) vs. 4.85 (SD = 0.57; n = 28) 4.05 54 < .01 
Recycling and Anger D2 2.51 (SD = 0.27; n = 28) vs. 2.24 (SD = 0.26; n = 28)    3.81 54 < .01 
a D stands for dimension.  
b Because the comparisons for H1 through H4 are nonorthogonal, a Bonferroni correction was used that adjusts the significance 
level for the number of comparisons to be made. There were three planned comparisons in H1-H4, thus the significance level 




Table 14. Overall Variance-Adjusted ANOVAs and Correlations for Significance Calculations in H5 
Dependent Variable a df 
Mean 






Recycling and Me D1 3, 111 3.77 29.67 < .01 .45 .43 .42** 
Recycling and Me D2 3, 111 2.31 47.61 < .01 .56 .55 - .05 
Recycling and Good D1 3, 111 3.00 17.33 < .01 .32 .30 .38** 
Recycling and Good D2 3, 111 2.09 33.35 < .01 .47 .46 -.02 
Note. The bivariate correlations reported in this table are between the independent variable (i.e., conditions coded linearly) and 
the dependent variable listed in the first column of this table.  
a D stands for dimension.  




Table 15. Overall Variance-Adjusted ANOVAs and Correlations for Significance Calculations in RQ1 
Dependent Variable a df 
Mean 




Eta Squared r 
Energy Conservation and Me D1 2, 84 2.29 13.05 < .01 .24 .22 .43** 
Energy Conservation and Me D2 2, 84 0.34 7.06 < .01 .14 .12 -.38** 
Energy Conservation and Good D1 2, 84 2.11 11.18 < .01 .21 .19 .38** 
Energy Conservation and Good D2 2, 84 0.30 5.61 < .01 .12 .10 -.33** 
Note. The bivariate correlations reported in this table are between the i dependent variable (i.e., amount of threat to freedom) 
and the dependent variable listed in the first column of this table. 
a D stands for dimension.  









Dependent Variablea Means being compared: t df pb 
Control vs. high threat Energy Conservation 
and Me D1 
M = 3.67 (SD = 0.42; n = 28) vs. M = 4.17 (SD = 0.47; n = 28) 4.20 54 < .01 
 Energy Conservation 
and Me D2 
M = 2.15 (SD = 0.24; n = 28) vs. M = 1.93 (SD = 0.22; n = 28) 3.58 54 < .01 
 Energy Conservation 
and Good D1 
M = 3.33 (SD = 0.46; n = 28) vs. M = 3.78 (SD = 0.45; n = 028) 3.70 54 < .01 
 Energy Conservation 
and Good D2 
M = 1.95 (SD = 0.27; n = 28) vs. M = 1.75 (SD = 0.21; n = 28) 3.09 54 < .01 
High vs. low threat  Energy Conservation 
and Me D1 
M = 4.17 (SD = 0.47; n = 28) vs. M = 3.69 (SD = 0.36; n = 31) 4.43 57 < .01 
 Energy Conservation 
and Me D2 
M = 1.93 (SD = 0.22; n = 28) vs. M = 2.02 (SD = 0.20; n = 31) 1.65 57 = .11 




and Good D1 
 Energy Conservation 
and Good D2 
M = 1.75 (SD = 0.21; n = 28) vs. M = 1.81 (SD = 0.22; n = 31) 1.07 57 = .29 
Control vs. low threat  Energy Conservation 
and Me D1 
M = 3.67 (SD = 0.42; n = 28) vs. M = 3.69 (SD = 0.36; n = 31) .20 57 = .85 
 Energy Conservation 
and Me D2 
M = 2.15 (SD = 0.24; n = 28) vs. M = 2.02 (SD = 0.20; n = 31) 2.27 57 = .03 
 Energy Conservation 
and Good D1 
M = 3.33 (SD = 0.46; n = 28) vs. M = 3.29 (SD = 0.40; n = 31) .35 57 = .72 
 Energy Conservation 
and Good D2 
M = 1.95 (SD = 0.27; n = 28) vs. M = 1.81 (SD = 0.22; n = 31) 2.19 57 = .03 
a D stands for dimension.  
b Because the comparisons are nonorthogonal, a Bonferroni correction was used that adjusts the significance level for the 
number of comparisons to be made. There were three planned comparisons, thus the significance level for these analyses was 




Table 17. Overall Variance-Adjusted ANOVAs and Correlations for Significance Calculations in RQ2 
Dependent Variable a df 
Mean 






Energy Conservation and Me D1 3, 111 3.72 22.73 < .01 .38 .36 .38** 
Energy Conservation and Me D2 3, 111 2.39 40.22 < .01 .52 .51 -.06 
Energy Conservation and Good D1 3, 111 2.89 16.23 < .01 .31 .29 .37** 
Energy Conservation and Good D2 3, 111 2.27 34.23 < .01 .48 .47 -.03 
Note. The bivariate correlations reported in this table are between the independent variable (i.e., conditions coded linearly) and 
the dependent variable listed in the first column of this table. 
a D stands for dimension.  




 Table 18. Overall Variance-Adjusted ANOVAs and Correlations for Significance Calculations in H6
Dependent Variable a df 
Mean 







Recycling and Me D1 2, 85 4.37 37.15 < .01 .47 .45 -.50** 
Recycling and Me D2 2, 85 0.83 22.62 < .01 .35 .33 .27* 
Recycling and Good D1 2, 85 4.26 30.38 < .01 .42 .40 -.49** 
Recycling and Good D2 2, 85 0.56 13.13 < .01 .24 .22 .17 
Note. The bivariate correlations reported in this table are between the independent variable (i.e., time) and the 
dependent variable listed in the first column of this table. 
a D stands for dimension.  





Table 19. Overall Variance-Adjusted ANOVAs and Correlations for Significance Calculations in RQ3 (High Threat with 
Restoration Condition) 
Dependent Variable a df 
Mean 






Recycling and Me D1 2, 84 8.71 66.74 < .01 .61 .61 -.08 
Recycling and Me D2 2, 84 8.20 162.07 < .01 .79 .79 -.23* 
Recycling and Good D1 2, 84 8.70 52.15 < .01 .55 .54 -.09 
Recycling and Good D2 2, 84 6.29 105.42 < .01 .72 .71 -.24* 
Note. The bivariate correlations reported in this table are between the independent variable (i.e., time) and the dependent 
variable listed in the first column of this table. 
a D stands for dimension.  




Table 20. Overall Variance-Adjusted ANOVAs and Correlations for Significance Calculations in RQ3 (Low Threat with 
Restoration Condition) 
Dependent Variable a df 
Mean 






Recycling and Me D1 2, 85 9.48 68.58 < .01 .62 .61 .77** 
Recycling and Me D2 2, 85 1.47 46.15 < .01 .52 .51 -.42** 
Recycling and Good D1 2, 85 6.26 32.54 < .01 .43 .42 .66** 
Recycling and Good D2 2, 85 1.12 25.11 < .01 .37 .36 -.43** 
Note. The bivariate correlations reported in this table are between the independent variable (i.e., time) and the dependent 
variable listed in the first column of this table. 
a D stands for dimension.  






Appendix A: The Questionnaire for Pilot Study 1 
Department of Communication, University of Maryland 
 
Researchers at the University of Maryland are studying what issues yo ng people on campus 
perceive to be exposed to. The word “EXPOSED” in this context means that you hear about 
them from parents, media, your friends, or other sources. We would like you to answer the 
question that follow to help us to learn about those issues. There are no right or wrong answers; 
we are interested in your views.  
 







Part 2: Please fill out the questions below. 
 
1.  My age is ___________ years. 
 
2.  I am  MALE  FEMALE (circle one) 
 
3. Please indicate your ethnicity: 
 
___________ AFRICAN AMERICAN, AFRICAN, BLACK 
___________ HISPANIC, LATINO, MEXICAN AMERICAN, CUBAN AMERICAN, PUERTO 
RICAN 
___________ ASIAN/CHINESE/JAPANESE AMERICAN, PACIFIC SLANDER, CHINESE, 
JAPANESE 
___________ AMERICAN INDIAN, NATIVE AMERICAN 
___________ CENTRAL ASIAN, INDIAN, PAKISTANI 
___________ ARAB, ARAB AMERICAN 
___________ JEWISH 
___________ WHITE, EUROPEAN AMERICAN NON-JEWISH 






4. Please indicate what year you are in college (CIRCLE ONE): 
 








Appendix B: The Questionnaire for Pilot Study 2  
Department of Communication 
 
 University of Maryland 
 
 
Part 1: WORD ASSOCIATION EXERCISE: 
 
Instructions: Think about the phrase “GLOBAL WARMING.” Write down whatever 
associations come to mind when you hear this phrase. Please use a WORD or a SHORT 




























Part 2: Please fill out the questions below. 
 
1.  My age is ___________ years. 
 
2.  I am  MALE  FEMALE (circle one) 
 
3. Please indicate your ethnicity: 
 
___________ AFRICAN AMERICAN, AFRICAN, BLACK 
___________ HISPANIC, LATINO, MEXICAN AMERICAN, CUBAN AMERICAN, PUERTO 
RICAN 
___________ ASIAN/CHINESE/JAPANESE AMERICAN, PACIFIC SLANDER, CHINESE, 
JAPANESE 
___________ AMERICAN INDIAN, NATIVE AMERICAN 
___________ CENTRAL ASIAN, INDIAN, PAKISTANI 
___________ ARAB, ARAB AMERICAN 
___________ JEWISH 
___________ WHITE, EUROPEAN AMERICAN NON-JEWISH 
___________ OTHER: ________________________________ ___ (PLEASE SPECIFY) 
 
 
4. Please indicate what year you are in college (CIRCLE ONE): 
 
FRESHMAN SOPHOMORE    JUNIOR    SENIOR MASTERS    DOCTORAL    
OTHER_______ 
 







Appendix C: The Questionnaire for Pilot Study 3 
Instructions type 1: Measuring distances using SOCIAL INCHES.  
 
We’d like you to estimate differences between pairs of concepts. Differences can be 
measured in social inches. To help you to know how big a social inch is, think of the 
moderate distance between two concepts as 100 social inches. 
 
Considering the pairs of concepts below, please remember the following. The more 
different you think the concepts are from each other, the larger the number of social 
inches between them. If you think that these concepts are more different than the 
difference between two moderately different concepts, then write a number greater than 
100. If you think that they are less different than moderately different concepts, use a 
number smaller than 100. If you think there is no difference between them, write zero (0). 
You can use any number from zero on up, such as 18, 193, or 347. Thus,  
 
 
These two concepts are identical = 0 
These two concepts are moderately different = 100 
Use any number from zero on up 
 
 




Example: Please indicate the difference (distance in social inches) between the following pairs 
of concepts: 
                                                                                                                                                                         write your number here 
A local bar and the campus student union   social inches different  
                                                                                                                                                                   write your number here 






Instructions type 2: OPINIONS 
 
We would like to know how knowledgeable you are about world history. To answer this 
question use a number from 0 (zero) to infinity. Zero means you are not knowledgeable at 
all, and higher numbers represent greater levels of knowledge. If you are moderately 
knowledgeable, rate your knowledge as 100. If your knowledge is twiceas much as 
moderate knowledge level, rate your knowledge as 200; if your knowledge is half of
moderate knowledge level, rate your knowledge as 50. You can use any number from 
zero on up, such as 18, 193, or 347. Thus,  
 
 
I have no knowledge on this issue at all = 0 
I have moderate knowledge on this issue = 100 
Use any number from zero on up 
 
 
Questions Instructions write your number here:  
1. How knowledgeable 
are you about world 
history? 
I have no knowledge about world history = 0 
I have moderate knowledge about world history = 100 
Use any number from zero on up 
 
 
2. How much do you care 
about world history? 
I do not care about world history at all = 0 
I moderately care about world history = 100 







Department of Communication 
 
 University of Maryland 
 
 Part 1: In the section below you will be asked to estimate differences of pairs of concepts. 
Please answer the questions below, following the instructions provided.  
 
Instructions: We’d like you to estimate differences between pairs of concepts. 
Differences can be measured in social inches. To help you to know how big a 
social inch is, think of the moderate distance between two concepts as 100 social 
inches. 
 
Considering the pairs of concepts below, please remember the following. The 
more different you think the concepts are from each other, the larger the number 
of social inches between them. If you think that these concepts are more differnt 
than the difference between two moderately different concepts, then write a 
number greater than 100. If you think that they are less different than moderately 
different concepts, use a number smaller than 100. If you think there is no 
difference between them, write zero (0). You can use any number from zero on 
up, such as 18, 193, or 347. 
 
               write your number here 
Melting ice and Al Gore are   social inches different  
 
Melting ice and rising temperature  social inches different  
 
Melting ice and pollution (carbon dioxide: CO2) 
  social inches different  
 
Melting ice and conservation of energy   social inches different  
 
Melting ice and recycling  social inches different  
 
Melting ice and me  social inches different  
 





Melting ice and bad  social inches different  
 
Melting ice and my freedom  social inches different  
 
Melting ice and anger  social inches different  
 
Al Gore and rising temperature  social inches different  
 
Al Gore and pollution (carbon dioxide: CO2)  social inches different  
 
Al Gore and conservation of energy   social inches different  
 
Al Gore and recycling  social inches different  
  
Al Gore and Me   social inches different  
 
Al Gore and Good  social inches different  
 
Al Gore and bad  social inches different  
  
Al Gore and my freedom  social inches different  
 
Al Gore and anger  social inches different  
 
Rising temperature and pollution   social inches different  
  
Rising temperature and conservation of energy  social inches different  
 





Rising temperature and me  social inches different  
  
Rising temperature and good  social inches different  
 
Rising temperature and bad  social inches different  
 
Rising temperature and my freedom  social inches different  
  
Rising temperature and anger  social inches different  
 
Pollution (CO2) and conservation of energy   social inches different  
 
Pollution (carbon dioxide: CO2) and recycling  social inches different  
  
Pollution (carbon dioxide: CO2) and me  social inches different  
 
Pollution (carbon dioxide: CO2) and good  social inches different  
 
Pollution (carbon dioxide: CO2) and bad  social inches different  
  
Pollution (carbon dioxide: CO2) and my freedom  social inches different  
 
Pollution (carbon dioxide: CO2) and anger  social inches different  
 
Conservation of energy and recycling  social inches different  
  
Conservation of energy and me  social inches different  
 






Conservation of energy and bad  social inches different  
  
Conservation of energy and my freedom  social inches different  
 
Conservation of energy and anger  social inches different  
 
Recycling and me  social inches different  
  
Recycling and good  social inches different  
 
Recycling and bad  social inches different  
 
Recycling and my freedom  social inches different  
  
Recycling and anger  social inches different  
 
Me and good  social inches different  
 
Me and bad  social inches different  
  
Me and my freedom  social inches different  
 
Me and anger  social inches different  
 
Good and bad  social inches different  
 
 Good and my freedom  social inches different  
 





Bad and my freedom  social inches different  
  
Bad and anger  social inches different  
 
My freedom and anger  social inches different  
 
Part 2: Please answer the question below. We would like to know how much you believe in 
global warming. To answer this question use a number from 0 (zero) to infinity. Zero means you 
do not believe in global warming at all, and higher numbers represent greater levels of belief in 
global warming. If you moderately believe in global warming, rate your belief as 100. If you 
believe in global warming twice as much as moderate level of belief, rate your belief as 200; if 
your belief in global warming is half of moderate belief level, rate your belief as 50. You can use 
any number from zero on up, such as 18, 193, or 347. Thus,  
If you do not believe this source at all = 0 
If you believe this source moderately = 100 




Questions Instructions write your number here:  
1. How much do you 
believe in global 
warming? 
I don’t believe in global warming at all = 0 
I moderately believe in global warming = 100 




Part 3: Please fill out the questions below. 
 
1.  My age is ___________ years. 
 
2.  I am  MALE  FEMALE (circle one) 
 
3. Please indicate your ethnicity: 
 
___________ AFRICAN AMERICAN, AFRICAN, BLACK 
___________ HISPANIC, LATINO, MEXICAN AMERICAN, CUBAN AMERICAN, PUERTO 
RICAN 
___________ ASIAN/CHINESE/JAPANESE AMERICAN, PACIFIC SLANDER, CHINESE, 
JAPANESE 
___________ AMERICAN INDIAN, NATIVE AMERICAN 
___________ CENTRAL ASIAN, INDIAN, PAKISTANI 





___________ WHITE, EUROPEAN AMERICAN NON-JEWISH 
___________ OTHER: ________________________________ ___ (PLEASE SPECIFY) 
 
 
4. Please indicate what year you are in college (CIRCLE ONE): 
 
FRESHMAN SOPHOMORE    JUNIOR    SENIOR MASTERS    DOCTORAL    
OTHER_______ 
 








Appendix D. Determining Dimensions: Scree Plot for Eigenvalues for All Conditis 





















Note. The eigenvalues were obtained after rotating the maps in a time-series fashion 
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Figure D-7. Scree Plot of Eigenvalues for Space 7 (High Threat without Restoration at 





















Note. The eigenvalues were obtained after rotating the maps in a time-series fashion 
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Figure D-11. Scree Plot of Eigenvalues for Space 11 (High Threat with Restoration at a 





















Note. The eigenvalues were obtained after rotating the maps in a time-series fashion 





Figure D-12. Scree Plot of Eigenvalues for Space 12 (High Threat with Restoration at a 
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